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CROWD CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES - Omega Research Foundation

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STOA, the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in Washington, to create an early warning system<br />

to alert decision makers about the potential hazards of technological innovation. Nowadays, the early<br />

warning system for such concerns about the environment has been institutionalised and we are all<br />

familiar with the process of Environmental Impact Assessments, which is now seen as a normal part of<br />

the planning landscape.<br />

Could not something similar be set up to ensure that decisions regarding new police technologies<br />

including crowd control weapons are fully informed by the full range of likely social and political<br />

impacts? Such technologies can have profound implications for civil liberties and human rights. If<br />

they were subject to a compulsory Social Impact Assessment or audit of the human and civil rights<br />

consequences, particularly problematic innovations would not proceed without the legal and regulatory<br />

framework being fully clarified. Experience has shown that vested interests soon surround the<br />

implementation of any new technology. Once introduced it is very difficult to reverse an implementation<br />

decision and its associated cultures.<br />

Decisions about specific crowd control technologies are often viewed as operational matters and<br />

simply left to the police or the military. Questions about appropriateness are taken by user groups and<br />

often in secrecy without any public debate. A better policy route would be to thoroughly explore the<br />

impacts of all policing technologies before implementation. A testing set of criteria should be developed<br />

to objectively judge and assess the impact, ongoing requirement (including deployment and training<br />

procedures) and any potential need to withdraw or redesign the technology should untoward impacts<br />

emerge. Special consideration should be paid to the dangers of )technological creep( and )decision<br />

drift( whereby a system that would never have been given the go-ahead if introduced in one move, is<br />

deployed by a series of incremental technological changes and gradual reorientation of training and<br />

targeting procedures. Such social impact assessments would be able to objectively pronounce on the<br />

health, safety and legal liability issues associated with particular crowd control weapons before they<br />

were introduced and ensure a consistent approach. The most efficient alternative to the deployment of<br />

crowd control weapons are social and economic policies which effectively create areas of freedom,<br />

security and justice. The deployment of crowd control weapons is usually an admission that such<br />

policies have not been implemented or have failed. In such instances, purely technical means do not<br />

effect a long term solution and can prove dysfunctional.<br />

7.3 Alternative Crowd Management Methodologies. Any alternatives to crowd control technologies<br />

must be discussed in the context of their role in creating areas of freedom, justice and security and<br />

must be democratically accountable. There may indeed be appropriate non lethal alternatives to<br />

currently used crowd control weapons but any proposed pragmatic options should be independently<br />

tested against preset health and safety criteria for both the public and the officers charged with using<br />

them. There are many potential pitfalls of implementing )easy technical fixes( based upon centralised<br />

control systems, secrecy and a lack of accountability. It is easy to substitute more repressive<br />

technologies for social justice as events recorded in Indonesia, Kenya and most recently Zimbabwe<br />

testify. (See Section 8). It is also easy to reject counter-intuitive alternatives because they seem too<br />

radical. A good example is crowd control outside nightclubs which was always thought to require<br />

muscle bound bouncers who could tackle any trouble that was presented at the doors by punters who<br />

might be less than sober. However, the macho culture of night club bouncers was based on the<br />

assumption that the threat of violence was the only way to maintain order and overly violent doormen<br />

caused many of the violent episodes they were there to prevent. Changing the image, training and<br />

including more women amongst night club door staff, has recently led to less violence, partially<br />

because the women appear to have more sophisticated verbal skills and can diffuse potential violence<br />

by negotiation rather than coercion. A prescient observation in this regard was given by Her Majestys<br />

Inspectorate of Constabulary in the UK )Some officers forget that the best weapons theyve got to deal<br />

with potential violence are their brains and the ability to talk(. 382<br />

Could a similar approach be successfully adopted for public order policing? Again it seems counterintuitive<br />

but we might be guided by the notion that if it has already happened then it is possible. South<br />

Korea, the most recent case, also seems the least likely. In the past, the South Korean Police have<br />

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