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Annual Report 2010 - SBM Offshore

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Implementation of Remuneration Policy<br />

2008 (RP 2008)<br />

Base salary<br />

The fixed part or base salary of the Managing Directors’<br />

total remuneration relates to the activities of the<br />

Company and the need to attract highly-qualified,<br />

internationally-orientated management. The base salary<br />

is reviewed on a regular basis, but at least annually to<br />

ascertain that its level remains competitive.<br />

Pension<br />

Managing Directors participate in a defined benefits<br />

Company pension plan which provides for retirement<br />

at the age of 62 with a maximum pension equal to 70%<br />

of final salary, earned at the rate of 2% for each year of<br />

service within the <strong>SBM</strong> <strong>Offshore</strong> group of companies.<br />

Premium is payable for 2/3 by the Company and for<br />

1/3 by the Managing Director which amount is capped<br />

at 20% of the base salary. This plan is reviewed on a<br />

regular basis by the Supervisory Board who can make<br />

adjustments when appropriate.<br />

Variable Remuneration<br />

The variable part of the Managing Directors’ remuneration<br />

is linked to the achievement of predetermined,<br />

measurable and influenceable targets, expressed<br />

as target zones. It is designed to strengthen the<br />

Managing Directors' commitment to the Company and<br />

its objectives and to align their interests with those of<br />

shareholders.<br />

The variable remuneration consists of:<br />

• a Short-Term Incentive: an annual bonus linked to<br />

the Company’s performance (Economic Profit) over<br />

the past financial year, payable partly in cash (80%)<br />

and partly in shares (20%). “At-target" performance<br />

will result in a bonus payment equal to 100% of<br />

the annual base salary received by the Managing<br />

Director in the performance year to which the<br />

bonus relates. The target zone for the Short-Term<br />

Incentive includes a threshold, i.e. bonus pay-out<br />

level if the minimum performance level is realised<br />

for any payment to occur (20% of annual base salary),<br />

as well as a cap, i.e. maximum bonus pay-out<br />

level (200% of annual base salary). To further align<br />

the interests of the Managing Director with those<br />

<strong>Report</strong> of Board of Management<br />

of the shareholders, there is a matching share<br />

arrangement aimed at strengthening the Managing<br />

Directors’ longer-term commitment to the Company.<br />

This matching share arrangement consists of the<br />

conditional grant of a number of shares equal to the<br />

number of shares granted as part payment of the<br />

bonus. These shares become unconditional upon<br />

completion of a three-year vesting period, subject to<br />

the Managing Directors’ continued employment with<br />

the Company until the vesting date. In case of retirement<br />

during the vesting period, matching shares will<br />

vest pro-rata. In case the Managing Director resigns<br />

during his term as Managing Director, all unvested<br />

matching shares lapse immediately.<br />

• a Long-Term Incentive: an award of conditional<br />

performance shares linked to the Company’s performance<br />

(annual average normalised growth of<br />

earnings per share) over three financial years, starting<br />

with the year in which the conditional shares are<br />

awarded. The number of conditional performance<br />

shares at the award date is, in value, the equivalent<br />

of 100% of the Managing Director’s base annual<br />

salary of the year preceding the year in which<br />

the conditional award is made. The target zone<br />

for the Long-Term Incentive includes a threshold<br />

below which no performance shares will vest. This<br />

threshold is 50% of the targeted annual averaged<br />

normalised EPS growth. At-target performance<br />

means realising a challenging averaged normalised<br />

EPS growth and results in a vesting of 100% of the<br />

number of shares granted. The maximum earnings<br />

possibility under the LTI plan is limited to 150% of<br />

the number of shares granted. For the year <strong>2010</strong>, the<br />

target annual averaged normalised EPS growth was<br />

set at 10% by the Supervisory Board, upon recommendation<br />

of the Remuneration Committee. The<br />

vesting period is three years. Vested performance<br />

shares are to be retained on a blocked securities<br />

account by the Managing Directors for a period of<br />

two years from the vesting date.<br />

•<br />

New Remuneration Policy 2011 (RP2011)<br />

Reasons for reviewing the existing RP 2008<br />

It is part of the Company’s policy to review the<br />

Remuneration Policy every three years. The RP 2008<br />

<strong>SBM</strong> <strong>Offshore</strong> – <strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2010</strong> 37

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