Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History

TOW ARD A WINTER ST ALEMA TE
already borne so much of the battle,
General Keyes had little choice other
than to employ the 34th Division, even
though that move boded ill for the
success of the new phase of the offensive.
The division was, in General
Clark's opinion, "diseased," suffering
from the chronic malaise of battle weariness.
Overseas for two and a half years
and veterans of some of the hardest
fighting since the previous winter, surviving
old-timers in the division had
long been clamoring to go home, and
replacements soon sank into a similar
state of low morale. Yet the 34th Division,
even without the detached 135th
Infantry, was still numerically strong. 4
Artillery of the adjacent 85th and
91st Divisions was to support the 34th
Division until Monte Belmonte was captured,
whereupon emphasis was to shift
to the 88th Division for an attack
against Monte Grande, thence to the
9-1 st Division and the third objective,
Monte Adone. In the last attack the 1st
Armored Division, on the 91st's immediate
left, was to assist by a holding
attack on the left flank of the corps.
General Bolte planned to attack with
his remaining two regiments abreast.
On the right and holding the widest
portion of the division sector, the 168th
Infantry, in a daylight operation, with a
company of the 757th Tank Battalion
in support, was to lead the attack
astride a broad ridge forming a divide
between the lena Creek and the Idice
River. The regiment'S objective was
Monte della Vigna, a 1,512-foot knob a
little over a mile north of Monte della
Formiche and a mile and a half south
4 Clark Diary, 16 Oct 44. See also General Keyes'
report on 34th Division cited in Truscott, Command
Missions, pp. 461-62.
379
of the division's objective, Monte Belmonte.
General Bolte expected that
timely capture of Monte della Vigna
would assist a later attack planned for
the 133d Infantry. Assigned a narrower
sector for greater concentration of firepower,
that regiment was to make the
main attack against Monte Belmonte by
night.
As the II Corps completed preparations
to make the last thrust toward
Highway 9 and the Po Valley, both
Generals Clark and Keyes looked to
Kirkman's British 13 Corps to continue
its role of tying down the 334th, 715th,
and 305th Infantry Divisions. That was
about all Kirkman's corps was capable
of. Its right flank remained virtually
stationary below Route 67, where rugged
terrain and modest combat
strength permitted little movement, and
its left wing was being constantly extended
northward to keep pace with
the 88th Division and to cover the I I
Corps' right flank.
The II Corps' Attack Renewed
From a line of departure about a half
mile north of Monte della Formiche,
the 168th Infantry, with three battalions
abreast, attacked at 0500 on 16 October.
Hardly had the attack begun when
a German antitank gun disabled the
lead tank of the supporting company
from the 757th Tank Battalion. The
disabled tank blocked the narrow road
and prevented other tanks from coming
forward, breaking up the closely
knit tank-infantry team upon which
battlefield successes had come to depend.
A heavy volume of enemy mortar
and small arms fire prevented the
infantry from continuing alone. By
nightfall only the regiment's 2d Battal-