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APPENDIX B 113 Its basic aim will be to secure a majority plus one vote against Mossadeq as required in Situation A. At the present time it is estimated that at least 30 deputies are prepared to vote against Mossadeq if they think there is a good chance that they will be in a majority. It is to be noted that all Majlis elected members would not normally be present at any one session. However, it will also be necessary to attempt to ensure that a quorum can be maintained in the Majlis at the moment when the anti- Mossadeq vote is to be taken. The minimum quorum requirement is that two-thirds of the deputies present in Tehran must be in the Chamber before a vote can be taken. Thus an effort will be made to purchase additional deputies solely to have them remain in the Chamber to ensure the quorum and not for the more sensitive role of voting against Mossadeq. (3) Political elements other than the Tudeh. Political parties or groups now opposed to Mossadeq will play only a very minor role in this campaign. Such parties as the Toilers Party, the Sumka and sections of the Pan-lranists could supply only limited and probably ineffectual street gangs. The Toilers Party will, however, play a fairly important role in the publicity described above. It is to be noted that while these parties command only ineffectual street gangs, the British group can muster up to approximately 3,000 street activists to be committed in Situation A. (4) Religious leaders. It is our belief that nearly all the impor tant religious leaders with large followings are firmly opposed to Mossadeq. Both the U.S. field station and the British group have firm contacts with such leaders. The pro-Zahedi capabilities in this field are very great. These leaders include such assorted and sometimes inimical elements as the non-political leaders [REDACTED] and [[REDACTED], as well as [[REDACTED] and [[REDACTED] and his terrorist gang, [[REDACTED]. During the period of intensive anti-Mossadeq publicity before coup day the leaders and their henchmen will: (a) Spread word of their disapproval of Mossadeq. (b) Give open support to the symbol of the throne and give
114 THE CIA IN IRAN moral backing to the Shah through direct contact with him at the shrine. (c) As required, stage small pro-religious anti-Mossadeq demonstrations in widely scattered sections of Tehran. (d) The terrorist group [sic] to threaten that they are ready to take direct action against pro-Mossadeq deputies and members of Mossadeq's entourage and government. (e) Ensure full participation of themselves and followers in Situation A. (0 After the change of government, give the strongest assurances over Radio Tehran and in the mosques that the new government is faithful to religious principles. (5) Bazaar Merchants. These are defined as a relatively small number of long established prominent merchants with a semi-religious outlook and with strong influence over the lower social orders in the bazaar section. Contacts with these merchants exist both through the British group and through the U.S. field station. These merchants are anti-Mossadeq because the government harms them directly through the stagnation of business, the cutting off of imports, the strenuous collection of taxes, and the general tightness of money. In the period of intensive publicity preceding Situation A, these merchants will be used to: (a) Spread anti-Government rumors in the bazaar. (b) Stage limited protests in the south of Tehran against the economic policies of the Mossadeq government. Then, at the time of Situation A, they will: (c) Close all or part of the bazaar. (c) Final Action Immediately Preceding the Coup. As noted above, the military action can result from Situation A, B, and C. However, the pre-coup activities of the organization as described above will be primarily for the purpose of creating Situation A which is described below. (1) On the appointed day, staged attacks will be made against respected religious leaders in Tehran.
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Published by American Free Press, T
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DEDICATION This book is dedicated t
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TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE .........
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PREFACE IN OCTOBER 2003, WHILE VISI
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PREFACE 9 only minimal redactions.
