Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History

186
Encouraged by Carleton's reaction,
Walker summoned his staff officers to
give them a planning concept that
envisioned pinning down the enemy in
Velletri with one regiment, the 141st,
and with the 142d and 143d scaling
Monte Artemisio. 5 The 142d was to
establish roadblocks to close the northern
escape routes from Vdletri, while
the 143d, after assisting in the capture
of Monte Artemisio, moved northward
into the Alban Hills to seize Monte
Cavo and the Rocca di Papa, two hills
providing excellent observation over the
entire area.
For the plan to succeed, armor and
artillery had to follow close behind the
attacking infantry to help maintain
roadblocks and protect the long flanks
created by the thrust. Since there would
also be a vulnerable line of communications
extending eight miles over a ridge
varying in height from t\H) to three
thousand feet, and since no more than
mere footpaths and a few cart trails led
over the mountain, success of the entire
venture would also depend upon rapid
improvement of one of the trails to
enable tracked vehicles and jeeps to
ascend behind the infantry regiments. t;
Here was a job for the engineers.
After studying aerial photographs and
reconnoitering several promising trails,
the' 36th Division's engineers found a
trail that apparently could be improved
within a reasonable period. Meanwhile,
Walker's infantry regiments had been
making their preparations. On the
'The 141st and 143d Infantry had incurred
heavy casualties in January 1944 along the Rapido
and 'again on Monte Cassino, See Blumenson,
Salerno to Cassino, pp, 322-51, 367-78,
6 Col Oran C. Stovall, Div Eng, typescript account
of operation.
CASSINO TO THE ALPS
morning of the 30th, the 36th Division
commander laid his completed plan of
operations bef