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Rudolf Steiner's Vision for the Future - Anthroposophical Society in ...

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XXXXXXX The Language of Organisms<br />

The Language of Organisms<br />

by Steve Talbott<br />

The follow<strong>in</strong>g is excerpted from two articles published <strong>in</strong> The<br />

Nature Institute’s onl<strong>in</strong>e Net<strong>Future</strong> newsletter (http://netfuture.<br />

org). The articles are also appear<strong>in</strong>g as part of a larger series <strong>in</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> hardcopy journal, The New Atlantis (http://<strong>the</strong>newatlantis.<br />

com). Please note that some statements <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> text are offered<br />

only so that <strong>the</strong>y can be qualified or revised <strong>in</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r parts of<br />

<strong>the</strong> articles which are not <strong>in</strong>cluded here. This <strong>in</strong>cludes, <strong>for</strong><br />

example, certa<strong>in</strong> remarks about <strong>the</strong> “because” of reason and <strong>the</strong><br />

“because” of physical science.<br />

Are you and I mach<strong>in</strong>es? Are we analyzable without rema<strong>in</strong>der<br />

<strong>in</strong>to a collection of mechanisms whose operation<br />

can be fully expla<strong>in</strong>ed, start<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> parts and proceed<strong>in</strong>g<br />

to <strong>the</strong> whole, by <strong>the</strong> causal operation of physical and<br />

chemical laws? It might seem so, judg<strong>in</strong>g from <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>sistent<br />

testimony of those whose work is to understand life.<br />

There is little doubt about <strong>the</strong> biologist’s declared<br />

obsession with mechanisms of every sort — “genetic mechanisms,”<br />

“epigenetic mechanisms,” “regulatory mechanisms,”<br />

“signal<strong>in</strong>g mechanisms,” “oncogenic mechanisms,”<br />

“immune mechanisms,” “circadian clock mechanisms,”<br />

“DNA repair mechanisms,” “RNA splic<strong>in</strong>g mechanisms,”<br />

and even “molecular mechanisms of plasticity.” The s<strong>in</strong>gle<br />

phrase “genetic mechanism” yields about 25,100 hits <strong>in</strong><br />

Google Scholar as I write, and seems to be ris<strong>in</strong>g by<br />

hundreds per month. But no cellular entity or process<br />

receives an exemption; everyth<strong>in</strong>g has been or will be baptized<br />

a “mechanism.” In an <strong>in</strong><strong>for</strong>mal analysis of <strong>the</strong> technical<br />

I have yet to f<strong>in</strong>d a s<strong>in</strong>gle<br />

technical paper <strong>in</strong> molecular<br />

biology whose author thought<br />

it necessary to def<strong>in</strong>e mechanism<br />

or any of <strong>the</strong> related terms.<br />

36 • be<strong>in</strong>g human<br />

papers I’ve collected <strong>for</strong> my current research, I found an<br />

average of 7.5 uses of mechanism per article, with <strong>the</strong><br />

number <strong>in</strong> a s<strong>in</strong>gle article vary<strong>in</strong>g from 1 to 32. The figure<br />

goes even higher when you throw <strong>in</strong> cognate <strong>for</strong>ms such as<br />

mechanistic and mach<strong>in</strong>e.<br />

The odd th<strong>in</strong>g is that I have yet to f<strong>in</strong>d a s<strong>in</strong>gle t<br />

echnical paper <strong>in</strong> molecular biology whose author thought<br />

it necessary to def<strong>in</strong>e mechanism or any of <strong>the</strong> related terms.<br />

If <strong>the</strong> mean<strong>in</strong>g is supposed to be obvious, <strong>the</strong>n presumably<br />

we should read <strong>the</strong> words <strong>in</strong> a straight<strong>for</strong>ward and concrete<br />

way — as <strong>in</strong>deed seems to be required <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong> case of<br />

molecular mach<strong>in</strong>es, which unashamedly projects <strong>the</strong><br />

human mach<strong>in</strong>e shop onto <strong>the</strong> molecular level. O<strong>the</strong>r<br />

usages, however — causal mechanism and mechanistic<br />

explanation are examples — evidently convey little more<br />

than an idea of physical lawfulness or causation, as when<br />

Zaidi et al. (2007) refer to “mechanistic <strong>in</strong>sights <strong>in</strong>to<br />

ma<strong>in</strong>tenance of cell phenotype through successive cell divisions.”<br />

Many nuances of mean<strong>in</strong>g are possible, of course,<br />

but whatever <strong>the</strong> withheld def<strong>in</strong>itions may turn out to be,<br />

no one will dispute me when I say that <strong>the</strong> <strong>in</strong>tertw<strong>in</strong>ed<br />

notions of mechanism and physical law <strong>in</strong>timately co<strong>in</strong>habit<br />

<strong>the</strong> m<strong>in</strong>ds of biologists today and are held to be keys<br />

<strong>for</strong> understand<strong>in</strong>g organisms.<br />

But here is <strong>the</strong> greater curiosity: <strong>the</strong> same biologists rely<br />

on an equally pervasive and utterly different term<strong>in</strong>ology —<br />

so different and yet so seem<strong>in</strong>gly <strong>in</strong>escapable as to demand,<br />

from any thoughtful researcher, some sort of reconciliation<br />

with <strong>the</strong> language of mechanism.<br />

What Changes at Death?<br />

Anyone whose pet dog has died knows <strong>the</strong> difference<br />

between a liv<strong>in</strong>g animal and a dead one. Biologists surely<br />

know this, too, although (strangely enough!) <strong>the</strong> difference<br />

between life and death does not often figure explicitly <strong>in</strong> <strong>the</strong>

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