Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History

TOWARD A WINTER ST ALEMA TE
own locations as those of the elusive
enemy. Under these circumstances, the
133d Infantry's experienced commander,
Colonel Braun, decided in
mid-afternoon to halt, to reorganize,
and to replenish supplies before renewing
the attack after nightfall. 7
For the renewed assault, Colonel
Braun committed the 1 st Battalion,
which since the morning of the 18th
had been in reserve near the Zena
bridge. To cover the regiment's left
flank, the I st Battalion was to seize high
ground north of Zena, while the 2d
and 3d Battalions continued toward
Monte Belmonte.
Hardly had nightfall come when the
enemy revealed that he had used the
interval to reinforce his positions. A
heavy mortar and artillery barrage hit
two companies of the 3d Battalion,
whereupon enemy tanks moved to
within 100 yards of the lead battalions
to deliver point-blank fire. Plagued by
mud and poor trails, Braun's own supporting
tanks and tank destroyers were
too far to the rear to be of any
assistance, and enemy guns matched
the artillery supporting the regiment
round for round. In the face of that
kind of opposition, General Bolte on 20
October directed both the 133d and
168th Regiments to halt in place and
regroup, the latter having at last completed
dearing the enemy from Monte
della Vigna but too late to be of much
help to the 133d Infantry.
On the 34th Division's left, the 91 st
Division had also encountered heavy
enemy fire-the heaviest since September-as
that division attacked along the
7 133d Inf Opns Rpt. Oct 44. Unless otherwise
indicated the following is based upon this source.
381
axis of Highway 65 to assist the operation
against Monte Belmonte. In General
Livesay's sector much of the fire
seemed to be aimed at the Livergnano
bottleneck with the purpose of blocking
the flow of supplies along the highway.
By nightfall on 19 October the 91 st
Division had managed to advance only
three miles beyond Livergnano. West of
the high\\'ay enemy forces in the vicinity
of Monte Adone, two miles northwest
of Livergnano, also checked General
Prichard's I st Armored Division.
The enemy's success in thwarting all
three divisions comprising the left wing
of the 11 Corps was all the more
disturbing because of gathering evidence
that either the enemy's J 6th SS
or 29th Panzer Grenadier D'ivision was
approaching or already in the area.
Lacking reserves, General Keyes
deemed he had little choice but to
order the three divisions to assume
what he called "an aggressive defense."H
Progress on the I I Corps right wing
meanwhile showed greater promise.
There General Coulter's 85th Division
had moved rapidly along a ridge east of
the Idice Valley and on the 19th captured
Monte Fano, one of the spurs of
a ridge three miles northeast of Monte
della Formiche. From that position the
division was in a favorable position to
assist General Kendall's 88th Division
on the right during its forthcoming
operation against Monte Grande, three
miles to the northeast.
German Countermeasures
The growing resistance the II Corps
had encountered since 17 October
" Fifth Army History, Part V Ill. pp. 11).1)-1)6.