Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History

A DIVERSIONARY OPERATION
last men departed on 5 October, the
Germans delivered yet another counterattack,
but this time the relieving British
troops joined in repulsing it. 27
Reflecting not only the fighting on
Monte Battaglia but also that in the hills
west and north of Castel del Rio, where
since the 28th the 349th and 35 I st
Regiments had attempted with scant
success to extend their gains beyond
Castel del Rio, losses 'were high. Since
General Kendall's division had re-entered
the line on 2 I September until
the last man left on 5 October, the 88th
Division's three regiments incurred
2, I 05 casualties. That was almost as
many as the entire II Corps had
sustained during the six-day breakthrough
offensive against II Giogo Pass
and the Gothic Line. Losses were high
too from injury and sickness attributed
to the rugged terrain and inclement
weather. Fortunately, the Fifth Army
replacement pool system, so effective
since the beginning of the campaign,
still functioned well. Within a few days
replacements and hospital returnees
brought the 88th Division's regiments
back up to strength. 28
The Germans Take Stock
On the German side, a week after
the British I st Guards relieved the 88th
Division, the 98th Division, recently
transferred from the Tenth Army, replaced
the 44th Reichsgrenadier Division.
Although the 98th Division earlier had
suffered considerable casualties during
the battle for the Rimini Line, the
division absorbed some replacements
during about two weeks out of line.
2J Ibid.
28 Fifth Army History, Part VII, p. 97.
353
'rhe division's low combat capability
nevertheless remained of concern to
General Lemelsen, the Fourteenth Army
commander. Fortunately for Lemelsen
and the 98th Division, General Clark's
decision to concentrate his operations
along Highway 65 promised some relief
for the Fourteenth Army's hard-pressed
left flank. The 44th Reichsgrenadier Division,
meanwhile, was moved into army
reserve. 29
As evidence accumulated at Lemelsen's
headquarters that Clark had abandoned
the thrust toward Imola, the
Fourteenth Army commander concluded
that the Allied command had shifted
the focus of its offensive from the
Adriatic flank to the central sector
south of Bologna, and that as a result,
pressure from the Eighth Army might
ease to some degree. Field Marshal
Kesselring, f()r his part, was not so sure.
He soon realized that Clark had sufficient
strength within his own army to
mount a major effort ag-ainst Bologna
without any drawing upon the Eighth
Army. 30
Shift Back to Highway 65
Kesselring was right in any case, but
particularly so because in blocking the
road to Imola the Germans had gravely
jeopardized their chances at the Radicosa
Pass. There three prominent
peaks, :Monti Bastione and Oggioli west
of the pass and Monte Canda to the
east, were potentially formidable defensive
positions. Higher than the summits
in the Gothic Line, they also presented
generally bare, treeless slopes. Yet two
29 AOK 14, la KTB AnI. Nr. 5, 7 Ocl 44, AOK 14,
Doc. 65922/2.
3(j Ibid.