Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History

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were committed as combat troops to
reinforce rear guard operations. Deprived
of engineer assistance, unit commanders
frequently had no choice but
to improvise on the spot.
Moreover, by 21 April it appeared
already too late for many of the German
units even to reach the Po, let
alone to cross it. One such unit was the
ill-starred 94th Infantry Division. That
night its commander, General Steinmetz,
received orders from the XIV
Panzer Corps to assemble survivors of his
division in the vicinity of Mirandola on
Highway 12 about midway between
Modena and the Po River crossing
point at Ostiglia. At Mirandola the 94th
Division was' to prepare a delaying position,
but even as the hapless Steinmetz
was reporting to corps headquarters to
receive the order, the U.S. 88th Division
entered Mirandola. The 94th Division's
survivors, generally in small detachments,
made their way to the Po as
best they could. Meanwhile, the division's
operations officer was wounded
and captured while making reconnaissance
for crossing the river, and Steinmetz
himself was cut off from his
troops. Lacking essential signal equipment
to control the di visions of the
corps, General von Senger und Etterlin
saw no alternative but to dismiss his
headquarters staff with orders to reassemble
at Legnano on the Adige some
ten miles to the north. Thus it was that
early on 23 April the corps commander
and his staff joined the precipitate flight
across the Po. 4
Imminent German collapse was
dearly evident at U.S. Fifth Army headquarters.
As early as 21 April Truscott's
4MS # C-095e (Senger).
CASSINO TO THE ALPS
G-2 had noted in his journal that "no
front line in the formal sense exists."'"
Truscott planned at that point to thrust
virtually his entire army into the gap
caused by the disintegration of the XIV
Panzer Corps. Crittenberger's IV Corps
was to seize crossing sites along a 20mile
stretch of the Po extending from
Borgoforte on Highway 62, just seven
miles south of Mantua, eastward to
Ostiglia on Highway 12, twenty-seven
miles south of Verona; while Keyes' II
Corps on the right was to capture
additional sites on a narrower sector
extending from Ostiglia to Se rm ide , ten
miles to the east. 6 (See Map XVI.)
The Pursuit
The IV Corps continued to lead the
way. In the center, Hays' 10th Mountain
Division progressed rapidly
throughout 21 April against only scattered
resistance. To take advantage of
the situation, Hays formed a tankinfantry
task force composed of a battalion
each of the 85th and 86th Mountain
Infantry Regiments, the 91st Cavalry
Reconnaissance Squadron, an engineer
company, a light tank company,
and a tank destroyer platoon, all under
the assistant division commander, Brig.
Gen. Robinson E. Duff. The task force
reached the Bomporto bridge on the
Panaro River at dusk. Although the
Germans had prepared the bridge for
demolition, the task force captured it
intact. In the 85th Division sector, the
leading regiment also seized intact the
bridge over the Panaro at Camposanto,
near where over a centurv before a
I
SHq Fifth Army G-2 Rpt, 21-22 Apr 45, G-2 Jnl.
105-2.2.
6Fifth Army OI 9, 19 Apr 45.