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7 APPARENT F A I L U R E AT 0545 HOURS ON THE MORNING of 16 August 1953, Radio Tehran came on the air with a special government communique covering the so-called abortive coup of the night just ending, and by 0600 hours Mossadeq was meeting with his cabinet to receive reports on the situation and to take steps to strengthen the security forces at government buildings and other vital points. Again at 0730 hours the communique was broadcast. Station personnel had passed an anxious, sleepless night in their office. From the fact that certain actions provided for in the military plan failed to materialize—no jeep with radio arrived at the compound, and the telephone system continued to function—it was obvious that something—or everything—had gone wrong. At 0500 hours, as soon as the curfew was lifted, Carroll toured the town and reported there was a concentration of tanks and troops around Mossadeq's house, and other security forces on the move. Then Colonel [Farzanegan] called the office to say that things had gone badly, and he, himself, was on the run toward the Embassy in search of refuge. At 0600 hours he appeared, gave a summary of the situation, which was like that of the government communique, and was rushed into hiding. The station was now suddenly faced with the task of rescuing the
52 THE CIA IN IRAN operation from total failure, and decisions of far-reaching effect were quickly taken. The first need was to establish contact with Ardeshir Zahedi, son of General Zahedi. At 0800 hours he sent word to the station of his whereabouts, and Roosevelt drove up to Shimran to hear that Areshir and his father felt that there was still hope in the situation. It was immediately decided that a strong effort must be made to convince the Iranian public that Zahedi was the legal head of the government and that Mossadeq was the usurper who had staged a coup. (It should be noted that all action taken from this time on corresponded to the basic estimate of the operational plan that the army would respond to the Shah if they were forced to choose between the ruler and Mossadeq.) This action was initiated by employing station communications facilities to relay a message to the New York Associated Press (AP) office stating that: "Unofficial reports are current to the effect that leaders of the plot are armed with two decrees of the Shah, one dismissing Mossadeq and the other appointing General Zahedi to replace him." In order to get an authoritative statement that could be distributed for local consumption, the station planned to send General McClure, head of the American Military Mission, to see the Shah and ask him whether the alleged farmans were valid. Later in the day it was learned that the Shah had fled. By 0930 hours the city was calm, with shops opening and people going about their normal business. However, tanks, extra soldiers, and police were stationed at key points, including the royal palaces which were sealed off from outside contact. Rumors began to circulate. The one that gained early attention was to the effect that the alleged coup had been inspired by the government in order to give Mossadeq an excuse to move against the Shah. At about this time Roosevelt sent General McClure to see General Riahi, Chief of Staff, to ask whether the U.S. Military Mission was still accredited to Mossadeq or someone else, as the Embassy had heard that an imperial farman had been issued naming Zahedi as Prime Minister. Riahi denied that the farman
Page 2 and 3: Published by American Free Press, T
Page 4 and 5: DEDICATION This book is dedicated t
Page 6 and 7: TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE .........
Page 8 and 9: PREFACE IN OCTOBER 2003, WHILE VISI
Page 10 and 11: PREFACE 9 only minimal redactions.
