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Coming to Terms with Reality. Evaluation of the Belgian Debt Relief ...

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Annexes<br />

6 Impact on Economic Growth and Poverty<br />

In this section we analyze <strong>the</strong> effects <strong>of</strong> debt relief obtained by Cameroon on two basic<br />

measures <strong>of</strong> wellbeing, i.e. economic growth and <strong>the</strong> evolution <strong>of</strong> poverty. From <strong>the</strong> outset<br />

we should emphasize that it is not evident <strong>to</strong> make definitive statements on <strong>the</strong> issue. First<br />

it is <strong>to</strong>o early <strong>to</strong> observe <strong>the</strong> impact <strong>of</strong> debt forgiveness: <strong>the</strong> bulk <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> debt cancellation<br />

was realized when Cameroon reached its Completion Point in 2006, and its effects may be<br />

spread over several years. Our most recent data are for 2007. Second <strong>the</strong> data on growth<br />

and poverty we observe are <strong>the</strong> result <strong>of</strong> a number <strong>of</strong> variables, debt forgiveness being one<br />

<strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong>m. So it is difficult, if not impossible, <strong>to</strong> single out <strong>the</strong> effect <strong>of</strong> one individual<br />

variable. Therefore we analyze whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> data on growth and poverty we observe<br />

between 2000 and 2006 or 2007 are compatible <strong>with</strong> a positive impact <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> debt<br />

forgiveness that occurred over this period and <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> expectation in <strong>the</strong> years prior <strong>to</strong> 2006<br />

<strong>of</strong> a wider debt relief when <strong>the</strong> country would reach its Completion Point.<br />

Before starting our analysis, it is worthwhile <strong>to</strong> mention that <strong>the</strong> Interim PRSP, published<br />

in August 2000 and whose final version was accepted by <strong>the</strong> IMF in 2003, defined <strong>the</strong><br />

major challenges for <strong>the</strong> country as <strong>the</strong> need <strong>to</strong> “diversify its economy, consolidate growth,<br />

and improve <strong>the</strong> standard <strong>of</strong> living <strong>of</strong> its population”. The document did specify <strong>the</strong><br />

weaknesses <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> educational system (a relatively low access and completion rate for <strong>the</strong><br />

primary education, coupled <strong>with</strong> a low transition rate between primary and secondary<br />

education) and <strong>the</strong> deterioration <strong>of</strong> health conditions (increasing child mortality, <strong>the</strong><br />

persistence <strong>of</strong> malaria, meningitis and viral hepatitis, and <strong>the</strong> alarming climb in <strong>the</strong> rate <strong>of</strong><br />

HIV/AIDS infection). But apart from mentioning <strong>the</strong> Millennium Development Goals, <strong>the</strong><br />

Interim PRSP did not set any specific short term objectives.<br />

6.1 Impact on economic growth<br />

We first compare data on economic growth over <strong>the</strong> period 2000-2006 <strong>with</strong> those <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

preceding six years. The former period covers more or less <strong>the</strong> Interim Period between<br />

Cameroon’s Decision and Completion Point, and <strong>the</strong> latter starts after <strong>the</strong> devaluation <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> CFA franc in January 1994. The first row <strong>of</strong> table 7 shows quite clearly that over <strong>the</strong><br />

period 2000-2006 <strong>the</strong> growth performance <strong>of</strong> Cameroon has deteriorated compared <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />

previous six years. In each <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> years 2001-2003 Cameroon’s growth rate <strong>of</strong> GDP was<br />

