Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History

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Army's attack. The American commander
felt keenly the growing pressure
of criticism from others in the U.S.
military establishment who had long
opposed extension of military operations
north of Rome. Almost a month
had elapsed since the Fifth Army had
arrived at the Arno, and every day that
passed with no effort to continue the
drive beyond the river increased the
urgings from the partisans of DRAGOON
that the Italian campaign be abandoned
altogether. The Eighth Army, the theory
had it, could take over the entire
front while the Fifth Army moved to
France. Foremost spokesman of that
viewpoint in the Mediterranean theater
was General Devers, who had been
named commander-designate of the 6th
Army Group to assume command in
southern France. A long-time opponent
of British strategy in the Mediterranean,
he had frequently recommended
to General Marshall that the Italian
venture be dropped. That the campaign
seemed to have bogged down at
the Arno reinforced his argument. 20
The Allied Plan
On 13 August Alexander's headquarters
distributed to the army commanders
the plan for the Gothic Line offensive
(Operation OLIVE) and three days
later the final order. As during the
spring offensive south of Rome, General
Alexander envisioned turning the
Tenth Army's flank, this time the left and
this time with the Eighth Army rather
than the Fifth. Controlling 1 1 divisions
on a relatively narrow front, Leese's
2HLtr, Gen Devers to General Marshall, 9 Aug 44,
CCS 603116, in ABC 384, Eur, Sec. 9-A; See also
Devers Diary, vol. II.
CASSINO TO THE ALPS
army was to drive through the Rimini
Gap, consisting of approximately 8
miles of coastal plain between Rimini
and the foothills of the Apennines.
Once through the gap the Canadian 1 st
Corps and the British 5 Corps were to
deploy onto the Romagna Plain, a lowlying
triangular-shaped area cut by
many streams and drainage ditches and
bounded on the south by Highway 9,
on the east by Highwav 16, paralleling
the coast between Rimini and Ravenna,
and to the west by Highway 67, extending
in a northeasterly direction from
Forli on Highway 9 to Ravenna. From
the Romagna the two corps were to
launch a two-pronged drive to roll up
the enemy's left flank toward Bologna
and Ferrara. Meanwhile, the U.S. Fifth
Army, with three corps controlling nine
divisions on an extended front, was to
move generally northward from Florence
toward the Po Valley. Both armies
were in time to converge on Bologna
and then exploit toward the Po. Only
light fexces, the British 10 Corps with
the equivalent of one and a half divisions,
were to operate in the mountainous
terrain between the two armies. On
the Fifth Army's left, between the central
sector and the Ligurian Sea, the
U.S. IV Corps with the equivalent of
two divisions on line and one in reserve
was considered to be strong enough to
serve as a covering force. 21
Alexander's resources no longer afforded
the luxury of an army group
reserve with which to influence the
offensive at a critical point. Yet that
seemed no serious problem at the time,
for both of his armies were to fight
essentially separate battles. Moreover,
21 Alexander Despatch, pp. 65-66.