(EU) and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR)? - FDCL

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• Thirdly the WTO Dispute Settlement Body on November 10, 2003 167 also declared
US-import tariffs for foreign steel as illicit and again allowed the EU to cross-retaliate
up to an amount of 2.242 billion US-dollars 168 and
• Fourthly the EU on September 22nd – shortly after the “failure” of Cancún – reactivated
the three year old WTO-dispute with the U.S.A. referred to the so-called
1916 US Anti-Dumping Act, in order to also take “punitive or protectory measures”
in this case. 169
After the “failure” of Cancún and after it became clear that the multilateral negotiations
of the WTO could not be brought to an end within the schedule of the Doha
Agenda, the U.S. as well as the EU were increasingly able relax the lip services concerning
a “real multilateralism”, so that an intense activity of bilateral negotiations on
FTAs could start with selected countries of interest for the U.S. 170 and the EU. 171
It is neither a thematic nor a timely coincidence, but a reflection of the competition
between the U.S.A. and Europe in trade-related questions, that the EU, after
the “failure” of Cancún as well as the weakening of Europe in foreign trade due to
the weaker dollar and the strengthening Euro, is planning to activate the retaliatory
measures assigned by the WTO in the case of the “Foreign Sales Companies” as
well as the “US 1916 Anti-Dumping Act” dispute case, also in order to simply put
a stop to an impending rise in imports from the US caused by a falling dollar. Even
though the implementation of the WTO judgment is doubtful, as the “material damage”
caused is not directly restituted to the claimant and its realization depends on
the trade related countermeasures, the political dimension of this procedure should
not be underestimated.
The increasingly openly led trade competition between the U.S. and the EU has
167 “The Appellate Body, on November 10, 2003, issued its report on the complaints brought to the WTO by Brazil,
China, the European Communities, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland against the United States
- Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products. It upheld most of the Panel’s conclusions
that the U.S. measures were inconsistent with the WTO Safeguards Agreement and the GATT 1994”, http:
//www.wto.org/english/news_e/news_e.htm.
168 http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news_e.htm#248_259_abr, also see: http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/
issues/sectoral/industry/steel/pr101103_en.htm, http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/sectoral/industry/steel/
memo101103_en.htm.
169 “Three years after the US Anti-Dumping Act of 1916 was found incompatible with WTO rules, the EU is still waiting
for concrete signs that the US will repeal its condemned legislation. Confronted with persisting inaction, the EU has
decided to reactivate the arbitration process that will decide on retaliatory measures. [...] But, the persisting inaction
of the U.S. leaves the EU no other option than to exercise this right under the WTO.” EU seeks retaliatory and
protective measures in US 1916 Anti-Dumping Act dispute, Brussels, September 22, 2003: http://europa.eu.int/
comm/trade/issues/respectrules/anti_dumping/pr220903_en.htm.
170 Robert B.Zoellick: America will not wait for the won’t-do countries, in: FT, September 22, 2003, p .23, http:
//www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/2003-09-22-ft.htm.
171 See the revealing speach of Pascal Lamy: “Trade Crisis?”, European Institute, Washington, November 4, 2003,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla198_en.htm.