Foucault, Biopolitics, and Governmentality
Foucault, Biopolitics, and Governmentality
Foucault, Biopolitics, and Governmentality
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MAURIZIO LAZZARATO<br />
“knowledge that is techne,” <strong>and</strong> does not risk anything by speaking, the<br />
parrhesiast takes the risk not only of polemics, but also of “hostility, war,<br />
hatred, <strong>and</strong> death.” He takes the risk of pitting equals against themselves.<br />
Between the speaker <strong>and</strong> what he enunciates, between the one who tells<br />
the truth <strong>and</strong> the one who accepts to receive the word, an affective <strong>and</strong><br />
subjective bond is established—a “belief,” which, as William James points<br />
out, is a “disposition to act.” 14 The self-relation, the relation to others, <strong>and</strong><br />
the belief that unites them, can be contained neither in equality nor in right.<br />
Crisis of parrhesia<br />
In the crisis of Greek democracy Rancière perceives simply a desire of the<br />
aristocrats to reestablish their birthright, status, <strong>and</strong> wealth, whereas<br />
<strong>Foucault</strong>, without disregarding this aspect, sees the crisis as coalescing<br />
around the relation between politics <strong>and</strong> ethics, equality <strong>and</strong> differentiation.<br />
The enemies of democracy put their finger on a problem that the<br />
proponents of equality as the sole principle of politics (Rancière <strong>and</strong><br />
Badiou) do not see, <strong>and</strong> which constitutes thereby one of the stumbling<br />
blocks of nineteenth <strong>and</strong> twentieth century communism, without this<br />
having led to any useful responses.<br />
As the enemies of equality claim, if everyone can have their say in the<br />
affairs of the city, there will be as many constitutions <strong>and</strong> governments as<br />
there are individuals. If everyone can take the floor, then the fools, the<br />
drunkards, will be authorized to state their opinions about public affairs in<br />
the same way as the best <strong>and</strong> those that are competent. In democracy,<br />
conflict <strong>and</strong> dispute, agonism <strong>and</strong> conflict among equals that all pretend to<br />
tell the truth, degenerate into seduction by orators who flatter the crowd in<br />
the assemblies. If the right to speak is h<strong>and</strong>ed out without control, “anyone<br />
can say anything.” How can we then distinguish the good from the bad<br />
orator? How can we produce an ethical differentiation? The truth, enemies<br />
of democracy always claim, cannot be spoken in a political field defined by<br />
the “indifference between speaking subjects”: “Democracy cannot make<br />
room for an ethical differentiation of subjects that speak, deliberate, <strong>and</strong> are<br />
capable of deciding.” 15<br />
14 See William James, La volonté de croire (Paris: Seuil, 2005) [The Will to Believe, <strong>and</strong><br />
Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 1897].<br />
15 <strong>Foucault</strong>, Le courage de la vérité, 46.<br />
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