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Coming to Terms with Reality. Evaluation of the Belgian Debt Relief ...

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Annexes<br />

Secondly FURRER and KADDER (2007) show a stabilizing effect <strong>of</strong> debt relief on public<br />

expenditures on health between 2000 and 2005 and a contribution <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> rise <strong>of</strong> public<br />

health expenditures in 2006 and 2007.<br />

Figure 22b Evolution <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Budget <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Ministry <strong>of</strong> Public Health (Millions <strong>of</strong> FCFA),<br />

decomposing <strong>Debt</strong> <strong>Relief</strong> and Normal Budget:<br />

120.000<br />

100.000<br />

80.000<br />

60.000<br />

40.000<br />

20.000<br />

0<br />

1998-1999<br />

1999-2000<br />

Source: FURRER and KADDER (2007)<br />

2000-2001<br />

2001-2002<br />

Total <strong>Debt</strong> <strong>Relief</strong> Used (HIPC, MDRI, C2D) Total expenses <strong>with</strong>out debt relief<br />

Thirdly IDA and <strong>the</strong> IMF (2007, table 3) have estimated that poverty-reducing<br />

expenditures have increased from 17% <strong>of</strong> government expenditures in 2000 <strong>to</strong> 33% in<br />

2006 and from 3.1% <strong>of</strong> GDP in <strong>the</strong> former year <strong>to</strong> 6.3% in <strong>the</strong> latter.<br />

We conclude that debt relief has contributed <strong>to</strong> a fiscal surplus. But its effect is overshadowed<br />

by that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> increasing oil price. On <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r hand <strong>the</strong> share <strong>of</strong> expenditures on education,<br />

health and infrastructure in <strong>to</strong>tal public expenditures has risen substantially.<br />

5.6 Governance Indica<strong>to</strong>rs:<br />

In this subsection we analyse whe<strong>the</strong>r governance has improved between Decision and<br />

Completion. To do this we use a number <strong>of</strong> indica<strong>to</strong>rs. We start by analysing <strong>the</strong> sovereign<br />

ratings <strong>of</strong> Cameroon by rating agencies, before focusing on <strong>the</strong> Country Policy and<br />

Institutional Assessment (CPIA) Rating and <strong>the</strong> Kaufmann-Kraay-Mastruzzi (KKM)<br />

index. Finally we mention <strong>the</strong> Corruption Perception Index (CPI).<br />

The ratings by Standard & Poor’s and Fitch did not change much after Cameroon reached <strong>the</strong><br />

Decision Point. Standard &Poor’s gave both long and short term debt a B grade in 2003, and<br />

downgraded it in December 2004 <strong>to</strong> respectively CCC and C, because <strong>of</strong> public finance<br />

slippages. It <strong>the</strong>n upgraded those ratings twice (in May 2006 and February 2007), so that <strong>the</strong>y<br />

2003<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

<strong>Coming</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Terms</strong> <strong>with</strong> <strong>Reality</strong><br />

reached <strong>the</strong>ir 2003 levels. Fitch started <strong>with</strong> a B rating for both long and short term debt. In<br />

February 2005 it downgraded long term debt <strong>to</strong> B-, because <strong>of</strong> poor budgetary management. In<br />

June 2006 it upgraded it again <strong>to</strong> B.<br />

The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) Index is published every year by <strong>the</strong><br />

World Bank, and “rates countries against a set <strong>of</strong> 16 criteria grouped in four clusters: (a)<br />

economic management; (b) structural policies; (c) policies for social inclusion and equity; and (d)<br />

public sec<strong>to</strong>r management and institutions” (World Bank). The final mark for <strong>the</strong> country lies<br />

between 1, which means <strong>the</strong> rating is highly unsatisfac<strong>to</strong>ry for two years or more, and 6, which<br />

means it is good for two years or more. Cameroon’s score decreased from 3.3 in 2005 <strong>to</strong> 3.2 in<br />

2006, which puts <strong>the</strong> country in <strong>the</strong> group <strong>of</strong> “weak performers”. This is mainly due <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> weak<br />

business regula<strong>to</strong>ry environment, <strong>the</strong> policies and institutions aimed at environmental sustainability<br />

and <strong>the</strong> inefficiency <strong>of</strong> revenue mobilisation. The country kept <strong>the</strong> same rating IN 2007.<br />

D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2008) constructed an indica<strong>to</strong>r <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> quality <strong>of</strong><br />

governance in a country, <strong>the</strong> so-called KKM Index. This index is based on six governance<br />

indica<strong>to</strong>rs (on a scale from -2,5 <strong>to</strong> 2,5), divided in<strong>to</strong> three groups. This is one <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> few<br />

governance index that covers a period <strong>of</strong> more than ten years (1996-2007).<br />

The first group covers “<strong>the</strong> process by which governments are selected, moni<strong>to</strong>red and replaced”,<br />

and is composed <strong>of</strong> two indica<strong>to</strong>rs: “voice and accountability” and “political stability and absence <strong>of</strong><br />

violence”. The former includes measures <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> political process, <strong>the</strong> respect <strong>of</strong> civil liberties and <strong>the</strong><br />

political rights. The latter integrates <strong>the</strong> perception or likelihood that <strong>the</strong> government will be<br />

overthrown, and <strong>the</strong> perception <strong>of</strong> internal violence. We represent both in figure 23. We observe that<br />

<strong>the</strong>re is no particular improvement in <strong>the</strong> “voice and accountability”, but <strong>the</strong> political stability<br />

indica<strong>to</strong>r has increased between 1996 and 2000 and between 2004 and 2006.<br />

Figure 23 “Voice and Accountability” and “Political Stability and Absence <strong>of</strong> Violence”<br />

Indica<strong>to</strong>rs, 1996 - 2007<br />

Score (-2,5; 2,5)<br />

0,0<br />

-0,2<br />

-0,4<br />

-0,6<br />

-0,8<br />

-1,0<br />

-1,2<br />

-1,4<br />

-1,6<br />

1996<br />

1998<br />

2000<br />

Political stability<br />

voice and accountability<br />

2002<br />

2003<br />

Source: Kaufmann D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2008)<br />

2004<br />

2005<br />

2006<br />

2007<br />

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