Untitled

More documents

Recommendations

Info

THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 73 loyal to the Shah, and stated that all of Azerbaijan was in the hands of the army. As it continued broadcasting, it became apparent that one of the speakers, [Mohammad Deyhim, head of the Fedakaran-i- Azerbaijan] and an effective sub-agent of station assets had played an important role in events at Tabriz. By 1800 hours the station at Isfahan was on the air with strong statements in favor of the Shah and Zahedi by such elements as local editors, a member of Baghai's Toiler's Party, religious leaders, and staff officers—all groups which we had hoped would react in this fashion. Not until 2000 hours did the radio station at Kerman proclaim loyalty to the new government. Meshed Radio was not heard from at all, but the religious-minded town turned loyalist almost immediately after the news of the change had been sent out over Radio Tehran. Known Tudehites were pursued and shops of Tudeh sympathizers looted. Colonel [Farzanegan] following Zahedi's instruction, and Carroll now closed up the operation. While [Batmangelich] had [been named chief of staff, Farzanegan]—at that office—kept in touch by phone and placed known supporters of Ajax in command of all units of the Tehran garrison, seized key military targets, and executed the arrest lists. As the afternoon drew to its close, Radio Tehran seemed to get down to a less haphazard schedule. From 1800 hours on, it made short announcements of government appointees. At 1845 hours the Associated Press representative and The New York Times man made fairly brief statements on the events of the day, intended for their home offices. Brief government communiques dealt with curfew hours, contained warnings against demonstrations, etc. A general news summary at 2100 hours was followed by a statement from Zahedi, installed in the office of the Chief of Police, and before 2200 hours the station had signed off for the night. The hectic day was over and curfew now in effect. Lives had been lost, but not nearly as many as stated in the white heat of the actual events. The security forces were firmly in control and well prepared to destroy any counter-effort. How had other interested parties weathered the exciting day? One such must have felt real anguish. This was the USSR and its
74 THE CIA IN IRAN people in Iran. Radio Moscow lagged far behind the rest of the world and did not put out a summary of the day's events at Tehran until 2300 hours GMT. Its Persian program that reached Iran early in the afternoon was built around the text of the earlier Pravda article entitled "The Failure of the American Adventure in Iran," and this program was repeated early in the evening. The same Pravda article was broadcast throughout the late afternoon and early evening from Moscow in English, Arabic, Bulgarian, Polish, Czech and Slovak, German, Dutch, Italian, Portuguese, and Turkish, although by that time nearly every one of its listeners must have known that this material was no longer applicable. The other parties to the original plan felt elated, and possibly self-satisfied. While the reactions of the Shah at Rome are rather beyond the scope of this account, one or two of his remarks are worth citing as they bear upon some of the original assumptions of the Ajax plan. He said, "It was my people who have shown me that they were faithful to the monarchy and that two and a half years of false propaganda were not enough," and again, "My country didn't want the Communists and therefore have been faithful to me." At Nicosia the earliest FBI intercepts had not been translated and distributed until nearly mid-afternoon local time. As word passed from Leavitt to Darbyshire, the latter became so excited that he drove his friend right to his office outside of the town, something he and his associates had always avoided doing in earlier weeks. Headquarters had its first word of what the day was to bring just before 0900 hours when someone burst in from the hall pouring out what at first seemed to be a bad joke—in view of the depression that still hung on from the day before—the news that Mossadeq was on the way out. Throughout the morning, the afternoon, and until late that night people hurried down the corridors with fresh slips of ticker tape. During the entire day only two Ajax cables were received from the station. However, it was a day that should never have ended
