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APPENDIX D 131 Colonel Ashrafi, Military Governor and Commanding Officer of the Third Mountain Brigade. Colonel Novzari, Commanding Officer of the Second Armore Brigade would probably remain neutral but we felt it imperative that his deputy, Lt. Colonel Bahrami, be arrested. It therefore became clear from the military point of view that success might depend upon whether or not General Riahi succeeded in arresting our friends before we arrested his, and that the test of strength would very largely rest upon the amount of security we were able to maintain while attempting to knit all of our friends into a functioning team. It also was clear that we had to devise a scheme capable of carrying our operations in the event our first platoon of young officers was arrested. Carroll therefore worked for two nights with Colonels [Farzanegan and Zand-Karimi] devising a system which would work in the event our first team was arrested. The danger signal we adopted to alert battalion and company commanders to take independent action was the arrest of Colonel {Zand-Karimi] and of his closest friends. The weakness in our plan lay in the fact that the station would not be in a position to contact battalion and company commanders but would have to depend upon Colonel [Zand-Karimi] to do the job. While discussing this subject, Colonel [Zand-Karimi] stated that he would be able to contact lower unit commanders within 48 hours after receipt of the Shah's farman. The hesitation of the Shah in signing the farman worked to our advantage for it gave us several more important days in which to discuss with Colonel [Zand-Karimi] the development of our final staff plans which was based upon the use of the units which his friends commanded. This problem was complicated by the fact that Colonel [Akhavi] became violently ill and was later forced to retire to his bed. As the climax approached, tension increased and it is not inconceivable that tension caused by fear had something to do with Colonel [Akhavi's] illness. Colonel [Akhavi] did remain on his feet long enough to speak to the Shah on 9 August in an interview which later proved vital to the success of the military phase of Ajax. Until Colonel [Akhavi] saw the Shah, he was not certain that our friends in the Tehran garrison would act without
132 THE CIA IN IRAN the Shah's approval. However, after talking with the Shah, Colonel [Akhavi] was able to tell Colonel [Zand-Karimi] that the Shah did desire military support in the event he should decide to sign the farman. Colonel [Akhavi] was asked by the Shah whether or not the Army would back a farman dismissing Mossadeq. Colonel [Akhavi] told the Shah that he had been meeting with Carroll and that a reasonable staff plan was being prepared, one that assured victory if it were carried out properly. The Shah then asked [Akhavi] for the names of the officers who would cooperate, and Colonel [Akhavi] reported the same names which we had earlier submitted to the Shah through Asadollah Rashidian. He asked [Akhavi] to meet General Zahedi. In reporting the substance of his audience with the Shah, Colonel [Akhavi] asked the station if the United States would support General Zahedi. He was told that it would. Colonel [Zand-Karimi] also accepted General Zahedi. Both officers stated that they had not been in touch with General Zahedi for several months but believed him to be a very good leader. During the nights of 11, 12 and 13 August, staff planning continued based upon the use of forty line commanders within the Tehran garrison. Colonel [Akhavi] met General Zahedi who agreed that General [Batmangelich] might be chief of staff. General [Batmangelich] expressed the desire to meet Carroll and to discuss plans with him, Farzanegan, Colonel [Akhavi], and Colonel [Zand-Karimi]. This meeting was postponed until we felt our staff plan was complete enough for General [Batmangelich] to act upon it. On 11 August Zahedi asked [Akhavi] to have [Farzanegan] come to see him. General Zahedi and [Farzanegan] talked for three hours. [Farzanegan] reported that General Zahedi was extremely appreciative of American assistance and asked [Farzanegan] to act as liaison officer between him-self and the Americans for military purposes; he also asked him to become his officer in charge of the Military Bureau which had been meeting with Carroll during the last week. On 12 August Farzanegan took General [Batmangelich] to see
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Published by American Free Press, T
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DEDICATION This book is dedicated t
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TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE .........
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PREFACE IN OCTOBER 2003, WHILE VISI
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PREFACE 9 only minimal redactions.
