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APPENDIX D 127 other British Army officers on duty with SIS, went over two military plans which had been drawn by the branch task force. Both of our military plans used the same arrest lists for military and civilian persons in Tehran. These lists were compiled as a result of a long study of pro-Mossadeq Iranians, and later proved to be at least 90 percent correct. The British approved the arrest lists after their CE [counter-espionage] expert and their biographical section studied them. A third arrest list, the Tudeh Arrest List, was studied very carefully by SIS Tudeh Party experts and was approved without addition. It would seem that our appraisal of Iranians must have been based upon approximately the same information.'' While these arrest lists were farmed out to SIS experts, Carroll sat down to study the two military plans with Major Keen and with the British major. The first plan was based upon the assumption that [Colonel Ashrafi] was a controlled British agent [and that his Third Mountain Brigade would follow his commands.] After a detailed examination of the Target List for Neutralization In the City of Tehran (machine gun factory, Ministry of Post and Telegraph, Office of the Chief of Staff, etc.), SIS stated that the targets we had listed for neutralization were the correct ones and that we had assigned duties for components of the Third Mountain Brigade about as well as any other way they might suggest. We next turned to an examination of our second military plan based upon the assumption that Carroll might be able to develop assets in Tehran capable of controlling three brigades. We all agreed that it would be extremely hazardous to base all of our hopes upon one brigade out of the five in Tehran and that, if possible, we should attempt to develop additional forces. SIS approved this plan and they then passed both plans up to a brigadier who returned them the next day without comment. During these discussions a cable arrived in London via Cyprus from Tehran in which Tehran Station reported General Zahedi's "military assets." This message confirmed all of our fears. For some time the Station had been attempting to persuade General Zahedi to list his military assets and to indicate how he hoped to use them.
128 THE CIA IN IRAN At last General Zahedi reported. He claimed none of the five brigades in Tehran. His military plan assumed that he might be able to use the Imperial Guard, some troops from the Department of Army Transport, components from the Department of Police, and components of the Armed Customs Guard. He also hoped that Colonel [Timur Bakhtiar] might be able to bring troops to Tehran from [Kermanshah.] SIS asked Carroll to write for them an appreciation of Zahedi's plan. In that appraisal it was stated that he did not believe the Shah would sign a farman dismissing Mossadeq until Zahedi could indicate to him how Chief of Staff Riahi's control over the Tehran garrison could be broken; further, he felt that if Ajax were to succeed military assets must be developed within the five brigades in Tehran. SIS agreed in London that military tasks should take the following priority: 1. Seizure and occupation of designated points. 2. Execution of arrest and detention lists. 3. Neutralization of pro-Mossadeq military forces in Tehran. 4. Neutralization of the city of Tehran. 5. Reinforcement of pro-Zahedi forces in Tehran by forces outside of the city. These priorities were laid down because it was desired that communications be knocked out as soon as possible in order to prevent pro-Mossadeq forces and personnel from communicating with each other. Carroll left London on the first available aircraft following these conferences, arrived in Tehran on 21 July, and got in touch with [Farzanegan.] Sifting through [Farzanegan's] operational contact reports covering all of his important conversations in Tehran [after his arrival from the United States], two officers were noted as being of special promise. These were contact reports of conversations with Major General [Nadr Batmangelich] and with Colonel [Hassan Akhavi], both of whom were old and good friends of [Farzanegan]. These two officers reflected the fear of the Tudeh party that was becoming general after the Tudeh showing of 21 July. Goiran, Goodwin,
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Published by American Free Press, T
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DEDICATION This book is dedicated t
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TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE .........
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PREFACE IN OCTOBER 2003, WHILE VISI
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PREFACE 9 only minimal redactions.