Page 2 and 3:
Published by American Free Press, T
Page 4 and 5:
DEDICATION This book is dedicated t
Page 6 and 7:
TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE .........
Page 8 and 9:
PREFACE IN OCTOBER 2003, WHILE VISI
Page 10 and 11:
PREFACE 9 only minimal redactions.
Page 12 and 13:
HISTORIAN'S NOTE THIS STUDY WAS ORI
Page 14 and 15:
1 PRELIMINARY STEPS REPRESENTATIVES
Page 16 and 17:
PRELIMINARY STEPS 15 Subsequent con
Page 18 and 19:
2 DRAFTING THE PLAN NEAR THE END OF
Page 20 and 21:
DRAFTING THE PLAN 19 of the assets
Page 22 and 23:
DRAFTING THE PLAN 21 proved to be a
Page 24 and 25: 3 THE OPERATIONAL PLAN ON THE AFTER
Page 26 and 27: OPERATIONAL PLAN 25 the approval or
Page 28 and 29: 4 ACTIVITY B E G I N S SINCE THE ME
Page 30 and 31: ACTIVITY BEGINS 29 important factor
Page 32 and 33: ACTIVITY B E G I N S 31 da aspects
Page 34 and 35: 5 MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHA
Page 36 and 37: MOUNTING PRESSURE 35 tain dates, wa
Page 38 and 39: MOUNTING PRESSURE 37 ative, for the
Page 40 and 41: MOUNTING PRESSURE 39 would constitu
Page 42 and 43: MOUNTING PRESSURE 41 were unnecessa
Page 44 and 45: MOUNTING PRESSURE 43 Zahedi; accord
Page 46 and 47: 6 THE F I R S T TRY THE PRECISE ORD
Page 48 and 49: THE FIRST TRY 47 their operation, M
Page 50 and 51: THE RASHIDIAN BROTHERS THREE IRANIA
Page 52 and 53: 7 APPARENT F A I L U R E AT 0545 HO
Page 54 and 55: APPARENT FAILURE 53 had been "authe
Page 56 and 57: APPARENT FAILURE 55 Persian typewri
Page 58 and 59: APPARENT FAILURE 57 not be consider
Page 60 and 61: APPARENT FAILURE 59 thing to do?" A
Page 62 and 63: APPARENT FAILURE 61 cerning his fut
Page 64 and 65: APPARENT F A I L U R E 63 ning for
Page 66 and 67: APPARENT FAILURE 65 and Headquarter
Page 68 and 69: 8 THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS WHILE ON T
Page 70 and 71: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 69 to the op
Page 72 and 73: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 71 bore full
Page 76 and 77: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 75 for it ca
Page 78 and 79: 9 REPORT TO LONDON ROOSEVELT ARRIVE
Page 80 and 81: REPORT TO LONDON 79 scious of the p
Page 82 and 83: REPORT TO LONDON 81 glee with a fol
Page 84 and 85: 10 WHAT WAS LEARNED FROM THE OPERAT
Page 86 and 87: WHAT WAS LEARNED 85 engaged in Midd
Page 88 and 89: WHAT WAS LEARNED 87 tion felt was s
Page 90 and 91: WHAT WAS LEARNED 89 it would have b
Page 92 and 93: APPENDICES APPENDIX A: INITIAL OPER
Page 94 and 95: APPENDIX A Initial Operation Plan f
Page 96 and 97: APPENDIX A 95 A. After agreement wi
Page 98 and 99: press and propaganda who will: APPE
Page 100 and 101: THE FIGHT OVER I R A N ' S OIL CIA
Page 102 and 103: I. INTRODUCTION APPENDIX B London D
Page 104 and 105: APPENDIX B 103 coup the best chance
Page 106 and 107: APPENDIX B 105 2. Second Stage: Wit
Page 108 and 109: APPENDIX B 107 merits the Shah may
Page 110 and 111: APPENDIX B 109 National Bank and it
Page 112 and 113: APPENDIX B 111 Phase 2. A massive p
Page 114 and 115: APPENDIX B 113 Its basic aim will b
Page 116 and 117: APPENDIX B 115 (2) Other religious
Page 118 and 119: APPENDIX B 117 C. If the coup is no
Page 120 and 121: APPENDIX C Foreign Office Memorandu
Page 122 and 123: Britain's Meddling in Iran Britain
Page 124 and 125:
APPENDIX D Report on Military Plann
Page 126 and 127:
APPENDIX D 125 drawn primarily from
Page 128 and 129:
APPENDIX D 127 other British Army o
Page 130 and 131:
APPENDIX D 129 and Carroll agreed t
Page 132 and 133:
APPENDIX D 131 Colonel Ashrafi, Mil
Page 134 and 135:
APPENDIX D 133 Zahedi, and General
Page 136 and 137:
APPENDIX E Military Critique Lesson
Page 138 and 139:
APPENDIX E 137 ferent in each case,
Page 140 and 141:
APPENDIX E 139 officers in command
Page 142 and 143:
APPENDIX E 141 must be seized or pr
Page 144 and 145:
APPENDIX E 143 has been wounded, ar
Page 146 and 147:
APPENDIX E 145 ly forces should be
Page 148 and 149:
A P P E N D I X E 147 • The possi
Page 150 and 151:
SUMMARY 149 covert operations. In A
Page 152 and 153:
SUMMARY 151 dismissing Mossadeq, ap
Page 154:
SUMMARY 153 as well as certain prov
show all

Untitled

Create successful ePaper yourself

Delete template?

Save as template?