Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

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28 Bendik Solum Whist average – at a mere 33.5% – and primary energy supply is dominated by solid fuels, particularly oil shale, with which Estonia is abundant. The share of gas in the energy mix (15%) is also low compared to the other Baltic States, which makes the Estonians less susceptible to energy pressure than their southern neighbours. Unfortunately for Estonia, this state-of-affairs cannot last, due to the high CO2 emission levels of oil shale, and natural gas has been presented as a feasible alternative. The use of gas has been steadily increasing in the past 20 years, and it is projected its importance will soon exceed that of oil (20%) in Estonia’s energy mix (Kasekamp et al. 2006: 7). Finally, it is worth mentioning that Poland, a state that has also voiced criticism for being bypassed by Nord Stream, is among the least dependent EU states in terms of energy, due to its vast hard coal resources. Import dependency is only 19.9%, and natural gas accounts for only 12% of the energy mix, making Poland less vulnerable than the Baltic States. Table 3: Import Dependence of the Baltic States, Finland & Poland (2003 & 2006) Source: EU Commission (2008) Import dependence, % 2003 Relative to EU Average 2006 Import dependence, % Relative to EU Average Finland 59.2 10.3 54.6 0.8 Estonia 26.3 -22.6 33.5 -20.3 Latvia 62.5 13.6 65.7 11.9 Lithuania 45.2 -3.7 64 10.2 Poland 13.2 -35.7 19.9 -33.9 EU Average 48.9 53.8 Hence, the three Baltic States are either already heavily dependent on Russian gas, or they will become increasingly dependent very soon, and this is why the Nord Stream pipeline is of such interest to them. As discussed in the previous subchapter, their perception of energy security (or lack thereof) is undoubtedly based on recent historical experience with Russia. And, surely, if it could be proven that Moscow is pursuing a neo-imperial foreign policy by means of energy levers, then Nord Stream could easily be interpreted as a means to put pressure on the Balts by halting their gas supplies without it affecting Western Europe. The problem is that motivations are never clear-cut; rather, they are contingent on interpretations, which will differ greatly depending on the interpreter. Regardless of foreign policy intentions, however, the Russians may simply not be able to produce enough gas to cover all of their commitments. Should Russia then have to choose where to send its scarce gas, it is fairly safe to assume that Germany will be higher on Moscow’s list than most Central and Eastern European states. The numbers speak for
Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline 29 themselves: In 2004, the EU members that were formerly under Soviet influence in the Warsaw Pact (the Baltic States, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) imported a total of 42.69 bcm of gas from Russia, whereas Germany alone imported 40.87 bcm (Stern 2005: 69, 110). In the event of a severe scarcity of gas, Nord Stream could contribute to a real division of Europe because it would enable Moscow to supply its single most important market, and decidedly most important European partner, at Eastern Europe’s expense. Today this is not possible because all the gas from Russia to Germany flows through Eastern Europe. Should the ‘scarcity-of-gas’-situation occur it would also be difficult to criticise Moscow for hostile intentions, since the Kremlin would have no choice but to cut supplies to someone. Berlin, at least, would hardly object to such cuts if the alternative were reduced supplies to Germany.
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The Fridtjof Nansen Institute is a
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Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

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