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HISTORIAN'S NOTE THIS STUDY WAS ORI
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1 PRELIMINARY STEPS REPRESENTATIVES
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PRELIMINARY STEPS 15 Subsequent con
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2 DRAFTING THE PLAN NEAR THE END OF
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DRAFTING THE PLAN 19 of the assets
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DRAFTING THE PLAN 21 proved to be a
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3 THE OPERATIONAL PLAN ON THE AFTER
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OPERATIONAL PLAN 25 the approval or
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4 ACTIVITY B E G I N S SINCE THE ME
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ACTIVITY BEGINS 29 important factor
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ACTIVITY B E G I N S 31 da aspects
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5 MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHA
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 35 tain dates, wa
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 37 ative, for the
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 39 would constitu
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 41 were unnecessa
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 43 Zahedi; accord
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6 THE F I R S T TRY THE PRECISE ORD
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THE FIRST TRY 47 their operation, M
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THE RASHIDIAN BROTHERS THREE IRANIA
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7 APPARENT F A I L U R E AT 0545 HO
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APPARENT FAILURE 53 had been "authe
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APPARENT FAILURE 55 Persian typewri
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APPARENT FAILURE 57 not be consider
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APPARENT FAILURE 59 thing to do?" A
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APPARENT FAILURE 61 cerning his fut
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APPARENT F A I L U R E 63 ning for
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APPARENT FAILURE 65 and Headquarter
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8 THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS WHILE ON T
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 69 to the op
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 71 bore full
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 73 loyal to
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 75 for it ca
Page 78 and 79: 9 REPORT TO LONDON ROOSEVELT ARRIVE
Page 80 and 81: REPORT TO LONDON 79 scious of the p
Page 82 and 83: REPORT TO LONDON 81 glee with a fol
Page 84 and 85: 10 WHAT WAS LEARNED FROM THE OPERAT
Page 86 and 87: WHAT WAS LEARNED 85 engaged in Midd
Page 88 and 89: WHAT WAS LEARNED 87 tion felt was s
Page 90 and 91: WHAT WAS LEARNED 89 it would have b
Page 92 and 93: APPENDICES APPENDIX A: INITIAL OPER
Page 94 and 95: APPENDIX A Initial Operation Plan f
Page 96 and 97: APPENDIX A 95 A. After agreement wi
Page 98 and 99: press and propaganda who will: APPE
Page 100 and 101: THE FIGHT OVER I R A N ' S OIL CIA
Page 102 and 103: I. INTRODUCTION APPENDIX B London D
Page 104 and 105: APPENDIX B 103 coup the best chance
Page 106 and 107: APPENDIX B 105 2. Second Stage: Wit
Page 108 and 109: APPENDIX B 107 merits the Shah may
Page 110 and 111: APPENDIX B 109 National Bank and it
Page 112 and 113: APPENDIX B 111 Phase 2. A massive p
Page 114 and 115: APPENDIX B 113 Its basic aim will b
Page 116 and 117: APPENDIX B 115 (2) Other religious
Page 118 and 119: APPENDIX B 117 C. If the coup is no
Page 120 and 121: APPENDIX C Foreign Office Memorandu
Page 122 and 123: Britain's Meddling in Iran Britain
Page 124 and 125: APPENDIX D Report on Military Plann
Page 126 and 127: APPENDIX D 125 drawn primarily from
Page 130 and 131: APPENDIX D 129 and Carroll agreed t
Page 132 and 133: APPENDIX D 131 Colonel Ashrafi, Mil
Page 134 and 135: APPENDIX D 133 Zahedi, and General
Page 136 and 137: APPENDIX E Military Critique Lesson
Page 138 and 139: APPENDIX E 137 ferent in each case,
Page 140 and 141: APPENDIX E 139 officers in command
Page 142 and 143: APPENDIX E 141 must be seized or pr
Page 144 and 145: APPENDIX E 143 has been wounded, ar
Page 146 and 147: APPENDIX E 145 ly forces should be
Page 148 and 149: A P P E N D I X E 147 • The possi
Page 150 and 151: SUMMARY 149 covert operations. In A
Page 152 and 153: SUMMARY 151 dismissing Mossadeq, ap
Page 154: SUMMARY 153 as well as certain prov
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