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APPENDIX E 145 ly forces should be drawn up by the CIA military officer and the military bureau. • If possible, a CIA radio net should be created specifically for the coup d'etat tying our CIA field officer with the military bureau which in turn should be tied in to the headquarters and command units for friendly forces. Where this practice is not feasible, other means of communication should primarily be relied upon. But in all situations a primary and alternate means of communication among these elements should be created. • Military planning should be based upon the principle that some elements [within] friendly forces will be exposed, and that our operation must not collapse on that account. Therefore, danger signals should be included which automatically call for movement from one phase to the other depending upon who or what units have been exposed to the hostile government. In Iran there was good reason to believe that danger signals so noted prior to the change of government were instrumental in keeping alive an operation which, to an outsider, appeared to have failed. • The possibility of civil war must be accepted by our military planners and measures taken within the plan for the eventuality. Such an eventuality might possibly include the necessity for establishing a safebase for the new friendly government. Possibilities and eventualities stemming from civil war can only be seen upon the analysis of each local situation, but they are not difficult to foresee and should certainly be planned for. • The creation of safehouse bases for operational contacts must be planned for and executed well in advance of the commitment of our friendly forces. Several safehouses or safebases should be found in order to maintain contact with friendly elements in the event one or more of our safehouses are blown. In cases where CIA personnel are all stationed within an embassy the operational situation demands that safehouses and safebases be established. These safehouses should ideally include radio, independent telephone, or other means of communications, depending upon the local situation. In situations in which it is necessary to cache money, ammunition, arms, clothing, food, and documents,
146 THE CIA IN IRAN safehouses should be found with secure keepers capable of securing these items. • Support items such as automobiles, taxicabs, and other vehicles should be procured and kept sterile well in advance of the operational situation. • Compartmentation of persons and units who compose our friendly forces should be made wherever possible. In the event a part of our operation be exposed, it is vital that interrogation not disclose our entire assets. • Members of the military bureau should under no circumstances actively participate in the operation because under interrogation they would be in a position to disclose too much. N. The military board should include both staff officers and line officers, and as many functional specialists as may be necessary under local conditions. A communications staff officer will be found very useful. • Possibilities of blowback against the United States should always be in the back of the minds of CIA officers involved in this type of operation. Few, if any, operations are as explosive as this type. This fact makes it imperative that the best trained and experienced officers who can be found be assigned. • Military planning should include the possibilities of complete failure and, therefore, should include an evacuation scheme for CIA and indigenous personnel who might be exposed. Aircraft of American military attaches, evasion and escape nets, and other operational assets might have to be employed. If none of these assets exists then hiding places should be created in advance of the operation which are kept sterile throughout. • Commitments to friendly persons should be kept well within our ability to make good. In Iran we did not rely upon bribery because we felt that those officers who would accept bribes would probably betray the operation in the event of extreme difficulty, i.e., torture. In Iran we did not spend one cent in the purchase of officers. • Forethought should also be given to the problem of care and keeping of wives and families of friendly officers.
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Published by American Free Press, T
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DEDICATION This book is dedicated t
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TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE .........
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PREFACE IN OCTOBER 2003, WHILE VISI
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PREFACE 9 only minimal redactions.
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HISTORIAN'S NOTE THIS STUDY WAS ORI
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1 PRELIMINARY STEPS REPRESENTATIVES
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PRELIMINARY STEPS 15 Subsequent con
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2 DRAFTING THE PLAN NEAR THE END OF
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DRAFTING THE PLAN 19 of the assets
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DRAFTING THE PLAN 21 proved to be a
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3 THE OPERATIONAL PLAN ON THE AFTER
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OPERATIONAL PLAN 25 the approval or
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4 ACTIVITY B E G I N S SINCE THE ME
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ACTIVITY BEGINS 29 important factor
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ACTIVITY B E G I N S 31 da aspects
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5 MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHA
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 35 tain dates, wa
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 37 ative, for the
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 39 would constitu
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 41 were unnecessa
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 43 Zahedi; accord
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6 THE F I R S T TRY THE PRECISE ORD
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THE FIRST TRY 47 their operation, M
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THE RASHIDIAN BROTHERS THREE IRANIA
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7 APPARENT F A I L U R E AT 0545 HO
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APPARENT FAILURE 53 had been "authe
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APPARENT FAILURE 55 Persian typewri
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APPARENT FAILURE 57 not be consider
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APPARENT FAILURE 59 thing to do?" A
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APPARENT FAILURE 61 cerning his fut
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APPARENT F A I L U R E 63 ning for
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APPARENT FAILURE 65 and Headquarter
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8 THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS WHILE ON T
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 69 to the op
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 71 bore full
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 73 loyal to
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 75 for it ca
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9 REPORT TO LONDON ROOSEVELT ARRIVE
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REPORT TO LONDON 79 scious of the p
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REPORT TO LONDON 81 glee with a fol
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10 WHAT WAS LEARNED FROM THE OPERAT
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WHAT WAS LEARNED 85 engaged in Midd
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WHAT WAS LEARNED 87 tion felt was s
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WHAT WAS LEARNED 89 it would have b
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APPENDICES APPENDIX A: INITIAL OPER
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APPENDIX A Initial Operation Plan f
Page 96 and 97: APPENDIX A 95 A. After agreement wi
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Page 100 and 101: THE FIGHT OVER I R A N ' S OIL CIA
Page 102 and 103: I. INTRODUCTION APPENDIX B London D
Page 104 and 105: APPENDIX B 103 coup the best chance
Page 106 and 107: APPENDIX B 105 2. Second Stage: Wit
Page 108 and 109: APPENDIX B 107 merits the Shah may
Page 110 and 111: APPENDIX B 109 National Bank and it
Page 112 and 113: APPENDIX B 111 Phase 2. A massive p
Page 114 and 115: APPENDIX B 113 Its basic aim will b
Page 116 and 117: APPENDIX B 115 (2) Other religious
Page 118 and 119: APPENDIX B 117 C. If the coup is no
Page 120 and 121: APPENDIX C Foreign Office Memorandu
Page 122 and 123: Britain's Meddling in Iran Britain
Page 124 and 125: APPENDIX D Report on Military Plann
Page 126 and 127: APPENDIX D 125 drawn primarily from
Page 128 and 129: APPENDIX D 127 other British Army o
Page 130 and 131: APPENDIX D 129 and Carroll agreed t
Page 132 and 133: APPENDIX D 131 Colonel Ashrafi, Mil
Page 134 and 135: APPENDIX D 133 Zahedi, and General
Page 136 and 137: APPENDIX E Military Critique Lesson
Page 138 and 139: APPENDIX E 137 ferent in each case,
Page 140 and 141: APPENDIX E 139 officers in command
Page 142 and 143: APPENDIX E 141 must be seized or pr
Page 144 and 145: APPENDIX E 143 has been wounded, ar
Page 148 and 149: A P P E N D I X E 147 • The possi
Page 150 and 151: SUMMARY 149 covert operations. In A
Page 152 and 153: SUMMARY 151 dismissing Mossadeq, ap
Page 154: SUMMARY 153 as well as certain prov
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