Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History
Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History
Cassino to the Alps - US Army Center Of Military History
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390<br />
tions encompassing Monte Grande and<br />
Monte Belmonte that afforded control<br />
of <strong>the</strong> commanding heights east of<br />
Highway 65. Monte Belmonte finally<br />
had fallen <strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> I33d Infantry after<br />
loss of Monte Grande and Hill 568<br />
prompted German withdrawal. West of<br />
<strong>the</strong> highway control of <strong>the</strong> heights was<br />
reversed, for <strong>the</strong> Germans still held<br />
Monte Adone and <strong>the</strong> Monterumici hill<br />
mass.<br />
To <strong>the</strong> west <strong>the</strong> positions of <strong>the</strong> II<br />
Corps tied in with those of <strong>the</strong> 6th<br />
South African Armoured Division, under<br />
Fifth <strong>Army</strong> control. Throughout<br />
<strong>the</strong> month <strong>the</strong> South Africans, reinforced<br />
by <strong>the</strong> I st Armored Division's<br />
CCB, had covered <strong>the</strong> left flank while<br />
<strong>the</strong> 13 Corps' 78th Division covered <strong>the</strong><br />
right. Given <strong>the</strong> limited strength of<br />
those units and <strong>the</strong> unfavorable terrain<br />
over which <strong>the</strong>y had <strong>to</strong> operate, <strong>the</strong>y<br />
could do little more than try <strong>to</strong> keep up<br />
enough pressure <strong>to</strong> prevent <strong>the</strong> enemy<br />
from shifting units from <strong>the</strong>ir fronts <strong>to</strong><br />
reinforce <strong>the</strong> sec<strong>to</strong>r opposite <strong>the</strong> II<br />
Corps. Since most, if not all, of <strong>the</strong><br />
German units moving <strong>to</strong> halt <strong>the</strong> II<br />
Corps had come ei<strong>the</strong>r from <strong>the</strong> Tenlh<br />
<strong>Army</strong> opposite <strong>the</strong> Eighth <strong>Army</strong>, or <strong>the</strong><br />
XIV Panzer Corps opposite <strong>the</strong> U.S. IV<br />
Corps, <strong>the</strong>y apparently fulfilled <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
mISSIon.<br />
Operations on tlu? IV Corps Front<br />
Still holding an elongated 50-mile<br />
front, extending from Forte dei Marmi<br />
on <strong>the</strong> ligurian coa,st <strong>to</strong> a line just short<br />
of <strong>the</strong> Reno River in <strong>the</strong> east, General<br />
Crittenberger's IV Corps had two general<br />
missions: protecting <strong>the</strong> Fifth<br />
<strong>Army</strong>'s left flank and organizing and<br />
training <strong>the</strong> two recently arrived divi-<br />
CASSINO TO THE ALPS<br />
sions-<strong>the</strong> Brazilian Expeditionary<br />
Force's 1 st Division, commanded by<br />
Maj. Gen. J. B. Mascarenhas de Morales,<br />
and <strong>the</strong> American 92d Division.<br />
As part of that training, regimental size<br />
combat teams were <strong>to</strong> participate during<br />
Oc<strong>to</strong>ber in limited-objective type<br />
operations.<br />
The operations began on 6 Oc<strong>to</strong>ber<br />
when <strong>the</strong> BEF's 6th Regimental Combat<br />
Team attacked a sec<strong>to</strong>r held by <strong>the</strong><br />
Italian Monte Rosa Alpine Division. Crossing<br />
<strong>the</strong> Lima Creek at Bagni di Lucca,<br />
12 miles north of Lucca, <strong>the</strong> Brazilians<br />
advanced northward up <strong>the</strong> Serchio<br />
valley for eight miles against light resistance.<br />
Showing little eagerness <strong>to</strong> stand<br />
and fight, <strong>the</strong> Italians fell back slowly<br />
in<strong>to</strong> <strong>the</strong> high mountain fastness <strong>the</strong>y<br />
knew so well. On <strong>the</strong> II th <strong>the</strong> Brazilians<br />
captured <strong>the</strong> <strong>to</strong>wn of Barga, and at<br />
<strong>the</strong> end of <strong>the</strong> month <strong>the</strong> operation<br />
came <strong>to</strong> an end. 29<br />
At <strong>the</strong> same time, Maj. Gen. Edward<br />
M. Almond's Task Force 92 began an<br />
attack on <strong>the</strong> coastal flank <strong>to</strong> afford<br />
combat experience for a contingent of<br />
<strong>the</strong> 92d Division. The task force consisted<br />
of <strong>the</strong> 92d Division's 370th Regimental<br />
Combat Team and <strong>the</strong> 2d Armored<br />
Group made up of <strong>the</strong> 434th<br />
and 435th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions,<br />
converted in<strong>to</strong> infantry and supported<br />
by <strong>the</strong> 751st Tank Battalion and<br />
<strong>the</strong> 849th Tank Destroyer Battalion.<br />
The mission was a limited objective<br />
attack <strong>to</strong>ward <strong>the</strong> <strong>to</strong>wn of Massa, six<br />
miles northwest of Forte dei Marmi, but<br />
ra<strong>the</strong>r than launch a frontal attack<br />
against <strong>the</strong> still intact Gothic Line de-<br />
29 J. B. Mascarenhas de Moraes, The Brazilian<br />
Expeditionary Force Uy Its Commander, 2d Ed., Rio de<br />
Janeiro, 1965, pp. 57-73.