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WHAT WAS LEARNED 87 tion felt was so essential. With regard to the fact that the military aspect of the plan was balanced, or complemented, by action designed to result in publicly expressed hostility to the government of Mossadeq, it was in this field that those in charge of executing the plan had to deviate the most from its details. The plan placed emphasis upon a program for a massive bast, or political sanctuary movement, against the government; but it was found impossible to bring this into being because of the dissolution of the Majlis and because the most influential religious leaders were not willing to make the commitments required of them. This unwillingness of the leaders had been foreseen by the planners, but they had been assured by the principal agents of SIS that these leaders would take whatever action was required of them. Failing in this respect, public hostility was fanned in a number of other ways, some suggested by the station to its agents and others thought up by agents. This activity has been covered in the earlier pages dealing with events in Tehran, and here it is necessary to repeat only one conclusion concerning what was learned during the operation as to the influence of the press in Iran. It must be admitted that in the years and months working with a subsidized press and its venal (or patriotic) journalists in Tehran, the station was still not sure whether it was achieving results comparable to the sums so spent. In July and early August every segment of the press with which we or the United Kingdom had working relations went all out against Mossadeq. As judged by the public reactions on the days following 16 August, there can be no doubt whatsoever that this campaign had reached a very large audience and had directly influenced their thinking in a most positive way. A separate analysis of this press operation should be made to serve as basic guidance in mounting future campaigns. The operation was a time of testing for the U.S. principal agents and for those of the station agents who were committed to the effort. All these agents did a superb job. It is easy to say that they did such a good job because they were not merely carrying out orders but were heart and soul in favor of the operation. This
88 THE CIA IN IRAN is true, but the fact must not be overlooked that in recruiting these individuals over a considerable period of time the station wittingly selected people whose basic ideologies were in accord with U.S. policy toward Iran and the USSR. This factor should not be overlooked in future recruitment in Iran. A word should be said about the fact that the high caliber of the agents was reflected in their performances. In one of the most critical periods station principal agents [REDACTED] were out of touch with the station, but on their own initiative took actions of just the type the station would have assigned to them. The performance of the indigenous agents is just one factor in the demonstration of the values received from long-term station planning. Another such factor of real importance was the capability of the station to produce indigenous documents on short order, documents which stood serious scrutiny shortly after they had been manufactured. This program has long been under development. The operation did reveal a need for the development of other long-term assets. Important in this field is the procurement of safehouses, at least two of which should be kept completely uncontaminated until time of real emergency. While the executors of the plan made brilliant use of the grounds of the Embassy and of houses occupied by U.S. personnel, this effort could have been nullified by a careful watch on the Embassy by agents of the government. Among the other long-term assets which the station feels should be developed are independent printing and reproduction facilities. The station believes that these facilities should be within the Embassy. This matter is now under discussion as it would appear that the movement of supplies into the Embassy and the removal of the finished products for distribution would create a serious security problem. The major role in the execution of the operational plan was assumed by U.S. assets. This does not mean, however, that the operation could have been carried through without the active cooperation of the United Kingdom and their assets. For one thing,
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Published by American Free Press, T
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DEDICATION This book is dedicated t
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TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE .........
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PREFACE IN OCTOBER 2003, WHILE VISI
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PREFACE 9 only minimal redactions.
