Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History

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billowing clouds of dust raised by the
bombers. The dust also had the effect
of making it difficult for the tactical
aircraft to find many of their closesupport
targets. Just before the infantrymen
began to advance from assembly
areas 200 yards east of the Senio,
several flights of fighter-bombers
roared across the army front in dummy
runs in an effort to convince the enemy
to remain under cover while infantry
and armor moved toward the crossing
sites along the east bank of the river.
First came f1amethrowing Churchills,
searing the far bank with fiery jets of
napalm, then the assault infantry bearing
assault boats and kapok bridges to
provide men and equipment a way
across the river. (Map XV) In spite of
the massive aerial bombardment and
flaming napalm, some German automatic
weapons opened fire from positions
along the western flood bank of
the Senio, but supporting artillery and
mortars silenced the enemy gunners
and enabled the Allied infantrymen to
launch their small boats and push their
assault bridges into place. 10
After eight hours of almost continuous
bombardment from the air and the
ground, that the enemy could resist at
all was a tribute to the courage and
discipline of the German infantryman.
Yet resist he did from well-prepared
positions worked on throughout the
winter. As was often the case, heavy
Allied bombardment did less damage to
front-line positions than to communications
to the rear, though that forced the
Germans to fight independent and
10 Operations of the British. Indian, and Dominion
Forces in Italy. Part IV, Sec. B. Unless otherwise
indicated the following sections are based upon
that reference.
CASSINO TO THE ALPS
unco-ordinated small unit actions all
along the front. Under those conditions
resistance could only be short-lived.
More than 1,300 prisoners rounded up
by the 5 Corps during the first twentyfour
hours reflected, in part, the degree
of disorganization among the enemy
units caused in large measure by disruption
of their communications.
The main assault on the Eighth
Army's right wing, made by the 2d
New Zealand and the 8th Indian Divisions
of the 5 Corps, established bridgeheads
beyond the Senio during the
night. Dawn on the 10th found contingents
of both divisions firmly established
in their new bridgeheads, and by
evening the New Zealanders had
pushed three miles beyond the Senio to
gain the east bank of the Santerno.
Encountering somewhat greater resistance,
the Indians came within a mile of
the Santerno in their sector.
Although the attack by the 2 Polish
Corps between Highways 9 and 16
began about the same time as that of
the 5 Corps, the Polish units ran into
considerably stronger resistance, for opposite
them lay the relatively fresh
battalions of the crack 26th Panzer Division.
It took two brigades of the 3d
Carpathian Division until the morning
of the 10th to establish a bridgehead
beyond the Senio. Yet the attack gathered
momentum during the day, and
by evening a strongpoint at Solarolo on
the Lugo Canal, two and a half miles
west of the Senio and five miles northwest
of Faenza, had fallen, although the
Santerno still lay three miles to the
west.
During the first twenty-four hours of
the offensive the enemy's 98th and 362d
Divisions bore the full brunt of the