Annual Report 2010 - SBM Offshore
Annual Report 2010 - SBM Offshore
Annual Report 2010 - SBM Offshore
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Implementation of Remuneration Policy<br />
2008 (RP 2008)<br />
Base salary<br />
The fixed part or base salary of the Managing Directors’<br />
total remuneration relates to the activities of the<br />
Company and the need to attract highly-qualified,<br />
internationally-orientated management. The base salary<br />
is reviewed on a regular basis, but at least annually to<br />
ascertain that its level remains competitive.<br />
Pension<br />
Managing Directors participate in a defined benefits<br />
Company pension plan which provides for retirement<br />
at the age of 62 with a maximum pension equal to 70%<br />
of final salary, earned at the rate of 2% for each year of<br />
service within the <strong>SBM</strong> <strong>Offshore</strong> group of companies.<br />
Premium is payable for 2/3 by the Company and for<br />
1/3 by the Managing Director which amount is capped<br />
at 20% of the base salary. This plan is reviewed on a<br />
regular basis by the Supervisory Board who can make<br />
adjustments when appropriate.<br />
Variable Remuneration<br />
The variable part of the Managing Directors’ remuneration<br />
is linked to the achievement of predetermined,<br />
measurable and influenceable targets, expressed<br />
as target zones. It is designed to strengthen the<br />
Managing Directors' commitment to the Company and<br />
its objectives and to align their interests with those of<br />
shareholders.<br />
The variable remuneration consists of:<br />
• a Short-Term Incentive: an annual bonus linked to<br />
the Company’s performance (Economic Profit) over<br />
the past financial year, payable partly in cash (80%)<br />
and partly in shares (20%). “At-target" performance<br />
will result in a bonus payment equal to 100% of<br />
the annual base salary received by the Managing<br />
Director in the performance year to which the<br />
bonus relates. The target zone for the Short-Term<br />
Incentive includes a threshold, i.e. bonus pay-out<br />
level if the minimum performance level is realised<br />
for any payment to occur (20% of annual base salary),<br />
as well as a cap, i.e. maximum bonus pay-out<br />
level (200% of annual base salary). To further align<br />
the interests of the Managing Director with those<br />
<strong>Report</strong> of Board of Management<br />
of the shareholders, there is a matching share<br />
arrangement aimed at strengthening the Managing<br />
Directors’ longer-term commitment to the Company.<br />
This matching share arrangement consists of the<br />
conditional grant of a number of shares equal to the<br />
number of shares granted as part payment of the<br />
bonus. These shares become unconditional upon<br />
completion of a three-year vesting period, subject to<br />
the Managing Directors’ continued employment with<br />
the Company until the vesting date. In case of retirement<br />
during the vesting period, matching shares will<br />
vest pro-rata. In case the Managing Director resigns<br />
during his term as Managing Director, all unvested<br />
matching shares lapse immediately.<br />
• a Long-Term Incentive: an award of conditional<br />
performance shares linked to the Company’s performance<br />
(annual average normalised growth of<br />
earnings per share) over three financial years, starting<br />
with the year in which the conditional shares are<br />
awarded. The number of conditional performance<br />
shares at the award date is, in value, the equivalent<br />
of 100% of the Managing Director’s base annual<br />
salary of the year preceding the year in which<br />
the conditional award is made. The target zone<br />
for the Long-Term Incentive includes a threshold<br />
below which no performance shares will vest. This<br />
threshold is 50% of the targeted annual averaged<br />
normalised EPS growth. At-target performance<br />
means realising a challenging averaged normalised<br />
EPS growth and results in a vesting of 100% of the<br />
number of shares granted. The maximum earnings<br />
possibility under the LTI plan is limited to 150% of<br />
the number of shares granted. For the year <strong>2010</strong>, the<br />
target annual averaged normalised EPS growth was<br />
set at 10% by the Supervisory Board, upon recommendation<br />
of the Remuneration Committee. The<br />
vesting period is three years. Vested performance<br />
shares are to be retained on a blocked securities<br />
account by the Managing Directors for a period of<br />
two years from the vesting date.<br />
•<br />
New Remuneration Policy 2011 (RP2011)<br />
Reasons for reviewing the existing RP 2008<br />
It is part of the Company’s policy to review the<br />
Remuneration Policy every three years. The RP 2008<br />
<strong>SBM</strong> <strong>Offshore</strong> – <strong>Annual</strong> <strong>Report</strong> <strong>2010</strong> 37