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1 PRELIMINARY STEPS REPRESENTATIVES OF BRITISH INTELLIGENCE met with Near East and Africa (NEA) Division representatives in Washington during November and December 1952 for the purpose of discussing joint war and stay behind plans in Iran. In attendance for British Intelligence were Mr. Christopher Montague Woodhouse, recently Chief of Station for British Intelligence in Tehran; Mr. Samuel Falle of the British Intelligence Station in Tehran; and Mr. John Bruce Lockhart, SIS Washington representative. In attendance for NEA Division were Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Chief of Division, Mr. John H. Leavitt, Chief of Iran Branch; Mr. John W. Pendleton, Deputy Chief of Division; and Mr. James A. Darling, Chief of NEA Paramilitary Staff. Although it was not on the previously agreed agenda of the meeting, British Intelligence representatives brought up the proposition of a joint political action to remove Prime Minister Mossadeq. The NEA Division had not intended to discuss this question at all and was unprepared to do so. The meeting concluded without any decision being made and with the NEA Division committing itself only to study in more detail the political action proposals advanced by British Intelligence. In March 1953 a telegram was received from the Tehran Station
14 THE CIA IN IRAN which stated that General [REDACTED] had contacted the assistant military attache and had requested Ambassador [Loy] Henderson's views as to whether or nor the U.S. Government was interested in covertly supporting an Iranian military effort to oust Premier Mossadeq. A meeting was held in the Embassy at which Headquarters personnel, then in the field, and station personnel were in attendance. A cautiously worded reply was drafted at Headquarters and its substance delivered to General [REDACTED]. The reply did not commit the United States in any way but was mildly encouraging and revealed some U.S. interest in the idea. On the basis of the [REDACTED] overture and other clear signs that determined opposition to Mossadeq was taking shape, and in view of the totally destructive and reckless attitude of the government of Prime Minister Mossadeq, General Walter Bedell Smith, Undersecretary of State, determined that the U.S. government could no longer approve of the Mossadeq government and would prefer a successor government in which there would be no National Frontists. The change in policy was communicated to CIA, and the NEA Division was informed that it was authorized to consider operations which would contribute to the fall of the Mossadeq government. The Department of State and CIA jointly informed Ambassador Henderson and the Chief of Station, Roger Goiran, of the new policy and of the operational authorization. The Director, on 4 April 1953, approved a budget of $1,000,000 which could be used by the Tehran Station in any way that would bring about the fall of Mossadeq. Full authority was given to Ambassador Henderson and the Chief of Station enabling any part or all of the $1,000,000 to be used without further authority, as long as the Ambassador and the station concurred. On 16 April 1953 a comprehensive study entitled: "Factors Involved in the Overthrow of Mossadeq" was completed. The study indicated that a Shah-General Zahedi combination, supported by CIA local assets and financial backing, would have a good chance of overthrowing Mossadeq, particularly if this combination should be able to get the largest mobs in the streets and if a sizable portion of the Tehran garrison refused to carry out Mossadeq's orders.
Page 2 and 3: Published by American Free Press, T
Page 4 and 5: DEDICATION This book is dedicated t
Page 6 and 7: TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE .........
Page 8 and 9: PREFACE IN OCTOBER 2003, WHILE VISI
Page 10 and 11: PREFACE 9 only minimal redactions.