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HISTORIAN'S NOTE THIS STUDY WAS ORI
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1 PRELIMINARY STEPS REPRESENTATIVES
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PRELIMINARY STEPS 15 Subsequent con
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2 DRAFTING THE PLAN NEAR THE END OF
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DRAFTING THE PLAN 19 of the assets
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DRAFTING THE PLAN 21 proved to be a
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3 THE OPERATIONAL PLAN ON THE AFTER
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OPERATIONAL PLAN 25 the approval or
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4 ACTIVITY B E G I N S SINCE THE ME
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ACTIVITY BEGINS 29 important factor
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ACTIVITY B E G I N S 31 da aspects
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5 MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHA
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 35 tain dates, wa
Page 38 and 39: MOUNTING PRESSURE 37 ative, for the
Page 40 and 41: MOUNTING PRESSURE 39 would constitu
Page 42 and 43: MOUNTING PRESSURE 41 were unnecessa
Page 44 and 45: MOUNTING PRESSURE 43 Zahedi; accord
Page 46 and 47: 6 THE F I R S T TRY THE PRECISE ORD
Page 48 and 49: THE FIRST TRY 47 their operation, M
Page 50 and 51: THE RASHIDIAN BROTHERS THREE IRANIA
Page 52 and 53: 7 APPARENT F A I L U R E AT 0545 HO
Page 54 and 55: APPARENT FAILURE 53 had been "authe
Page 56 and 57: APPARENT FAILURE 55 Persian typewri
Page 58 and 59: APPARENT FAILURE 57 not be consider
Page 60 and 61: APPARENT FAILURE 59 thing to do?" A
Page 62 and 63: APPARENT FAILURE 61 cerning his fut
Page 64 and 65: APPARENT F A I L U R E 63 ning for
Page 66 and 67: APPARENT FAILURE 65 and Headquarter
Page 68 and 69: 8 THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS WHILE ON T
Page 70 and 71: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 69 to the op
Page 72 and 73: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 71 bore full
Page 74 and 75: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 73 loyal to
Page 76 and 77: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 75 for it ca
Page 78 and 79: 9 REPORT TO LONDON ROOSEVELT ARRIVE
Page 80 and 81: REPORT TO LONDON 79 scious of the p
Page 82 and 83: REPORT TO LONDON 81 glee with a fol
Page 84 and 85: 10 WHAT WAS LEARNED FROM THE OPERAT
Page 86 and 87: WHAT WAS LEARNED 85 engaged in Midd
Page 90 and 91: WHAT WAS LEARNED 89 it would have b
Page 92 and 93: APPENDICES APPENDIX A: INITIAL OPER
Page 94 and 95: APPENDIX A Initial Operation Plan f
Page 96 and 97: APPENDIX A 95 A. After agreement wi
Page 98 and 99: press and propaganda who will: APPE
Page 100 and 101: THE FIGHT OVER I R A N ' S OIL CIA
Page 102 and 103: I. INTRODUCTION APPENDIX B London D
Page 104 and 105: APPENDIX B 103 coup the best chance
Page 106 and 107: APPENDIX B 105 2. Second Stage: Wit
Page 108 and 109: APPENDIX B 107 merits the Shah may
Page 110 and 111: APPENDIX B 109 National Bank and it
Page 112 and 113: APPENDIX B 111 Phase 2. A massive p
Page 114 and 115: APPENDIX B 113 Its basic aim will b
Page 116 and 117: APPENDIX B 115 (2) Other religious
Page 118 and 119: APPENDIX B 117 C. If the coup is no
Page 120 and 121: APPENDIX C Foreign Office Memorandu
Page 122 and 123: Britain's Meddling in Iran Britain
Page 124 and 125: APPENDIX D Report on Military Plann
Page 126 and 127: APPENDIX D 125 drawn primarily from
Page 128 and 129: APPENDIX D 127 other British Army o
Page 130 and 131: APPENDIX D 129 and Carroll agreed t
Page 132 and 133: APPENDIX D 131 Colonel Ashrafi, Mil
Page 134 and 135: APPENDIX D 133 Zahedi, and General
Page 136 and 137: APPENDIX E Military Critique Lesson
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APPENDIX E 137 ferent in each case,
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APPENDIX E 139 officers in command
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APPENDIX E 141 must be seized or pr
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APPENDIX E 143 has been wounded, ar
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APPENDIX E 145 ly forces should be
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A P P E N D I X E 147 • The possi
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SUMMARY 149 covert operations. In A
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SUMMARY 151 dismissing Mossadeq, ap
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SUMMARY 153 as well as certain prov
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