Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History

BATTLE FOR THE PASS
tered patches of brush covered the
narrow ridges, while lower slopes were
generally well concealed by thick b'Toves
of chestnut and pine.
As \-vas so often the case in the Italian
Campaign, the nature of the terrain
would impose strict limitations on the
tactical choices open to the various
commanders. Route 6524, for example,
had to serve as a line of communication
for both the 85th and 91 st Divisions. At
best the road resembled a two-lane,
asphalt-covered American country road.
Since its many sharp curves were under
direct observation of gunners on the
slopes of Monticelli and Monte Altuzzo,
those portions close to the front would
be unable to sustain much daylight
traffic until heights flanking the II
Giogo Pass were in hand.
The Monticelli massif southwest of
the pass consists of a long, steep backbone
ridge with a concave southern
slope. Slightly higher than Monticelli,
Monte Altuzzo is a conical peak with a
main north-south ridge extending
southward for 2,500 yards from its
summit. Numerous narrow wooded
draws cut the slopes of the ridge and
offered covered routes of approach for
attacking troops.
II Glogo Pass had indeed been well
chosen for die American main effort,
for General Lemelsen, the Fourteenth
Army commander, and Field Marshal
Kesselring shared a conviction that the
Americans would concentrate on the
Futa Pass and the principal crossing of
the Apennines, Highway 65. Although
the 4th Parachute Division of Schlemm's I
Parachute Corps was responsible for defense
of both passes, two of its regiments
focused on the Futa Pass, leaving
only one, the 12th Parachute Regiment, to
325
hold II Giogo Pass, including both Monticelli
and Monte Altuzzo, plus the
other heights eastward to a lxmndary
with the 715th Division of the Ll Mountain
Corps. Reduced by heavy losses
during the fighting south of Rome to a
small cadre of combat-experienced
troops, the 4th Parachute Division had
been fleshed out in recent weeks by
inexperienced replacements, many of
whom had yet to fire live ammunition.
Two other divisions to the west opposite
the 34th U.S. Division and the 6th
South African Armoured Division were
responsible for sectors of the Gothic
Line averaging ten miles each, so that
there was little possibility of drawing on
them for reserves in the main battle.
General Schlemm's corps reserve consisted
of only two battalions of the
Grerwdier Lehr Brigade. 2
Along that sector of the C"othic Line
about to feel the main weight of the
Fifth Army's assault, the attacking
f()rces would enjoy a three-to-one superiority
over the defenders. Before II
Giogo Pass General Keyes had concentrated
half of his infantry strength, and
each of the attacking divisions would
have the support of an entire corps
artillery group. Given those conditions,
the Americans had every right to view
the task ahead with confidence, in spite
of the mountainous and forbidding
terrain pocked with well-camouflaged
positions manned by a foe with orders
to defend to the last bullet.
First Contacts
During the afternoon of the 12th,
Col. W.F. Magill's 363d Infantry led the
'AOK 14, fa KTB Nr. 4. 6-8 Sep 44, DOL
62241/1. See also Fifth Army Hislory. Part VII, pp.
53-54 and 72.