Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History

362
ander had little choice but to somehow
raise the needed manpower through
reorganization of his own command.
As part of the reorganization, he
reduced the British I st Armoured Division
to nonoperational status and transferred
its infantry to the British 56th
Division to bring it up to strength.
Some help was also coming from outside
Eighth Army resources. Two infantry
brigades, recruited among refugee
Poles, joined the 2 Polish Corps, adding
approximately ten thousand men to
Eighth Army ranks. In October, Clark
finally wrung from a reluctant War
Department 3,000 American infantrymen.
Originally scheduled as replacements
for northwestern Europe, they
arrived too late to take part in the
fighting during that month. General
Marshall also repeated his earlier assurances
that all U.S. troops then present
in Italy would remain until the enemy
had been defeated. That at last laid to
rest the chronic concern at Alexander's
and Leese's headquarters that the U.S.
Fifth Army might be moved from Italy
and the British left to carry the campaign
alone. 8
In spite of reinforcements for the
Polish corps, American replacements,
and assurances that U.S. troops would
remain in Italy, General Alexander continued
to be skeptical about the prospects
for his armies. Their great autumn
offensive, he reported to General
Wilson on 2 October, was "a slow and
costly process, and my fears are now
that we may not be just quite strong
enough to carry it through. I am
reinforcing [Clark's] Fifth Army by giv-
8 SAC Despatch, 13 Aug-12 Dec 44, p. 34; Fifth
Army History, Part VII, p. 163.
CASSINO TO THE ALPS
ing them the [British] 78th Division for
13 Corps. It is my last remaining fully
fresh division" 9
Welcome though the 78th Division
was to General Clark, a lone division
could not suffice to alleviate the Fifth
Army's chronic shortage of infantry
replacements, a shortage made increasingly
acute with the attrition of each
passing day of combat and worsening
weather. During the first week of October
the II Corps' four infantry divisions
had endured a daily average of 550
casualties over and above returns to
units from hospitals. At that rate those
four divisions, upon which rested the
burden of continuing the Fifth Army's
fall offensive, could maintain their T/O
strength only through 10 October.
Without additional replacements, the
infantry strength of the divisions would
be reduced by approximately 500 men
for each day of fighting after that date.
Under those circumstances the offensive
would eventually have to come to a
halt short of its goal. 10
Keyes' Plan
In spite of the discouraging estimates,
Allied commanders saw no alternative
to maintaining pressure against the
Germans on all fronts. General Clark
therefore ordered the II Corps to resume
a full-scale effort along the axis of
Highway 65 toward the village of
Monghidoro, about three and a half
miles north of Radicosa Pass.
North of the pass the terrain would
be similar to that already encountered
by the 88th Division in the Santerno
valley. The drainage patterns of the
9 SAC Des patch, 13 Aug-12 Dec 44, p. 46.
10 Clark Diary, 6 Oct 44.