CROWD CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES - Omega Research Foundation
CROWD CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES - Omega Research Foundation
CROWD CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES - Omega Research Foundation
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guarantees are forthcoming both from the manufacturers and the government agencies deploying these weapons<br />
about their alleged safety.. The European Parliament may wish to request the Commission to report on the existing<br />
liaison arrangements for the second generation of non-lethal weapons to enter European Union from the USA and call<br />
for an independent report on their alleged safety as well as their intended and unforseen social and political effects.<br />
[13] The ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) SIrUS principles ( which suggests that because of their<br />
technical characteristics and human targeting mechanisms, certain weapons should be banned because they are<br />
intrinsically inhumane or capable of causing unnecessary suffering) should be adopted<br />
[14] The decision making process for procuring any new crowd control technologies could be subject to more formal<br />
controls so that common parameters are examined when deciding on innovations regarding crowd control weapons.<br />
The Committee may wish to consider requesting STOA to formally examine what might be involved in setting up the<br />
bureaucratic procedures to achieve such an objective, along the lines of the current environmental impact assessment<br />
regimes. In practical terms that would mean having formal, independent Social Impact Assessment of new police<br />
technologies before they are deployed.<br />
[15] Other alternatives options to Darth Vader like riot squads to policing protest should not be seen in purely<br />
technological terms. Some effective options might be counter-intuitive, such as the Korean police decision to use more<br />
highly educated female officers without riot gear to more peacefully police public demonstrations. Members of the<br />
Committee may wish to invite the South Korean officials involved in this decision to discuss their thinking and its<br />
apparent success. There may be opportunities to emulate this successful change of tactics in Europe.<br />
[16] Crowd control options using biometric based or face recognition systems could play a powerful role in preventing<br />
public disorder occurring at fixed locations such as enclosed sports stadia, where there are inevitably considerable<br />
public safety considerations. A series of pilot projects be explored with member states who have had experience of<br />
crowd behaviour problems in recent years and that any plans to extend these pilot schemes be made in conjunction<br />
with supporters clubs, the police and with government on the basis of the practical experience of how effectively the<br />
systems worked in practice.<br />
[17] The status quo option would be to attempt to assess the risks posed by the new emergent bio technologies only<br />
after they had been actually weaponised.<br />
[18] Given that the EC has already agreed to ban any weapons which directly work on the basis of targeting or<br />
otherwise interfering with the operation of the human brain, a new STOA study should be commissioned on the<br />
potential malign implications of human genetic modification research and related genome projects on human control<br />
weapons of the future.<br />
[19] The EU Status Quo on exports of crowd control weapons could be maintained, i.e. that following the voluntary<br />
EU Code of Conduct on Arms, weapons should not be exported to countries where they can be used for internal<br />
repression or contribute to external aggression. However, EU member states have inconsistent policies in regard to<br />
controlling the export of certain crowd control technologies. If this situation continues this option will mean that<br />
European companies and governments will continue colluding with human rights violations in States that have very<br />
poor human rights records. It would be hypocritical for the European Union to define )areas of freedom, justice and<br />
security( inside its territories, whilst undermining the same rights of freedom, justice and security because of<br />
inappropriate and ineffective export controls and procedures on the supply, licencing and brokerage of crowd control<br />
weapons and munitions to other countries.<br />
[20] Effective limits should be set on the exports or licensed production of any crowd control technology, ancillary<br />
equipment and training, which is not seen as acceptable for use within the EU. This option begs the case for banning<br />
electroshock weapons in this context which would mean no manufacture, no imports, no exports, no licensed<br />
production, no use.<br />
[21] STOA should consider commissioning a new study on the extent to which European companies have profited<br />
from the transfer of technologies of political control and their role in perpetrating human rights violations. The purpose<br />
of this study would be to present new policies to plug the loopholes in current export controls and hence recommend<br />
effective mechanisms for implementing the agreed EU common criteria. Member States should be requested to disaggregate<br />
export licences and trade data so that proper scrutiny becomes possible.<br />
Acknowledgements<br />
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