CROWD CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES - Omega Research Foundation

spray as suggested in ACPOs 1999 guidance(. 131 However no guidance is provided on how mentally ill
people are recognised at a distance.
The tolerance phenomena is proportionally significant. For example, in regard to CS, the UK Police
Complaints Authority reported a failure of subject response at 18%. 132 Cincinnati police in Ohio reported
a 13% failure rate with CS and cited this as the main reason for testing OC products because of the
manufacturers claims that it is effective on psychotics and persons under the influence of drugs or
alcohol. 133 However, analysis of the effectiveness of OC pepper spray in Berkeley contradicted this
notion, reporting OC to be ineffective 35% of the time. 134 Such tolerance has implications for dosage
levels since it is experienced by the spraying officers as ineffectiveness or potency of their weapon. A
common reaction to such a lack of impact is for officers to use more of the irritant. Often police
guidelines contradict those provided by the manufacturers. A worrying example of the implications of
such confusion regarding appropriate dosage is the Novato (California, USA) police case which led to
the death of a man who was sprayed with OC. Novato police OC guidelines advise that suspects )shall
not be exposed to oleoresin capsicum (pepper spray) for longer than absolutely necessary to
accomplish control(. John Crew, Director of the Police Practices Project for the ACLU of Northern
California stated that, )this contradicts how the manufacturers say pepper spray should be used
because it implies that you spray until the suspect is subdued... the manufacturers advise that if you hit
the suspect's target area, and it doesn't work, it's not going to work, and improperly prolonged spraying
poses a health risk to the suspect". 135
Other hazards associated with excess dosage include delayed allergic contact dermatitis, the severity
depending on the level of exposure 136 - in some cases leading to vesication, the time course of which is
the same as that for skin damage caused by exposure to mustard gas. 137
4.1.3 Hazards of Carrier Solvents & Propellants can be illustrated by the case of French made CS
sprays being prematurely introduced into the UK on 1 March 1996, before the requisite scientific
research was accomplished. One of the key issues considered by the UK Department of Health
Committee (subsequently set up to assess the products safety) were the hazards posed by the solvent
Methyl Isobutyl Ketone (MIBK) - used to dissolve solid CS so that it can be used as a targetable spray.
Official reports show that government scientists have warned on at least two occasions that MIBK is
too dangerous to be used in CS sprays. But the UK Home Office and Police Forces ignored both
reports and continued using MIBK. Four years ago the Home Office commissioned scientists at Porton
Down to compare the toxicities of MIBK and an alternative solvent methylene chloride.
In July 1996, the Porton scientists "strongly recommended" that the police should use methylene
chloride, rather than MIBK in their CS sprays. Just a month before Home Secretary Michael Howard
introduced MIBK based CS sprays, Porton Down was advocating that the available information would
suggest that methylene chloride, in the vapour form, is likely to be less hazardous than MIBK.
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138 139 140
In addition, Porton Down was of the view that methylene chloride would pose a significantly reduced
risk given that the current handheld spray containing CS dissolved in MIBK delivers liquid droplets
rather than solid particulate CS. This comment is significant because it raises questions about the
controllability of the amount of chemical irritant and associated solvent dumped on the target. In the
following year, Porton scientists were again commissioned by the Home Office to scrutinize 28
solvents to advise on one which would be both safe and effective in CS sprays. Again they concluded
that MIBK was 'a serious hazard' and put it into a group of chemicals which were 'clearly' not safe
solvents because they were "either confirmed or suspected carcinogens with associated mutagenic
potential." This time, the Porton Down scientists considered advice was that for a definitive answer on
a low toxicity solvent for CS spray devices the properties of di(propylene) glycol and polyethylene glycol
should be investigated. 141 As before, this report was brushed aside in a way which would be politically
and legally unforgivable if these substances were drugs rather than riot control agents. Yet the UK
Committees on Toxicity, Mutagenicity and Carcinogenicity gave the product the all clear despite noting
)the sparsity of data on the combination of CS dissolved in MIBK(. 142 The UK Police Complaints
Authority report already referred to has also advised that research should be progressed rapidly on
finding alternatives to the solvent MIBK.