Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History

BREAKTHROUGH ON THE EIGHTH ARMY FRONT 467
Despite OKW's earlier rejection of a
large-scale withdrawal to the Po, Vietinghoff
again returned to the theme,
stating:
If the Supreme Command of the Army
Forces contmues to maintain its intention
of keeping the Anglo-Americans as far and
as long as possible from the borders of the
Reich, its aim can only be achieved if we
defeat the known intentions of our enemies,
the annihilation of the German armies.
This can be done only if we avoid
decisive battles by retreating, if necessary,
to our prepared Ticino-Po defense positions.
This decision must be made soon in
order to allow for the necessary and difficult
moves from the western Alps and
from the Ligurian coast. As these moves
will require at least two weeks, we must act
quickly in order to prevent the enemy
from reaching the Po on our eastern flank.
This means that Tenth Army would have to
hold its sector at least two' weeks after the
commencement of our withdrawal from
the western and alpine sectors of the army
group's front. This is considered the only
way in which the north Italian areas, so
important to our war industry, can be
preserved for the German Army until the
day of our decisive battle.
Without waiting for OK W's reply,
Vietinghoff risked Hitler's opprobrium
by withdrawing the I Parachute Corps
from the Imola salient and pulling it
back into the Genghis Khan Line.
Meanwhile, he continued to reini(m:e
the Argenta Gap as best he could.
Vietinghoff had little time to lose, for
Keightley's 5 Corps was dosing in on
the gap and McCreery, deciding to
strengthen his center, started shifting
the British 13 Corps with its 10th
Indian Division from the army right
wing to a sector between the 2 Polish
Corps and the British 5 Corps. Unaware
of that decision but anticipating it
as likely, General Herr ordered the
entire 29th Panzer Grenadier Division to
the defense of Argenta and the 278th
Volksgrenadier Division from the I Parachute
Corps to the LXXVI Panzer Corps,
where the volksgrenadier division was
to relieve the 98th Di'vision, reduced by
casualties to the size of a battle group.
He then pulled the 26th Panzer Division
from the line opposite the 2 Polish
Corps to provide a mobile reserve fOf
the Reno line. 14
By 15 April the 278th Division had
taken over from the 98th Division the
sector astride the Medicina-yfassa Lombarda
railroad; but the change came
too late to do more than momentarily
check the momentum of the New Zealanders'
thrust from their bridgehead
over the Sillaro. South of that sector the
4th Parachute Division also briefly held
up those elements of the Polish' corps
advancing astride Highway 9. Brief
though it was, that rear guard action
nevertheless enabled the I Parachute
Corps to withdraw those forces still in
the Imola salient to the temporary-but
as it turned out, illusory-security of
the Genghis Khan Line.
Confronted by elements of the 29th
Panzer Grenadier Division instead of battered
survivors of the 42d Jaeger and
362d Divisions, General Keightley decided
to throw in everything that the
relatively narrow Argenta sector could
accommodate. All three of his separate
infantry brigades were to continue their
efforts to outflank Argenta: the first to
drive northeastward toward Portomaggiore,
a second to pass directly east of
Argenta, and a third to assist the 78th
Division in reducing the strongpoint at
Bastia village. The 2d Commando Bri-
14 MS # T-lb (Westphal ei ai,).