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APPENDIX D 125 drawn primarily from members of the pro-Mossadeq Iran Party. It had to be assumed that the chief of staff and officers within all sections of his staff were under control of Mossadeq. It has also to be assumed that at least three out of five of the brigade commanders in Tehran were completely under General Riahi's control. Those assumptions proved to be correct. SIS reported that Colonel [Ashrafi, military governor of Tehran and commanding officer of the Third Mountain Brigade,] could be relied upon; this later turned out to be incorrect but for staff planning purposes in June it had to be assumed correct. It was disappointing to learn that Major General Zahedi, Prime Minister designate under Ajax, possessed almost no military assets. General Zahedi, therefore, could not be relied upon to execute his own staff plan. In the early part of July, the branch task force was able to draw up a plan designed to neutralize the Tehran garrison and to isolate all other brigades in Iran. It appeared at that time that only a very small force could be relied upon by CIA, primarily the Third Mountain Brigade in Tehran. Therefore, our first staff plan was based upon the use of the Third Mountain Brigade for the capture and arrest of the officers assigned to the Chief of Staff, as well as the arrest and neutralization of all other forces in the city of Tehran. Because of the fact that CIA did not possess any military assets capable at that time of helping Ajax, it was suggested that Station agent Colonel [Aban Farzanegan] be given special training. [Farzanegan] was trained in a safehouse in Washington with the assistance of instructors from the training division. [Farzanegan] had no idea what lay before him. He had never previously participated in any military action, although he had been superbly trained [in logistics in the Command and General Staff School at Ft. Leavenworth. Further, he had been assistant military attache for Iran in Washington for several years, and] before that had been the [Iranian liaison officer to the United States Military Assistance Advisory Group in Tehran. He, therefore, had a good grasp of American army methods. He was a Signal Corps officer by profession.] Because of the extreme sensitivity of Ajax, [Farzanegan] was given the lie detector test. In early July, [Farzanegan] was directed
126 THE CIA IN IRAN to go to Tehran and to renew all of his old contacts within the Iranian army. In June, Carroll was assigned TDY [temporary duty] to Cyprus to work with Donald Wilber, NEA Planning Officer, and SIS. Carroll concentrated on military planning aspects with SIS, and ascertained the extent to which SIS could control Iran military assets. Headquarters was extremely concerned because the plan assumed that the Shah would sign a farman dismissing Mossadeq without being certain that his army officers and men were well organized enough to force Mossadeq from office in the event Mossadeq did not obey the farman, since CIA and SIS did not possess military assets capable of being organized into an effective fighting force and it was feared that the development of new military assets and their organization into a fighting force could not be accomplished in time. SIS in Cyprus stated that it did have several important friends among the military, but the only officer among their friends then in a position to be of assistance to us was Colonel [Ashrafi.l SIS agreed that our preliminary military plan must be based on the assumption that Colonel [Ashrafi] would cooperate. Military Planner Carroll doubted whether one brigade out of five would be sufficient to overthrow Mossadeq and stated frankly that our military plan must be viewed as extremely tentative; he also stated that he hoped upon arrival in Tehran to find other assets in addition to Colonel [Ashrafi.] From the military point of view the discussions in Cyprus were extremely disappointing because they made it clear that they wanted to accomplish much but had very little with which to accomplish it. It also made it clear that Carroll and Colonel [Farzanegan] should arrive in Tehran as soon as possible where the military plan would of necessity have to be completed. On 15 July Carroll left for London where SIS studied the military plan for two days and approved it with little comment. They agreed that, if Ajax were to succeed, CIA must start from scratch and work quickly to find powerful friends among Iranian Army troop commanders. In London, Carroll with Major Keen and two
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Published by American Free Press, T
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DEDICATION This book is dedicated t
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TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE .........
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PREFACE IN OCTOBER 2003, WHILE VISI
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PREFACE 9 only minimal redactions.
