(EU) and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR)? - FDCL

38
posedly successful foreign investment, buys
“only 2.89 percent of their resources for production and packing material in
Mexico. In constrast the Mexican manufacturing industry, which is not part of
the maquila-industry, still had in 1983 acquired 91% of its production resources
internally, in 1997 it was only 37%. Additionally, most foreign investment in
Mexico concentrates on this highly export-oriented sector. In short: We export
a lot, but our exports are not particularly Mexican.” 74
According to the Mexican economist Alberto Arroyo, as a consequence of
NAFTA “production chains were dissolved and production sites denationalized.” 75
Although during the first 8 years of NAFTA until 2002 Mexico had received 140
billion US-dollars in foreign investment, the majority of this inflow of investment capital
was appointed to M&A of existing firms and on top of that jobs were lost in the
national supplier’s chain. And the supposedly so successful maquila-industry has in
fact created jobs, but these jobs are:
“insecure and based on fixed-term contracts with long working hours and the
organization in unions is prevented by strong and illegal means of exerting
pressure. Additionally these jobs are highly dependent on the economic cycle
in the U.S. From November 2000 to March 2002 the U.S.A. was struggling
with serious economic problems, and 287,630 jobs were cut in the maquilaindustry,
somewhat less than half of the employment created in this sector
during the first seven years of NAFTA.” 76
Therefore, the connection, which is determined within the neoliberal consensus,
of the opening of markets, of FDI and of regional, national or even overall development
is anything but proven. Furthermore, this market supported association
between FDI and the direct impact on development of the investment-importing
country, like job creation, the extension of infrastructure, technological transfers,
stabilization, the creation or stimulation of national value creation chains and the
74 Own translation of the following original text: “nur 2,89 Prozent ihrer Produktionsbestandteile und
Verpackungsmaterialien in Mexico. Die mexikanische Manufaktur-Industrie hingegen, die nicht zur Maquila-
Industrie gehört, hatte 1983 noch 91 Prozent der Produktionsbestandteile in Mexico gekauft, 1996 nur noch 37
Prozent. Dazu kommt, dass sich gerade in diesen hochgradig auf den Export ausgerichteten Unternehmen die
meisten Investitionen aus dem Ausland konzentrieren. Kurz: Wir exportieren viel, aber das, was wir exportieren, ist
nicht besonders mexikanisch .” Taken from: Arroyo Picard, Alberto: Dürftige Bilanz. Was haben acht Jahre NAFTA/
TLCAN Mexico gebracht, ila No. 260, November 2002, p. 14.
75 Ibid., p. 15.
76 Own translation of the following original text: “...unsicher und basieren auf Zeitverträgen, die Arbeitstage sind lang,
gewerkschaftliche Zusammenschlüsse werden mit starken und illegalen Druckmitteln verhindert. Außerdem sind
diese Arbeitsplätze hochgradig abhängig vom Wirtschaftskreislauf der USA. Von November 2000 bis März 2002
hatte die USA mit schweren wirtschaftlichen Problemen zu kämpfen, und in der Maquila-Industrie sind 287 630
Arbeitsplätze verloren gegangen, etwas weniger als die Hälfte der Jobs, die in den ersten sieben Jahren des TLCAN
[NAFTA, Anm.d.A.] in diesem Bereich neu entstanden waren.” Taken from: Ibid., p. 15.