4% or higher, in line <strong>with</strong> <strong>the</strong> previous six years. But from 2004 onwards <strong>the</strong> GDP growth<br />

rate was lower than 4% <strong>with</strong> a particularly poor performance in 2005 (2.3%). In 2007, in<br />

line <strong>with</strong> <strong>the</strong> previous three years, <strong>the</strong> growth rate was 3.4%. Remark that <strong>the</strong> international<br />

economic climate over <strong>the</strong> period under consideration, especially in <strong>the</strong> years after 2003,<br />

was quite favorable for Cameroon, <strong>with</strong> <strong>the</strong> increase <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> oil price and favorable prices <strong>of</strong><br />

primary commodities.<br />

Table 7 also shows that Cameroon’s growth performance was weak relative <strong>to</strong> that <strong>of</strong><br />

comparable groups <strong>of</strong> countries, such as Sub Saharan Africa and <strong>the</strong> low and lower middle<br />

income countries. Over <strong>the</strong> years 1994-2000 Cameroon outperformed <strong>the</strong>se three groups <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>Coming</strong> <strong>to</strong> <strong>Terms</strong> <strong>with</strong> <strong>Reality</strong><br />

countries (if we exclude fast growing India and China from respectively <strong>the</strong> low and <strong>the</strong><br />

lower middle income groups), but between 2000 and 2006 Cameroon’s growth rate was a<br />

full 1% lower than <strong>the</strong> average <strong>of</strong> Sub Saharan Africa and <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> lower middle income<br />

countries (excluding China) and more than 1.5% below that <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> low income countries<br />

(excluding India).<br />

Table 7 GDP average annual growth rates, Cameroon and groups <strong>of</strong> comparable countries (%):<br />

1994-2000 2000-2006<br />

Cameroon 4.5 3.7<br />

Sub Saharan Africa 3.5 4.7<br />

Low income countries 5.2 6.5<br />

Low income countries excluding India 4.2 5.4<br />

Lower middle income countries 5.9 7.5<br />

Lower middle income countries excl. China 3.1 4.8<br />

Source: World Development Indica<strong>to</strong>rs (2008)<br />

Table 8 shows that agriculture did perform strongly over <strong>the</strong> period 1994-2000. Thereafter<br />

its growth rate remained a full percentage point in excess <strong>of</strong> population growth. The<br />

problem sec<strong>to</strong>r after 2000 has been industry <strong>with</strong> a growth rate hardly exceeding that <strong>of</strong><br />

population. Remark that in a developing economy <strong>the</strong> growth rate <strong>of</strong> industry is expected<br />

<strong>to</strong> exceed that <strong>of</strong> agriculture. The best performer after 2000 was <strong>the</strong> service sec<strong>to</strong>r.<br />

Table 8 Growth rates <strong>of</strong> value added by sec<strong>to</strong>r (%):<br />

1994-2000 2000-06<br />

Agriculture 7.0 3.8<br />

Industry 4.7 2.9<br />

Services 0.7 6.9<br />

Source: World Development Indica<strong>to</strong>rs (2008)<br />

It is not easy <strong>to</strong> identify <strong>the</strong> causes <strong>of</strong> Cameroon’s poor growth performance after <strong>the</strong><br />

country reached its HIPC Decision Point in 2000. It is possible that debt alleviation during<br />

<strong>the</strong> Interim period and <strong>the</strong> expectation <strong>of</strong> more substantial debt relief at <strong>the</strong> Completion<br />

Point had a positive, but weak effect on economic growth. But if <strong>the</strong>re was such an effect,<br />

it was swamped by o<strong>the</strong>r negatively impacting variables. In this context we should repeat<br />

that <strong>the</strong> amount <strong>of</strong> debt relief during <strong>the</strong> Interim Period was ra<strong>the</strong>r limited and that a strong<br />

effect could only have resulted from <strong>the</strong> expectation <strong>of</strong> more debt relief <strong>to</strong> come.<br />

We may get an idea <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> o<strong>the</strong>r variables that may have impacted on growth when we<br />

reconsider investment, which we discussed in <strong>the</strong> previous section. Between 2000 and<br />

2004, public investment as a fraction <strong>of</strong> GDP increased from 2.1% <strong>to</strong> 2.6%, but over <strong>the</strong><br />

three following years it fell back <strong>to</strong> 2.3%. In o<strong>the</strong>r words <strong>the</strong>re are no indications <strong>of</strong> a<br />

drastic and sustained increase in public investment. The problem was not so much a lack <strong>of</strong><br />

funds, but difficulties <strong>of</strong> executing <strong>the</strong> public investment budget. This was true not only for<br />

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