Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline

Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline 33
jeopardy, or that the friction in Sweden would delay the project so much
that they decided to let the platform go. What is curious about this, however,
is that the platform had previously been presented as crucial for
successful operation of the pipeline. Swedish parliamentarian and opponent
of the project, Carl B. Hamilton, has commented that if the platform
were vital for Nord Stream, then Sweden could in fact veto the whole
project by rejecting the platform application – regardless of Sweden’s
legal rights with respect to the pipeline itself (Hamilton 2007: 19-20). But
what is even more remarkable is that Russian ambassador Kadakin, as
early as February 2007, stated that ‘it is even imaginable that the platform
will not be built. It is technically possible to have a pipeline without such
a platform, as a worst-case scenario’ (Sveriges Radio 2007). Although the
ambassador is no spokesperson for the Nord Stream consortium, Hamilton
(2007: 20) believes either von Ameln or Kadakin ‘knew more than
they were willing to say publicly.’ In his newsletter of 8 April 2008,
Hamilton (2008a) declared that ‘the withdrawal of the application for the
platform confirm[ed] [his] own suspicion that Nord Stream AG knew
from the beginning that it would be able to do without it – even if it
would cost more in terms of bigger pipes.’ Therefore, even if some
Swedes were relieved that the platform plan has been abandoned, and the
intelligence-related arguments are somewhat weakened, Wahlbäck (forthcoming)
holds that the constantly changing argumentation from the consortium
‘does not inspire confidence in Nord Stream’s thoroughness.’ He
believes it is not very confidence-building that the pipeline company all
of a sudden realised that there are other sub-sea pipelines, such as the
Langeled (1200 km) and Franpipe (840 km), that successfully use intelligent
‘pigs’ over longer distances (see for instance Nord Stream 2008c).
How is it possible, he rhetorically asks, that they did not know about this,
and if they did, why did they lie to the public? Furthermore, it is worth
noticing that Langeled actually does have a midway service platform,
Sleipner (see Figure 6, chapter 6.2), and one might therefore ask if the
Nord Stream platform application has been temporarily dropped for tactical
reasons. If permission to lay the pipeline is given, and it becomes
clear when it is under construction that the operation of the pipeline will
be much safer with the platform, then it will be very difficult for the
Swedish government to say no, at least from an environmental point of
view. In any event, this may become a case of being ‘damned if you do,
and damned if you don’t’, and opponents of the pipeline may have been
given a new reason to question the project.
5.2 Comparing Debates: Sweden, Finland and Estonia
Although the platform as a security issue was a purely Swedish concern,
the pipeline route was also planned through the Finnish EEZ, and it is
therefore relevant to ask how the Finns reacted to the issue. Interestingly,
the debate in Finland never resembled the one in Sweden, not even
regarding the possibility of sensors on the pipeline. The Swedish Defence
Research Agency had argued that since the pipeline would pass through
the exercise area of the Finnish armed forces, the Russians could possibly
‘monitor Finnish, Swedish and NATO exercises and naval activities
without any apparent presence of military vessels or submarines’ (FOI
2007: 16). If this was a disconcerting scenario to the Swedes, one might
expect the Finns to share the concern, but even if they did, it is difficult to