48 Bendik Solum Whist ones), Laar began to gain ground at the expense of the Prime Minister, who, according to Kasekamp (interview) was being pounded, not only by the opposition, but more importantly by the main competitor for his own electorate within the government … He claimed to never have supported it [granting the permit] at all, but that is not true, of course. So when the cabinet met, the second last week of September, they had a unanimous decision [to reject the application] … It was clear that Ansip had reversed himself because he realised that he had nothing to gain and everything to lose. As mentioned earlier, the official explanation given for the rejection was that the application had legal contradictions and could therefore not be evaluated in its current state. Mati Murd (interview) in the Estonian MFA states that ‘it was even amazing that this kind of company, a subsidiary of the biggest energy companies, used a lawyer who was not in a position to make a legally correct application.’ Nonetheless, Moscow’s interpretation of the decision was crystal clear. In the words of the Russian Energy Minister, Viktor Khristenko: ‘To use such tools, as the Estonian government did, it’s in my view pure politicisation, and done in a rude way’ (Financial Times 2007). The Kremlin’s problem, of course, was that it could not be proven that there were other motivations behind the rejection. Estonian defence analyst Riina Kaljurand (interview), however, believes that ‘for most Estonians it may have been logical that we should say no [and] this legal argument was something that they used to support that.’ Similarly, Kasekamp (interview) holds that ‘it was agreed to say no, and then we had to find the legal justification for it because there wasn’t anything else to cling to.’ First, this highlights how problematic it can be to take government statements at face value. <strong>Not</strong> wholly unlike the energy interruptions discussed in chapter 4.2, this is another example that it is difficult to prove official explanations right or wrong. Whether a statement comes from an energy company or the government, it will inevitably be contingent on interpretation, and the only certain thing is the action itself (i.e. that supplies were interrupted, or in this case, that Estonia rejected an application). Regardless of official declarations from Sweden, Estonia, or even Finland, there is always a chance that there is ‘more to it’ than what is announced officially (a point also made in the discussion about Finlandisation). Second, politicians in opposition, or even within the government, may certainly have a reason to heat up an issue if it will help them in a subsequent election. This is not to say that those who have voiced environmental, or other, concerns about <strong>Nord</strong> <strong>Stream</strong> have been purely cynical, but doing so may have coincided perfectly with their domestic political interests. As this chapter shows, environmental concern regarding <strong>Nord</strong> <strong>Stream</strong> may certainly be justified, as the Baltic Sea arguably contains enough waste and pollutants to cause significant harm if disturbed or not managed properly. However, it seems clear that other factors cannot be excluded from the equation, be it politicisation due to domestic political tensions, or more historical aspects. Finally, an interesting feature about the environmental argument is that it may carry with it a discernible
<strong>Nord</strong> <strong>Stream</strong>: <strong>Not</strong> <strong>Just</strong> a <strong>Pipeline</strong> 49 altruism. Since environmental problems in the Baltic would definitely have transboundary effects, those who focus on such issues can hardly be attacked, as they are speaking for the whole region and not only their narrow national interests.
Change language