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HISTORIAN'S NOTE THIS STUDY WAS ORI
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1 PRELIMINARY STEPS REPRESENTATIVES
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PRELIMINARY STEPS 15 Subsequent con
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2 DRAFTING THE PLAN NEAR THE END OF
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DRAFTING THE PLAN 19 of the assets
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DRAFTING THE PLAN 21 proved to be a
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3 THE OPERATIONAL PLAN ON THE AFTER
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OPERATIONAL PLAN 25 the approval or
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4 ACTIVITY B E G I N S SINCE THE ME
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ACTIVITY BEGINS 29 important factor
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ACTIVITY B E G I N S 31 da aspects
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5 MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHA
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 35 tain dates, wa
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 37 ative, for the
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 39 would constitu
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 41 were unnecessa
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 43 Zahedi; accord
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6 THE F I R S T TRY THE PRECISE ORD
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THE FIRST TRY 47 their operation, M
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THE RASHIDIAN BROTHERS THREE IRANIA
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7 APPARENT F A I L U R E AT 0545 HO
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APPARENT FAILURE 53 had been "authe
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APPARENT FAILURE 55 Persian typewri
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APPARENT FAILURE 57 not be consider
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APPARENT FAILURE 59 thing to do?" A
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APPARENT FAILURE 61 cerning his fut
Page 64 and 65: APPARENT F A I L U R E 63 ning for
Page 66 and 67: APPARENT FAILURE 65 and Headquarter
Page 68 and 69: 8 THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS WHILE ON T
Page 70 and 71: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 69 to the op
Page 72 and 73: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 71 bore full
Page 74 and 75: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 73 loyal to
Page 76 and 77: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 75 for it ca
Page 78 and 79: 9 REPORT TO LONDON ROOSEVELT ARRIVE
Page 80 and 81: REPORT TO LONDON 79 scious of the p
Page 82 and 83: REPORT TO LONDON 81 glee with a fol
Page 84 and 85: 10 WHAT WAS LEARNED FROM THE OPERAT
Page 86 and 87: WHAT WAS LEARNED 85 engaged in Midd
Page 88 and 89: WHAT WAS LEARNED 87 tion felt was s
Page 90 and 91: WHAT WAS LEARNED 89 it would have b
Page 92 and 93: APPENDICES APPENDIX A: INITIAL OPER
Page 94 and 95: APPENDIX A Initial Operation Plan f
Page 96 and 97: APPENDIX A 95 A. After agreement wi
Page 98 and 99: press and propaganda who will: APPE
Page 100 and 101: THE FIGHT OVER I R A N ' S OIL CIA
Page 102 and 103: I. INTRODUCTION APPENDIX B London D
Page 104 and 105: APPENDIX B 103 coup the best chance
Page 106 and 107: APPENDIX B 105 2. Second Stage: Wit
Page 108 and 109: APPENDIX B 107 merits the Shah may
Page 110 and 111: APPENDIX B 109 National Bank and it
Page 112 and 113: APPENDIX B 111 Phase 2. A massive p
Page 116 and 117: APPENDIX B 115 (2) Other religious
Page 118 and 119: APPENDIX B 117 C. If the coup is no
Page 120 and 121: APPENDIX C Foreign Office Memorandu
Page 122 and 123: Britain's Meddling in Iran Britain
Page 124 and 125: APPENDIX D Report on Military Plann
Page 126 and 127: APPENDIX D 125 drawn primarily from
Page 128 and 129: APPENDIX D 127 other British Army o
Page 130 and 131: APPENDIX D 129 and Carroll agreed t
Page 132 and 133: APPENDIX D 131 Colonel Ashrafi, Mil
Page 134 and 135: APPENDIX D 133 Zahedi, and General
Page 136 and 137: APPENDIX E Military Critique Lesson
Page 138 and 139: APPENDIX E 137 ferent in each case,
Page 140 and 141: APPENDIX E 139 officers in command
Page 142 and 143: APPENDIX E 141 must be seized or pr
Page 144 and 145: APPENDIX E 143 has been wounded, ar
Page 146 and 147: APPENDIX E 145 ly forces should be
Page 148 and 149: A P P E N D I X E 147 • The possi
Page 150 and 151: SUMMARY 149 covert operations. In A
Page 152 and 153: SUMMARY 151 dismissing Mossadeq, ap
Page 154: SUMMARY 153 as well as certain prov
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