Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History

While General Clark's decision to
pause along the Arno during the second
half of July had forfeited the
temporary advantages provided by Operation
MALLORY MAJOR through destruction
of the Po bridges, timing of
the aerial operation had been Alexander's
responsibility rather than
Clark's. Furthermore, General Clark
saw several compelling reasons for
holding his army south of the river,
most important of which was the condition
of men and equipment. The ports
of Civitavecchia, San Stefano, and
Piombino were just beginning to take
up some of the slack caused by leaving
Naples and Anzio far to the rear, but
the essential port of Leghorn had yet to
begin to function. Moreover, in Clark's
opinion, the demands of Operation
ANVIL had already deprived his army
of the reserves necessary to continue
the advance beyond the Arno without a
pause for rest and reorganization. I
That was a theme to which the Fifth
Army commander would frequently return.
Since the Eighth Army would not
reach the Arno between Pontassieve
and Florence until the end of the
month and would, like the Fifth Army,
also have to pause and reorganize before
continuing, MALLORY MAJOR'S brief
opportunities were forfeited by the
Eighth Army as well.
That Crittenberger's IV Corps, at
least, was desperately weary and in no
I Clark Diary, 8Jul 44.
CHAPTER XVI
Along the Arno
condition to continue the advance beyond
the Arno without pause there
seemed little doubt. Everybody was
near exhaustion and in desperate need
of rest, although, as Alexander reminded
Clark, no more so than the
enemy.
There were organizational changes
too that required a pause. The 1 st
Armored Division, then in corps reserve,
had on 17 July also acquired a
new commanding general, Maj. Gen.
Vernon E. Prichard, former commander
of an armored division in the
United States. Like Ryder, General
Harmon went home to assume command
of a corps. Three days later the
1st Armored Division undertook a thorough
reorganization, one that had been
postponed since September 1943, when
the U.S. Army had adopted a new
Table of Organization and Equipment
for armored divisions. Although the
new organization was an outgrowth of
the 1st Armored Division's own experiences
in the North African campaign,
the division had been unable to reorganize
in September, since part of the
unit had been fighting in Italy and the
rest was in Algeria preparing to move
to Italy. In the months since Salerno
some elements of the division had been
in almost continuous contact with the
enemy. As the Fifth Army pulled up to
the Arno, the time to make the changes
had come. 2
2 Howe, The Battle History oj the 1 sl Armored
Division, pp. 363-66.