Foucault, Biopolitics, and Governmentality
Foucault, Biopolitics, and Governmentality
Foucault, Biopolitics, and Governmentality
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MAURIZIO LAZZARATO<br />
movements after ’68 (the women’s movement or that of the unemployed)<br />
would be able to claim, “we are the people,” or, we are at the same time “the<br />
part <strong>and</strong> the whole.” In <strong>Foucault</strong>’s model, the problem is not to count those<br />
that have no part, or to demonstrate that they speak the same language as<br />
their masters, but it is to undertake a “transvaluation” of all values, which<br />
also, <strong>and</strong> first of all, concerns those that have no part <strong>and</strong> their mode of<br />
subjectivation. In this transvaluation, equality is connected to difference,<br />
<strong>and</strong> political equality to ethical differentiation. Through the Cynics we also<br />
once more encounter Nietzsche—these cynics that have entered the history<br />
of philosophy in the guise of “counterfeiters,” as those that have altered the<br />
“value” of money.<br />
The motto of the Cynics, “change the value of money,” refers both to the<br />
alteration of money (Nomisma) <strong>and</strong> of the law (Nomos). The Cynics did not<br />
dem<strong>and</strong> recognition, they did not want to be counted or included. They criticized<br />
the institutions <strong>and</strong> modes of life of their contemporaries, by experimentation<br />
with <strong>and</strong> testing themselves against others, <strong>and</strong> against the world.<br />
The problem of how to constitute the self as an ethico-political subject<br />
also involves particular truth-games:<br />
No longer the truth-game of apprenticeship, of the acquisition of true<br />
propositions <strong>and</strong> knowledge, as in Platonism, but the truth-game that<br />
bears on oneself, on what one is capable of doing, on the level of<br />
dependence one attains, on the progress to be made […] These truth<br />
games do not derive from the mathemata, they are not things that are<br />
taught <strong>and</strong> learned, they are exercises performed on the self – exercise,<br />
testing of oneself, a combat in this world. 22<br />
The political truth-games practiced in the constitution of another life <strong>and</strong><br />
another world are thus no longer those of recognition, demonstration, <strong>and</strong><br />
argumentative logic, but those of a politics of experimentation that binds<br />
together both the rights <strong>and</strong> formation of an ethos. The opposition between<br />
Plato <strong>and</strong> the Cynics is to some extent reminiscent of the one between<br />
Rancière <strong>and</strong> <strong>Foucault</strong>.<br />
22 <strong>Foucault</strong>, Le courage de la vérité, 210.<br />
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