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HISTORIAN'S NOTE THIS STUDY WAS ORI
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1 PRELIMINARY STEPS REPRESENTATIVES
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PRELIMINARY STEPS 15 Subsequent con
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2 DRAFTING THE PLAN NEAR THE END OF
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DRAFTING THE PLAN 19 of the assets
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DRAFTING THE PLAN 21 proved to be a
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3 THE OPERATIONAL PLAN ON THE AFTER
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OPERATIONAL PLAN 25 the approval or
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4 ACTIVITY B E G I N S SINCE THE ME
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ACTIVITY BEGINS 29 important factor
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ACTIVITY B E G I N S 31 da aspects
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5 MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHA
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 35 tain dates, wa
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 37 ative, for the
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 39 would constitu
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 41 were unnecessa
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MOUNTING PRESSURE 43 Zahedi; accord
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6 THE F I R S T TRY THE PRECISE ORD
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THE FIRST TRY 47 their operation, M
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THE RASHIDIAN BROTHERS THREE IRANIA
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7 APPARENT F A I L U R E AT 0545 HO
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APPARENT FAILURE 53 had been "authe
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APPARENT FAILURE 55 Persian typewri
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APPARENT FAILURE 57 not be consider
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APPARENT FAILURE 59 thing to do?" A
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APPARENT FAILURE 61 cerning his fut
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APPARENT F A I L U R E 63 ning for
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APPARENT FAILURE 65 and Headquarter
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8 THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS WHILE ON T
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 69 to the op
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 71 bore full
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THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 73 loyal to
Page 76 and 77: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 75 for it ca
Page 78 and 79: 9 REPORT TO LONDON ROOSEVELT ARRIVE
Page 80 and 81: REPORT TO LONDON 79 scious of the p
Page 82 and 83: REPORT TO LONDON 81 glee with a fol
Page 84 and 85: 10 WHAT WAS LEARNED FROM THE OPERAT
Page 86 and 87: WHAT WAS LEARNED 85 engaged in Midd
Page 88 and 89: WHAT WAS LEARNED 87 tion felt was s
Page 90 and 91: WHAT WAS LEARNED 89 it would have b
Page 92 and 93: APPENDICES APPENDIX A: INITIAL OPER
Page 94 and 95: APPENDIX A Initial Operation Plan f
Page 96 and 97: APPENDIX A 95 A. After agreement wi
Page 98 and 99: press and propaganda who will: APPE
Page 100 and 101: THE FIGHT OVER I R A N ' S OIL CIA
Page 102 and 103: I. INTRODUCTION APPENDIX B London D
Page 104 and 105: APPENDIX B 103 coup the best chance
Page 106 and 107: APPENDIX B 105 2. Second Stage: Wit
Page 108 and 109: APPENDIX B 107 merits the Shah may
Page 110 and 111: APPENDIX B 109 National Bank and it
Page 112 and 113: APPENDIX B 111 Phase 2. A massive p
Page 114 and 115: APPENDIX B 113 Its basic aim will b
Page 116 and 117: APPENDIX B 115 (2) Other religious
Page 118 and 119: APPENDIX B 117 C. If the coup is no
Page 120 and 121: APPENDIX C Foreign Office Memorandu
Page 122 and 123: Britain's Meddling in Iran Britain
Page 124 and 125: APPENDIX D Report on Military Plann
Page 128 and 129: APPENDIX D 127 other British Army o
Page 130 and 131: APPENDIX D 129 and Carroll agreed t
Page 132 and 133: APPENDIX D 131 Colonel Ashrafi, Mil
Page 134 and 135: APPENDIX D 133 Zahedi, and General
Page 136 and 137: APPENDIX E Military Critique Lesson
Page 138 and 139: APPENDIX E 137 ferent in each case,
Page 140 and 141: APPENDIX E 139 officers in command
Page 142 and 143: APPENDIX E 141 must be seized or pr
Page 144 and 145: APPENDIX E 143 has been wounded, ar
Page 146 and 147: APPENDIX E 145 ly forces should be
Page 148 and 149: A P P E N D I X E 147 • The possi
Page 150 and 151: SUMMARY 149 covert operations. In A
Page 152 and 153: SUMMARY 151 dismissing Mossadeq, ap
Page 154: SUMMARY 153 as well as certain prov
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