Overall Analysis - FIFA.com

to name but three. In the case of Korea, their
capacity to take the initiative (i.e. attacking
with and without the ball), to operate their
‘Dutch’ 3-4-3 system, and to dominate for
the bulk of each match, was astonishing. Four
months of full-time training certainly paid
dividends for the Koreans.
Combination Play
Combination play (i.e. two, three or four players
exchanging short, quick passes, usually
in the central attacking area of the field)
was highly developed and demonstrated to
great effect by many teams, including Spain,
Denmark, Argentina, Mexico and Turkey.
When analysing combination play, two types
must be considered: the predictable and the
unpredictable. In the former category, which
is based on well-developed training methods,
the Germans, Italians, and Americans were
fine exponents. In contrast, the Brazilians,
Costa Ricans, Senegalese, and other ‘flamboyant’
types, those with a flair for inventiveness
and unconventional technique, often put
together combinations that mesmerised and
surprised the defending team.
Tactical Flexibility
The ability to change structure, and sometimes
style, during a match, or from match
to match is an important component in a
team’s armoury. When Korea were losing to
Italy, Guus Hiddink changed his approach
and went from his adventurous 3-4-3 to an
ultra-risk-taking 3-2-5 – it worked, because he
saved the game, and then saw Ahn Jung-Hwan
score the Golden Goal to win him and Korea
the match. Brazil outclassed Costa Rica, but
their organisation lacked balance, and Scolari
introduced a two-man midfield screen in front
of the back three for the quarter-final against
England. Examples of tactical flexibility were
plentiful.
Technical Quality
In the 2002 FIFA World Cup, teamwork,
emphasising compactness in defence and
attack and involving a minimum of 7 or 8
players, often overshadowed the individual.
However, the technical ability of most players,
including many defenders, was of a high
standard. It has become a necessity for players
to break from the back, to ‘give and go’,
and thus increase the numbers in the attacking
area. Brazil’s back three were all capable
of springing from their defensive positions
and joining in the creative build-up. The
same applied to players from Senegal, Spain,
Turkey, Argentina, Costa Rica and a number of
others. Team-oriented skills were the norm,
with functionality, accuracy, and speed the
priorities. Some, however, transcended the
conventional, and this was particularly true
of many players playing in the hole between
attack and midfield (i.e. second strikers),
such as Rivaldo, Ronaldinho, Sas, Raúl, Totti,
Photo: Christian Liewig
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