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10 WHAT WAS LEARNED FROM THE OPERATION TWO ELEMENTS LENDING SUPPORT to the operation seemed unable to meet the sudden demand for utmost speed and accomplishment. These were Communications and the Psychological Warfare (PW) Senior Staff. Many individual communications officers—at Headquarters, Nicosia, and Tehran—worked many extra hours and displayed commendable zeal and initiative in dealing with a great volume of traffic. Between 14 May and 1 September a total of 990 Ajax messages entered or left Headquarters. The unsatisfactory phase of communications was the three-way link between Headquarters, Nicosia, and Tehran by which MECA facilities were made available for almost simultaneous transmission from any one of the three stations named to the other two. Until near the end of the period of the operation, there was considerable delay in Tehran messages destined for Nicosia and for those in the opposite direction. It may also be suggested that transmission time was not rapid as had been hoped. Very few "operational immediate" messages were originated by any of the three stations, but when Tehran sent such a message it took from three to four hours to get to Headquarters measured from the time
84 THE CIA IN IRAN the enciphered message was filed for transmission until the deciphered message reached the branch desk. In July support was sought from the PW Staff. Both the branch and higher levels were anxious to have certain items, including the texts of news articles, commentaries and editorials, appear in papers in this country. The texts themselves were prepared by NE/4 Branch on themes agreed upon by Headquarters and the station. It was planned to cable summaries of such planted material to the station for distribution to the friendly local press and, hence, to backstop the active propaganda campaign against Mossadeq. This support was not forthcoming. It appeared to the branch as if the staff lacked contacts capable of placing material so that the American publisher was unwitting as to its source, as well as being able to see that no changes in theme or emphasis were made. In contrast to this relatively ineffective venture, the Iran desk of the State Department was able to place a CIA study in Newsweek, using the normal channel of desk officer to journalist. Recognizing the fact that the Agency is not able to employ such a channel as just described, it does appear that some improvement of capabilities might be desirable. Either those contacts used to secure the unwitting publication of material should be expanded and improved, or else there should be a provision made for passing material directly to cleared editors and owners of press media. Throughout the course of the operation, members of the Agency were in touch with members of SIS in Washington, Nicosia, London, and—incidentally—Cairo. In all but one of these places, we were on their home ground and hence, in a position to penetrate their organization, particularly with regard to building up personal histories of its personnel. The apparent fact that this organization was quite ready to act as the junior partner in this operation has been covered in an earlier paragraph, as has the indication that individual SIS officers made a definite effort to win the friendship and confidence of their contacts. The existence of friction between SIS headquarters and the station at Nicosia was also of interest to us. However, of greatest interest from an operational point of view was the very limited number of personnel
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Published by American Free Press, T
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DEDICATION This book is dedicated t
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TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE .........
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PREFACE IN OCTOBER 2003, WHILE VISI
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PREFACE 9 only minimal redactions.
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HISTORIAN'S NOTE THIS STUDY WAS ORI
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1 PRELIMINARY STEPS REPRESENTATIVES
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PRELIMINARY STEPS 15 Subsequent con
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2 DRAFTING THE PLAN NEAR THE END OF
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DRAFTING THE PLAN 19 of the assets
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DRAFTING THE PLAN 21 proved to be a
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3 THE OPERATIONAL PLAN ON THE AFTER
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OPERATIONAL PLAN 25 the approval or
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4 ACTIVITY B E G I N S SINCE THE ME
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ACTIVITY BEGINS 29 important factor
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ACTIVITY B E G I N S 31 da aspects
Page 34 and 35: 5 MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHA
Page 36 and 37: MOUNTING PRESSURE 35 tain dates, wa
Page 38 and 39: MOUNTING PRESSURE 37 ative, for the
Page 40 and 41: MOUNTING PRESSURE 39 would constitu
Page 42 and 43: MOUNTING PRESSURE 41 were unnecessa
Page 44 and 45: MOUNTING PRESSURE 43 Zahedi; accord
Page 46 and 47: 6 THE F I R S T TRY THE PRECISE ORD
Page 48 and 49: THE FIRST TRY 47 their operation, M
Page 50 and 51: THE RASHIDIAN BROTHERS THREE IRANIA
Page 52 and 53: 7 APPARENT F A I L U R E AT 0545 HO
Page 54 and 55: APPARENT FAILURE 53 had been "authe
Page 56 and 57: APPARENT FAILURE 55 Persian typewri
Page 58 and 59: APPARENT FAILURE 57 not be consider
Page 60 and 61: APPARENT FAILURE 59 thing to do?" A
Page 62 and 63: APPARENT FAILURE 61 cerning his fut
Page 64 and 65: APPARENT F A I L U R E 63 ning for
Page 66 and 67: APPARENT FAILURE 65 and Headquarter
Page 68 and 69: 8 THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS WHILE ON T
Page 70 and 71: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 69 to the op
Page 72 and 73: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 71 bore full
Page 74 and 75: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 73 loyal to
Page 76 and 77: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 75 for it ca
Page 78 and 79: 9 REPORT TO LONDON ROOSEVELT ARRIVE
Page 80 and 81: REPORT TO LONDON 79 scious of the p
Page 82 and 83: REPORT TO LONDON 81 glee with a fol
Page 86 and 87: WHAT WAS LEARNED 85 engaged in Midd
Page 88 and 89: WHAT WAS LEARNED 87 tion felt was s
Page 90 and 91: WHAT WAS LEARNED 89 it would have b
Page 92 and 93: APPENDICES APPENDIX A: INITIAL OPER
Page 94 and 95: APPENDIX A Initial Operation Plan f
Page 96 and 97: APPENDIX A 95 A. After agreement wi
Page 98 and 99: press and propaganda who will: APPE
Page 100 and 101: THE FIGHT OVER I R A N ' S OIL CIA
Page 102 and 103: I. INTRODUCTION APPENDIX B London D
Page 104 and 105: APPENDIX B 103 coup the best chance
Page 106 and 107: APPENDIX B 105 2. Second Stage: Wit
Page 108 and 109: APPENDIX B 107 merits the Shah may
Page 110 and 111: APPENDIX B 109 National Bank and it
Page 112 and 113: APPENDIX B 111 Phase 2. A massive p
Page 114 and 115: APPENDIX B 113 Its basic aim will b
Page 116 and 117: APPENDIX B 115 (2) Other religious
Page 118 and 119: APPENDIX B 117 C. If the coup is no
Page 120 and 121: APPENDIX C Foreign Office Memorandu
Page 122 and 123: Britain's Meddling in Iran Britain
Page 124 and 125: APPENDIX D Report on Military Plann
Page 126 and 127: APPENDIX D 125 drawn primarily from
Page 128 and 129: APPENDIX D 127 other British Army o
Page 130 and 131: APPENDIX D 129 and Carroll agreed t
Page 132 and 133: APPENDIX D 131 Colonel Ashrafi, Mil
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APPENDIX D 133 Zahedi, and General
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APPENDIX E Military Critique Lesson
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APPENDIX E 137 ferent in each case,
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APPENDIX E 139 officers in command
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APPENDIX E 141 must be seized or pr
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APPENDIX E 143 has been wounded, ar
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APPENDIX E 145 ly forces should be
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A P P E N D I X E 147 • The possi
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SUMMARY 149 covert operations. In A
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SUMMARY 151 dismissing Mossadeq, ap
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SUMMARY 153 as well as certain prov
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