Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History

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dark hills and valleys to the north. Key
ground had been won, but the first day
had been costlv, with 553 mountain
infantrymen killed, wounded, or missing.
Although the Americans had a
foothold on the Roffeno massif, Monte
Pigna still remained in enemy hands.
At dawn on 15 April a 20-minute
artillery barrage, including the guns of
supporting tanks and tank destroyers,
opened the second day of the IV Corps
attack. Twenty minutes later the leading
battalions of the 87th Mountain Infantry
moved out from Torre Iussi and
Hill 903 toward Monte Pigna about a
mile to the north. Resistance was spotty,
and just over an hour later the Americans
were on the crest preparing to
continue their advance northward toward
the town of Tole, four miles
northwest of Vergato commanding a
network of secondary roads leading
into the Samoggia and lavino valleys.
About the same time, the 86th
Mountain Infantry in the center began
moving from Rocca Roffeno toward the
hamlet of Amore, a battered collection
of stone cottages a thousand yards to
the north. There too resistance was
weak. Passing through Amore in midmorning,
the men continued along a
ridge terminating at Monte Mantino
and just as darkness fell occupied that
height without opposition.
The situation was far different on the
division's left flank where the 85th
Mountain Infantry, advancing from the
high ground overlooking the Pra del
Bianco toward Monte Righetti, two and
a half miles west of Monte Pigna, ran
into such heavy resistance that the
division commander thought it prudent
to bring forward a special unit for flank
protection, the 10th Mountain Infantry
CASSINO TO THE ALPS
Antitank Battalion, formed from the
antitank companies of the division's
three regiments. Noting the contrast
with fading resistance on the right, the
corps commander, General Crittenbe1'gel',
directed a shift of the division's
main effort to the right.
The enemy commander in that sector,
General Steinmetz of the 94th Infantry
Division, was fully aware that his
front was crumbling. Having requested
XIV Panzer Corps headquarters in vain
for permission to withdraw his left
flank regiments, he decided on the 16th
to take matters into his own hands.
That afternoon he ordered the troops
on his center and left to fall back
during the night to new positions. But
he had waited dangerously long, for the
Americans had already cut the few
roads leading from that sector. Steinmetz's
troops had to withdraw crosscountry
in the darkness over mountainous
terrain, abandoning much of their
heavy equipment along the way and
falling prey to harassing American artillery
fire. So cut up was the division's
left flank battalion as to become virtually
useless.
The 10th Mountain Division was on
the verge of a breakthrough of the
enemy front between the Samoggia and
Lavino Rivers, and progress over the
next three days confirmed it. As the
94th Infantry Division continued to withdraw
behind smoke screens and artillerv
fire, the 86th and 87th Mountain
Infantry Regiments, moving in column
of battalions following a 20-minute artillery
barrage, jumped off at 0620 on the
16th. Despite the efforts of a determined
rear guard, the 86th Mountain
Infantry in the early afternbon occupied
hills just north of Monte Mantino,