Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History

STRATEGIES AND PLANS
mouth of the Po. By early April Tito's
partisans had reached Senj, only thirty
miles southeast of Fiume, a major Italian
port on the northeastern corner of
the Istrian peninsula. To the Germans
it seemed logical that to take advantage
of this development the Allies might
land somewhere to the west of the
peninsula and thrust overland to effect
a junction with the Yugoslavs and together
advance via Ljubljana toward
Vienna. Inasmuch as the Red Army
also threatened that city, that course of
action seemed an even more likely
possibility. 9
In an effort to counter the threat, the
German high command in early April
extended Army Group C's long eastern
flank northward to include the Austrian
provinces of Vorarlberg, Tyrol, Salzburg,
and the western half of Styria
and Carinthia. Because of that added
responsibility, Army Group C's eastern
boundary was withdrawn westward an
average of twenty miles from the prewar
!talo-Yugoslav frontier to the line
of the Isonzo River, which flows southward
through the easternmost Italian
province of Gorizia to enter the gulf of
Trieste some twelve miles west of that
city. Since the partisans under Tito's
leadership had long claimed the Isonzo
as the legitimate postwar frontier between
the countries-it had been the
pre-World War I boundary between the
Austrian Empire and Italy-the German
action had, perhaps deliberately,
cast an apple of discord into the midst
of Allied councils. As a result of the
boundary shift between Vietinghoffs
Army Group C and von Weich's Army
Group E, the XCVII Corps with two
9 MS # T-lb (Westpbal et at.). vol. 2, part II.
441
divisions passed to command of Army
Group E.1O
On the eve of the Allied offensive
Vietinghoffs command included 26 divisions
of all types, of which 21 were
German and five Italian. Sixteen were
actually deployed across the front from
the Adriatic to the Tyrrhenian Sea. The
remainder were either in reserve or on
coastal defense or rear area security
duty. The Tenth Army, since February
commanded by General Herr, continued
to hold the army group's left wing
with two corps: the LXXVI Panzer Corps
with four divisions and the I Parachute
Corps, also with four. 11
Two of the best of the divisions of
the I Parachute Corps, the 4th Parachute
and the 26th Panzer, were astride Highway
9, which the Germans still considered
to be the most likely approach to
Bologna from the southeast. The sector
in the A pennines foothills was held by
the 1 st Parachute Division opposite the
13 Corps Monte Grande sector, and the
278th Division opposed the 10 Corps.
Defending the Tenth Army's front that
would eventually bear the brunt of the
Eighth Army's offensive, the LXXVI
Panzer Corps employed the 42d Jaeger
(Light Infantry), the 362d Infantry Division,
defender of Cisterna at Anzio the
previous spring, and the 98th Volksgrenadier
Divisions. Since those divisions occupied
positions on which they had
been working since January, they could
expect to be fairly well sheltered from
all but direct hits by artillery fire or
aerial bombs. All, however, had incurred
heavy losses during the fighting
10 Ibid. Unless otherwise indicated the f()llowing
section is based upon this source.
II Greiner and Schramm, ed., OKW/WFSt, KTB,
IV(2), 1400.