Page 12 and 13: HISTORIAN'S NOTE THIS STUDY WAS ORI
Page 14 and 15: 1 PRELIMINARY STEPS REPRESENTATIVES
Page 16 and 17: PRELIMINARY STEPS 15 Subsequent con
Page 18 and 19: 2 DRAFTING THE PLAN NEAR THE END OF
Page 20 and 21: DRAFTING THE PLAN 19 of the assets
Page 22 and 23: DRAFTING THE PLAN 21 proved to be a
Page 24 and 25: 3 THE OPERATIONAL PLAN ON THE AFTER
Page 26 and 27: OPERATIONAL PLAN 25 the approval or
Page 28 and 29: 4 ACTIVITY B E G I N S SINCE THE ME
Page 30 and 31: ACTIVITY BEGINS 29 important factor
Page 32 and 33: ACTIVITY B E G I N S 31 da aspects
Page 34 and 35: 5 MOUNTING PRESSURE AGAINST THE SHA
Page 36 and 37: MOUNTING PRESSURE 35 tain dates, wa
Page 38 and 39: MOUNTING PRESSURE 37 ative, for the
Page 40 and 41: MOUNTING PRESSURE 39 would constitu
Page 42 and 43: MOUNTING PRESSURE 41 were unnecessa
Page 44 and 45: MOUNTING PRESSURE 43 Zahedi; accord
Page 46 and 47: 6 THE F I R S T TRY THE PRECISE ORD
Page 48 and 49: THE FIRST TRY 47 their operation, M
Page 50 and 51: THE RASHIDIAN BROTHERS THREE IRANIA
Page 54 and 55: APPARENT FAILURE 53 had been "authe
Page 56 and 57: APPARENT FAILURE 55 Persian typewri
Page 58 and 59: APPARENT FAILURE 57 not be consider
Page 60 and 61: APPARENT FAILURE 59 thing to do?" A
Page 62 and 63: APPARENT FAILURE 61 cerning his fut
Page 64 and 65: APPARENT F A I L U R E 63 ning for
Page 66 and 67: APPARENT FAILURE 65 and Headquarter
Page 68 and 69: 8 THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS WHILE ON T
Page 70 and 71: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 69 to the op
Page 72 and 73: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 71 bore full
Page 74 and 75: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 73 loyal to
Page 76 and 77: THE SHAH IS VICTORIOUS 75 for it ca
Page 78 and 79: 9 REPORT TO LONDON ROOSEVELT ARRIVE
Page 80 and 81: REPORT TO LONDON 79 scious of the p
Page 82 and 83: REPORT TO LONDON 81 glee with a fol
Page 84 and 85: 10 WHAT WAS LEARNED FROM THE OPERAT
Page 86 and 87: WHAT WAS LEARNED 85 engaged in Midd
Page 88 and 89: WHAT WAS LEARNED 87 tion felt was s
Page 90 and 91: WHAT WAS LEARNED 89 it would have b
Page 92 and 93: APPENDICES APPENDIX A: INITIAL OPER
Page 94 and 95: APPENDIX A Initial Operation Plan f
Page 96 and 97: APPENDIX A 95 A. After agreement wi
Page 98 and 99: press and propaganda who will: APPE
Page 100 and 101: THE FIGHT OVER I R A N ' S OIL CIA
Page 102 and 103:
I. INTRODUCTION APPENDIX B London D
Page 104 and 105:
APPENDIX B 103 coup the best chance
Page 106 and 107:
APPENDIX B 105 2. Second Stage: Wit
Page 108 and 109:
APPENDIX B 107 merits the Shah may
Page 110 and 111:
APPENDIX B 109 National Bank and it
Page 112 and 113:
APPENDIX B 111 Phase 2. A massive p
Page 114 and 115:
APPENDIX B 113 Its basic aim will b
Page 116 and 117:
APPENDIX B 115 (2) Other religious
Page 118 and 119:
APPENDIX B 117 C. If the coup is no
Page 120 and 121:
APPENDIX C Foreign Office Memorandu
Page 122 and 123:
Britain's Meddling in Iran Britain
Page 124 and 125:
APPENDIX D Report on Military Plann
Page 126 and 127:
APPENDIX D 125 drawn primarily from
Page 128 and 129:
APPENDIX D 127 other British Army o
Page 130 and 131:
APPENDIX D 129 and Carroll agreed t
Page 132 and 133:
APPENDIX D 131 Colonel Ashrafi, Mil
Page 134 and 135:
APPENDIX D 133 Zahedi, and General
Page 136 and 137:
APPENDIX E Military Critique Lesson
Page 138 and 139:
APPENDIX E 137 ferent in each case,
Page 140 and 141:
APPENDIX E 139 officers in command
Page 142 and 143:
APPENDIX E 141 must be seized or pr
Page 144 and 145:
APPENDIX E 143 has been wounded, ar
Page 146 and 147:
APPENDIX E 145 ly forces should be
Page 148 and 149:
A P P E N D I X E 147 • The possi
Page 150 and 151:
SUMMARY 149 covert operations. In A
Page 152 and 153:
SUMMARY 151 dismissing Mossadeq, ap
Page 154:
SUMMARY 153 as well as certain prov
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