Executive Summary - Fss.aero

9.
10.
When the pilot incapacitation happened, the first officer proceeded with the
11.
system at CKS International Airport.
However, the first officer failed to use
12.
The doctor on board performed first aid to the captain and found that the captain
13.
The first officer conducted the flight with autopilot. The weather of the day was
fair and the aircraft was in airworthiness condition. Before the incident, no flight
crew had extra workload and the captain was under regular pressure of work.
(1.1,1.6.2)
airlines' incapacitation procedures and landed the aircraft safely with auto-land
emergency phraseology to report the serious incident. (1.1,1.15.2,1.15.6)
As the captain experienced the incapacitation, the flight attendants that entered
into the cockpit had good cooperation with copilot and kept performing cardio
pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) to the captain. (1.15.3)
had incontinence of urine, mydriasis, no heartbeat and pulse reaction. (1.15.3)
The CKS International Airport provided medical personnel and facilities and
maintained a medical cooperative contract with MinShen Hospital. The
CKS
Airport also provided procedures for seriously ill passengers to quickly pass the
immigration. However, there were no medical treatment operation procedures
established in CKS Airport. (1.13)
14. In the "Civil Aircraft Accident Procedure Highlights" of the CKS International
Airport, it stipulated that medical service in airport was the responsibility of the
contracted Mingsheng Hospital. However, the said
Highlights failed to describe
the duties and detailed procedures of the medical service team. (1.13,2.3.10.1)
15. The air traffic controllers at Taipei Area Control Center failed to understand the
message of incapacitation
sent by the first officer of the aircraft. They relayed a
wrong message of a seriously ill passenger to the airport authority. Again, the
first officer made requests twice to land on Runway 05-Left, however, the air
traffic controllers answered runway in use 06. It was observed that the air traffic
controllers failed to comprehend the message sent by the first officer and that
severely affecting the following emergency operations on ground. (1.15.6,
2.4.1,2.4.5)
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