Page 12 and 13: HISTORIAN'S NOTE THIS STUDY WAS ORI
Page 16 and 17: PRELIMINARY STEPS 15 Subsequent con
Page 18 and 19: 2 DRAFTING THE PLAN NEAR THE END OF
Page 20 and 21: DRAFTING THE PLAN 19 of the assets
Page 22 and 23: DRAFTING THE PLAN 21 proved to be a
Page 24 and 25: 3 THE OPERATIONAL PLAN ON THE AFTER
Page 26 and 27: OPERATIONAL PLAN 25 the approval or
Page 28 and 29: 4 ACTIVITY B E G I N S SINCE THE ME
Page 30 and 31: ACTIVITY BEGINS 29 important factor
Page 32 and 33: ACTIVITY B E G I N S 31 da aspects
Page 34 and 35: 5 MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHA
Page 36 and 37: MOUNTING PRESSURE 35 tain dates, wa
Page 38 and 39: MOUNTING PRESSURE 37 ative, for the
Page 40 and 41: MOUNTING PRESSURE 39 would constitu
Page 42 and 43: MOUNTING PRESSURE 41 were unnecessa
Page 44 and 45: MOUNTING PRESSURE 43 Zahedi; accord
Page 46 and 47: 6 THE F I R S T TRY THE PRECISE ORD
Page 48 and 49: THE FIRST TRY 47 their operation, M
Page 50 and 51: THE RASHIDIAN BROTHERS THREE IRANIA
Page 52 and 53: 7 APPARENT F A I L U R E AT 0545 HO
Page 54 and 55: APPARENT FAILURE 53 had been "authe
Page 56 and 57: APPARENT FAILURE 55 Persian typewri
Page 58 and 59: APPARENT FAILURE 57 not be consider
Page 60 and 61: APPARENT FAILURE 59 thing to do?" A
Page 62 and 63: APPARENT FAILURE 61 cerning his fut
Page 64 and 65:
APPARENT F A I L U R E 63 ning for
Page 66 and 67:
APPARENT FAILURE 65 and Headquarter
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8 THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS WHILE ON T
Page 70 and 71:
THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 69 to the op
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 71 bore full
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 73 loyal to
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 75 for it ca
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9 REPORT TO LONDON ROOSEVELT ARRIVE
Page 80 and 81:
REPORT TO LONDON 79 scious of the p
Page 82 and 83:
REPORT TO LONDON 81 glee with a fol
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10 WHAT WAS LEARNED FROM THE OPERAT
Page 86 and 87:
WHAT WAS LEARNED 85 engaged in Midd
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WHAT WAS LEARNED 87 tion felt was s
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WHAT WAS LEARNED 89 it would have b
Page 92 and 93:
APPENDICES APPENDIX A: INITIAL OPER
Page 94 and 95:
APPENDIX A Initial Operation Plan f
Page 96 and 97:
APPENDIX A 95 A. After agreement wi
Page 98 and 99:
press and propaganda who will: APPE
Page 100 and 101:
THE FIGHT OVER I R A N ' S OIL CIA
Page 102 and 103:
I. INTRODUCTION APPENDIX B London D
Page 104 and 105:
APPENDIX B 103 coup the best chance
Page 106 and 107:
APPENDIX B 105 2. Second Stage: Wit
Page 108 and 109:
APPENDIX B 107 merits the Shah may
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APPENDIX B 109 National Bank and it
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APPENDIX B 111 Phase 2. A massive p
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APPENDIX B 113 Its basic aim will b
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APPENDIX B 115 (2) Other religious
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APPENDIX B 117 C. If the coup is no
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APPENDIX C Foreign Office Memorandu
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Britain's Meddling in Iran Britain
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APPENDIX D Report on Military Plann
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APPENDIX D 125 drawn primarily from
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APPENDIX D 127 other British Army o
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APPENDIX D 129 and Carroll agreed t
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APPENDIX D 131 Colonel Ashrafi, Mil
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APPENDIX D 133 Zahedi, and General
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APPENDIX E Military Critique Lesson
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APPENDIX E 137 ferent in each case,
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APPENDIX E 139 officers in command
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APPENDIX E 141 must be seized or pr
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APPENDIX E 143 has been wounded, ar
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APPENDIX E 145 ly forces should be
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A P P E N D I X E 147 • The possi
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SUMMARY 149 covert operations. In A
Page 152 and 153:
SUMMARY 151 dismissing Mossadeq, ap
Page 154:
SUMMARY 153 as well as certain prov
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