Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History
Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History
Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History
Create successful ePaper yourself
Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.
322<br />
Even had <strong>the</strong>re been no threat of a<br />
Fifth <strong>Army</strong> offensive, General Lemelsen<br />
would have been disturbed by <strong>the</strong><br />
shortage of troops, for partisan activity<br />
in <strong>the</strong> FuurlRmth Annv's rear was increasing,<br />
particularly between <strong>the</strong> Ligurian<br />
coast and Highway 9, Anny Group C's<br />
main lateral line of communication.<br />
Almost every day some partisan band<br />
demolished a railroad, a bridge, a highway.<br />
To ,)rovide vitally needed security,<br />
Lemelsen transferred <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> rear one<br />
battalion from each division in <strong>the</strong> less<br />
threatened XIV Panzer Corps opposite<br />
<strong>the</strong> V.S. IV CorpS.25<br />
In addition <strong>to</strong> harassment by paltisans,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Germans were plagued by<br />
Allied bombers and fighters. Medium<br />
bombers again struck <strong>the</strong> Po River<br />
crossings <strong>to</strong> destroy bridges repaired<br />
since Operation MALLORY MJ\JOR in<br />
July. They also attempted <strong>to</strong> seal off<br />
<strong>the</strong> industrial area of northwestern Italy<br />
from <strong>the</strong> front by lx)mbing five railroad<br />
bridges. Fighter-bombers harassed<br />
roads and rail lines on both sides of <strong>the</strong><br />
PO.21;<br />
On 9 September <strong>the</strong> mediums, in an<br />
effort <strong>to</strong> isolate <strong>the</strong> immediate battle<br />
area planned for <strong>the</strong> Fifth <strong>Army</strong>,<br />
shifted <strong>the</strong>ir attacks <strong>to</strong> railroad lines<br />
'5Ibid.<br />
•• Craven and Cate, eds., AAF III, pp. 445-46.<br />
CASSINO TO THE ALPS<br />
leading in<strong>to</strong> Bologna. By nightfall <strong>the</strong><br />
next day <strong>the</strong>y had cut all four main<br />
lines. 27<br />
Meanwhile, <strong>the</strong> bulk of <strong>the</strong> fighterbombers<br />
hit <strong>the</strong> Gothic Line itself.<br />
Beginning on 9 September and continuing<br />
through <strong>the</strong> 20th, when wea<strong>the</strong>r<br />
would restrict operations, fighter-lx)mbers<br />
would fly an average of 240 sorties<br />
daily against bivouac areas, command<br />
}X>sts, and supply depots in <strong>the</strong> vicinity<br />
of FUla and II Giogo Passes. For three<br />
days, beginning on <strong>the</strong> 9th, mediums<br />
joined <strong>the</strong> attack, flying 339 sorties<br />
against barracks, supply points, and gun<br />
positions between <strong>the</strong> front and Bologna.<br />
2x<br />
As <strong>the</strong> 4th Parachute and 715th Diztisions<br />
resumed <strong>the</strong>ir withdrawal in<strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong><br />
main Gothic Line defenses, General<br />
Lemelsen grew increasingly disturbed<br />
over his chances of holding <strong>the</strong> line. On<br />
9 September his chief of staff requested<br />
Kesselring <strong>to</strong> transfer at least one depleted<br />
division from <strong>the</strong> Tenth Armv <strong>to</strong><br />
replace <strong>the</strong> departing 16th SS Panzer<br />
Grenadier Division. Although Kesselring<br />
agreed, he added that he saw no reason<br />
for immediate concern, for in his opinion,<br />
<strong>the</strong> Fourteenth Anny faced no immediate<br />
attack. 29<br />
27 Ibid.<br />
'K Ibid.<br />
29 AOK 14, Ia KTB Nr. 4, 6-9 Sep 44, AOK 14,<br />
Doc. 62241/1.