Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History

392
Another factor ameliorated the failure
to reach the Po Valley before
winter set in: a serious food shortage in
the Allied-occupied regions of Italy that
threatened the civil population with the
prospect of near starvation. Having to
feed the population of the yet unconquered
regions of northern Italy as well
would have further stretched already
inadequate foodstocks.
As early as July, General Wilson, at
the suggestion of the Allied Control
Commission, had taken note of the
growing seriousness of the f(lod situation
by announcing his intention to
increase the daily bread ration from
200 to 300 grams per person. When
that increase was projected to include
the regions of northern Italy still under
German control, it became clear to
Allied planners that the grain import
program would have to be heavily
augmented, even though the area nor-
CASSINO TO THE ALPS
mally exported f(lod. Since under the
most favorable conditions the Italian
harvest would provide only 160 grams
of the requirement, imports of over a
million and a half tons would have
been needed to meet the 300-gram goal
for all haly, and a world-wide shortage
of both wheat and shipping made that
an impossible task. :1:1
Under those circumstances the Combined
Chiefs saw the failure of General
Alexander's armies to occupy northern
Italy, with its heavily fXlpulated industrial
region, as something short of regrettable.
The Allied command could
take some comfort in the fact that the
enemy would have to draw upon its
own limited resources to sustain the
region through the winter.
33 Coakley and Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy,
1943-45, pp. 773-779.