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HISTORIAN'S NOTE THIS STUDY WAS ORI
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1 PRELIMINARY STEPS REPRESENTATIVES
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PRELIMINARY STEPS 15 Subsequent con
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2 DRAFTING THE PLAN NEAR THE END OF
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DRAFTING THE PLAN 19 of the assets
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DRAFTING THE PLAN 21 proved to be a
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3 THE OPERATIONAL PLAN ON THE AFTER
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OPERATIONAL PLAN 25 the approval or
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4 ACTIVITY B E G I N S SINCE THE ME
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ACTIVITY BEGINS 29 important factor
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ACTIVITY B E G I N S 31 da aspects
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5 MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHA
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 35 tain dates, wa
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 37 ative, for the
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 39 would constitu
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 41 were unnecessa
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 43 Zahedi; accord
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6 THE F I R S T TRY THE PRECISE ORD
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THE FIRST TRY 47 their operation, M
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THE RASHIDIAN BROTHERS THREE IRANIA
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7 APPARENT F A I L U R E AT 0545 HO
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APPARENT FAILURE 53 had been "authe
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APPARENT FAILURE 55 Persian typewri
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APPARENT FAILURE 57 not be consider
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APPARENT FAILURE 59 thing to do?" A
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APPARENT FAILURE 61 cerning his fut
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APPARENT F A I L U R E 63 ning for
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APPARENT FAILURE 65 and Headquarter
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8 THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS WHILE ON T
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 69 to the op
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 71 bore full
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 73 loyal to
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 75 for it ca
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9 REPORT TO LONDON ROOSEVELT ARRIVE
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REPORT TO LONDON 79 scious of the p
Page 82 and 83: REPORT TO LONDON 81 glee with a fol
Page 84 and 85: 10 WHAT WAS LEARNED FROM THE OPERAT
Page 86 and 87: WHAT WAS LEARNED 85 engaged in Midd
Page 88 and 89: WHAT WAS LEARNED 87 tion felt was s
Page 90 and 91: WHAT WAS LEARNED 89 it would have b
Page 92 and 93: APPENDICES APPENDIX A: INITIAL OPER
Page 94 and 95: APPENDIX A Initial Operation Plan f
Page 96 and 97: APPENDIX A 95 A. After agreement wi
Page 98 and 99: press and propaganda who will: APPE
Page 100 and 101: THE FIGHT OVER I R A N ' S OIL CIA
Page 102 and 103: I. INTRODUCTION APPENDIX B London D
Page 104 and 105: APPENDIX B 103 coup the best chance
Page 106 and 107: APPENDIX B 105 2. Second Stage: Wit
Page 108 and 109: APPENDIX B 107 merits the Shah may
Page 110 and 111: APPENDIX B 109 National Bank and it
Page 112 and 113: APPENDIX B 111 Phase 2. A massive p
Page 114 and 115: APPENDIX B 113 Its basic aim will b
Page 116 and 117: APPENDIX B 115 (2) Other religious
Page 118 and 119: APPENDIX B 117 C. If the coup is no
Page 120 and 121: APPENDIX C Foreign Office Memorandu
Page 122 and 123: Britain's Meddling in Iran Britain
Page 124 and 125: APPENDIX D Report on Military Plann
Page 126 and 127: APPENDIX D 125 drawn primarily from
Page 128 and 129: APPENDIX D 127 other British Army o
Page 130 and 131: APPENDIX D 129 and Carroll agreed t
Page 134 and 135: APPENDIX D 133 Zahedi, and General
Page 136 and 137: APPENDIX E Military Critique Lesson
Page 138 and 139: APPENDIX E 137 ferent in each case,
Page 140 and 141: APPENDIX E 139 officers in command
Page 142 and 143: APPENDIX E 141 must be seized or pr
Page 144 and 145: APPENDIX E 143 has been wounded, ar
Page 146 and 147: APPENDIX E 145 ly forces should be
Page 148 and 149: A P P E N D I X E 147 • The possi
Page 150 and 151: SUMMARY 149 covert operations. In A
Page 152 and 153: SUMMARY 151 dismissing Mossadeq, ap
Page 154: SUMMARY 153 as well as certain prov
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