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PREFACE IN OCTOBER 2003, WHILE VISITING the dentist's office, I met an Iranian who had recently started there as a dentist. It was just before President George W. Bush had attacked Iraq—a tragic and bloody blunder. The Iranian's name was Ali Fatemi, and we struck up a candid discussion on the Middle East in our brief encounter. At one point in the conversation, I asked Fatemi, somewhat jokingly, if he was related to Hoseyn Fatemi, the maverick nationalist foreign minister under the regime of former Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq. His response surprised me: "He was my uncle," he said. We then talked about the coup that took place in Iran in 1953, and he told me that his family had fled to San Francisco when it looked as though serious trouble was brewing in his country. He told me that he still remembers the day he found out that his uncle had been killed. He was swimming in the pool of the hotel where his family was staying at the time when they received the news that his uncle Foreign Minister Fatemi had been executed by a firing squad. I mentioned to him that I had read a redacted version of a secret CIA report detailing how U.S. and British intelligence, from behind the scenes, had planned and orchestrated the coup. Fatemi told me that he had seen the un-redacted version of the report in Farsi, the language of Iran. He knew full-well who was behind the bloody plan to depose Mossadeq and the murder of his uncle. Since that time, I have related this story to many people to illustrate the anger that Iranians still harbor toward Washington. It is worse than that though, as Iranians' anti-West views have
8 THE CIA IN IRAN only increased with time. While access to oil dictated Washington's Middle East policy in the 1950s, today, it is the U.S. government's staunch support for Israel, at the expense of the Palestinian people, that has exacerbated the situation. The simple fact is, for too long Americans have received only half the story of U.S. involvement in Iran, thanks to the craven mainstream U.S. media. Americans fail to understand the context that led to the Iranian Revolution in 1979, which threw out the Shah. And it was this event that led to the hostage crisis, where 50 U.S. embassy staffers in Tehran were held for 444 days by Iranian students, who were reacting to U.S. support for the Shah. Iranians remember that history well, particularly the days after the CIA successfully carried out its overthrow. Mossadeq stood accused of defying the Shah's order to resign and of trying to overthrow the Iranian regime. He was found guilty and sentenced to death. His sentence was commuted because of his age—he was 70 years old at the time—but he was still forced to serve out the rest of his life in solitary confinement. Others were not so lucky. Thousands of Mossadeq's supporters in government and the military were also rounded up in the days following the coup, and hundreds of them were executed just like Fatemi's uncle. As the United States and Iran are now again in confrontation, it is critical that we look back to 1953, when U.S. intelligence, working in conjunction with the British, bought off key officials in the Iranian government and the military, committed acts of terrorism and set up a once popular Iranian prime minister for the purpose of overthrowing a secular populist government that had been taking root there. And that is why American Free Press is publishing this once top-secret CIA document, which provides the often shocking details of how secret intelligence operatives, working out of the U.S. embassy, planned the overthrow of the democratically elected government of Iran, led by Mossadeq. For America to understand the deep-seated anti-West views held by many Iranians today, we must go back to 1953. It is with this in mind that American Free Press is bringing you the full report, published in the United States for the first time with
Page 2 and 3: Published by American Free Press, T
Page 4 and 5: DEDICATION This book is dedicated t
Page 6 and 7: TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE .........
Page 10 and 11: PREFACE 9 only minimal redactions.
Page 12 and 13: HISTORIAN'S NOTE THIS STUDY WAS ORI
Page 14 and 15: 1 PRELIMINARY STEPS REPRESENTATIVES
Page 16 and 17: PRELIMINARY STEPS 15 Subsequent con
Page 18 and 19: 2 DRAFTING THE PLAN NEAR THE END OF
Page 20 and 21: DRAFTING THE PLAN 19 of the assets
Page 22 and 23: DRAFTING THE PLAN 21 proved to be a
Page 24 and 25: 3 THE OPERATIONAL PLAN ON THE AFTER
Page 26 and 27: OPERATIONAL PLAN 25 the approval or
Page 28 and 29: 4 ACTIVITY B E G I N S SINCE THE ME
Page 30 and 31: ACTIVITY BEGINS 29 important factor
Page 32 and 33: ACTIVITY B E G I N S 31 da aspects
Page 34 and 35: 5 MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHA
Page 36 and 37: MOUNTING PRESSURE 35 tain dates, wa
Page 38 and 39: MOUNTING PRESSURE 37 ative, for the
Page 40 and 41: MOUNTING PRESSURE 39 would constitu
Page 42 and 43: MOUNTING PRESSURE 41 were unnecessa
Page 44 and 45: MOUNTING PRESSURE 43 Zahedi; accord
Page 46 and 47: 6 THE F I R S T TRY THE PRECISE ORD
Page 48 and 49: THE FIRST TRY 47 their operation, M
Page 50 and 51: THE RASHIDIAN BROTHERS THREE IRANIA
Page 52 and 53: 7 APPARENT F A I L U R E AT 0545 HO
Page 54 and 55: APPARENT FAILURE 53 had been "authe
Page 56 and 57: APPARENT FAILURE 55 Persian typewri
Page 58 and 59:
APPARENT FAILURE 57 not be consider
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APPARENT FAILURE 59 thing to do?" A
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APPARENT FAILURE 61 cerning his fut
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APPARENT F A I L U R E 63 ning for
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APPARENT FAILURE 65 and Headquarter
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8 THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS WHILE ON T
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 69 to the op
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 71 bore full
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 73 loyal to
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 75 for it ca
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9 REPORT TO LONDON ROOSEVELT ARRIVE
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REPORT TO LONDON 79 scious of the p
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REPORT TO LONDON 81 glee with a fol
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10 WHAT WAS LEARNED FROM THE OPERAT
Page 86 and 87:
WHAT WAS LEARNED 85 engaged in Midd
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WHAT WAS LEARNED 87 tion felt was s
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WHAT WAS LEARNED 89 it would have b
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APPENDICES APPENDIX A: INITIAL OPER
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APPENDIX A Initial Operation Plan f
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APPENDIX A 95 A. After agreement wi
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press and propaganda who will: APPE
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THE FIGHT OVER I R A N ' S OIL CIA
Page 102 and 103:
I. INTRODUCTION APPENDIX B London D
Page 104 and 105:
APPENDIX B 103 coup the best chance
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APPENDIX B 105 2. Second Stage: Wit
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APPENDIX B 107 merits the Shah may
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APPENDIX B 109 National Bank and it
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APPENDIX B 111 Phase 2. A massive p
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APPENDIX B 113 Its basic aim will b
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APPENDIX B 115 (2) Other religious
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APPENDIX B 117 C. If the coup is no
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APPENDIX C Foreign Office Memorandu
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Britain's Meddling in Iran Britain
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APPENDIX D Report on Military Plann
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APPENDIX D 125 drawn primarily from
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APPENDIX D 127 other British Army o
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APPENDIX D 129 and Carroll agreed t
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APPENDIX D 131 Colonel Ashrafi, Mil
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APPENDIX D 133 Zahedi, and General
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APPENDIX E Military Critique Lesson
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APPENDIX E 137 ferent in each case,
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APPENDIX E 139 officers in command
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APPENDIX E 141 must be seized or pr
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APPENDIX E 143 has been wounded, ar
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APPENDIX E 145 ly forces should be
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A P P E N D I X E 147 • The possi
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SUMMARY 149 covert operations. In A
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SUMMARY 151 dismissing Mossadeq, ap
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SUMMARY 153 as well as certain prov
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