Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History

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failed to defend that line, both armies
were to cross the Adige and continue
without pause-the Fifth to the Alps
and northwestern Italy, the Eighth to
Trieste and the northeastern frontier. 21
Inherent in Clark's concept was that the
Fifth Army would at first throw its
main effort against the formidable enemy
defenses astride Highway 65 south
of Bologna and take the city while the
Eighth Army resumed its methodical
advance northwestward astride Highway
9 toward Bologna.
The 15th Army Group Operations Plan
Taking into account the differing
views of the two army commanders, the
army group commander's staff prepared
a detailed three-phase plan that
General Clark presented at a conference
at his headquarters on 18 March.
During the first phase, the Eighth
Army in a secondary role was to cross
the Senio and push on to establish
bridgeheads beyond the Santerno. Until
the Santerno was crossed, all available
air support, including heavy bombers,
was to be allotted the Eighth Army.
Thereafter priority would shift to the
Fifth Army, which was to make the
main effort by advancing into the Po
Valley either to capture or isolate Bologna.
The wording would leave Truscott
free to bypass the city, if he wished,
and downgraded the earlier priorities
that Clark had placed on its capture.
Emphasis in the second phase was to be
placed, as both Alexander and Mc­
Creery had argued, on encircling major
enemy forces south of the Po, rather
than on Clark's earlier emphasis on a
2I 15th AGp. Opns Instr. No.3, 12 Feb 45, ann.
A; Truscott, Command Missions, p. 480.
CASSINO TO THE ALPS
rapid thrust through the enemy's center
to divide the enemy and develop the
line first of the Po and then of the
Adige. 22
If the major goals of the first two
phases were realized, those of the third
would be relatively easy: to cross the Po,
capture Verona, and develop the line of
the Adige, which, if major enemy forces
were destroyed south of the Po, probably
would be lightly defended. As Clark
saw it, the Eighth Army's role in the
third phase was primarily to assist the
Fifth Army in trapping the enemy
south of the Po. Following establishment
of bridgeheads over the Santerno,
the Eighth Army was to continue to
advance in two columns, one in the
direction of the Bastia Bridge and the
other toward Budrio. The former, a
crossing of the Reno, lay three miles
south of Argenta, while Budrio was
located nine miles northeast of Bologna.
Clark expected Budrio to draw Mc­
Creery northwestward in the direction
most advantageous to the Fifth Anpy.
Only if he appeared to be making good
progress in that direction was he to
launch an amphibious operation across
the Comacchio Lagoon. If therehy he
managed to outf1ank the Argenta Gap,
which Clark doubted he would be able
to do, the two commanders would then
decide whether to redirect the army's
main effort in a more northerly direction
toward Ferrara, as McCreery had
originally planned ang desired. Only
then would Budrio and the entrapment
of major enemy forces between Budrio
and Bologna be relegated to the status
of secondary objectives. In short, if all
"Hq 15th AGp, Opns Instr. No.4, 24 Mar 45,
in Fifth Army History, Part IX, ann. B.