(EU) and the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR)? - FDCL

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88 which also speaks out against the European agricultural subsidies, 248 as well as the “trade and investment barriers” imposed by MERCOSUR. The Ibero-Amerika Verein, together with the BDI, founded in 1994 the Lateinamerika-Initiative der deutschen Wirtschaft (LAI-Latin America Initiative of the German Enterprises) in cooperation with the Deutschen Industrie- und Handelskammertag (DIHK employers’ umbrella organization), 249 which advocates a broad FTA between the EU and MERCOSUR. In this sense the “Declaration of Frankfurt” of the Lateinamerika-Konferenz der Deutschen Wirtschaft from May 14-15, 2003 demanded the following: “The Latin American countries will be explicitly encouraged in their efforts to promote structural reforms, privatizations, deregulation, liberalization and democratization. The creation and consolidation of a reliable juridical framework is of particular importance. [...} The German enterprises once again call on the EU-Commission to speed up the negotiations of the planned agreement with MERCOSUR. In order to succeed in the negotiations, a more flexible position is needed in the area of EU agricultural policy.” 250 On the side of European governments Spain is the first-ranking advocate of the planned agreement, and the treatment of foreign investment is the central issue here: “None of the EU countries with substantial investment in MERCOSUR want to cede terrain. Among those, e.g., in Argentina, Spain comes in first place (39%) followed by the U.S. (28%), France (7%), Canada (6%) and Italy (5%). Around the turn of the year [2001/2002, the author] the Spanish government besieged the Casa Rosada (seat of government) in Buenos Aires, in order to be able to transfer profits from Spanish companies in Argentina to Spain in foreign currency and not in devaluated Pesos. In July 2002 the Spanish members of the European People’s Party (EEP with parliamentarians from the German CDU/CSU and the Austrian ÖVP, among others) succeeded in persuading the 248 Peter Rösler, vice-director of the Ibero-Amerika Verein, speaks of “oversubsidized agriculture” in some industrial countries. See: Rösler, Peter: “Freihandel EU-MERCOSUR und FTAA bedroht”, http://www.iberoamerikaverein.de. 249 http://www.mebf.bdi-online.de/reddot/lai.htm. 250 Own translation of the following original text: “Die lateinamerikanischen Länder werden in ihrem Bestreben, Strukturreformen, Privatisierungen, Deregulierung, Liberalisierung und Demokratisierung weiterhin zügig voranzutreiben, ausdrücklich ermuntert. Von besonderer Bedeutung ist die Schaffung bzw. Konsolidierung verlässlicher rechtlicher Rahmenbedingungen. [...]Die deutsche Wirtschaft fordert die EU-Kommission erneut auf, die Verhandlungen des geplanten Abkommens mit den Ländern des MERCOSUR zu beschleunigen. Für einen Verhandlungserfolg mit dem MERCOSUR ist mehr Flexibilität in der EU-Agrarpolitik notwendig.” Taken from: http://www.lateinamerika-konferenz.de.
European Parliament to adopt a statement regarding Argentina, that demands help, refers to the cultural roots and to a particular human right in modern societies, the right to property.” 251 An addition: in Brazil Spanish corporations dispose of a FDI stock of currently 25 billion US-dollars, which represents a share of 14% of total foreign direct investment in Brazil. 252 The German government on its part has always pleaded for the interests of the German trade associations and, in the case of German interests in Brazil, can look back on a tradition of more than forty years. 253 From October 27-28 in Goiánia, federal state of Goiás, the 21st German-Brazilian Economic Meeting took place, organized by the BDI and its Brazilian partner organization CNI. 254 There it was regretfully stated that: “German participation in the total Foreign Direct Investment in Brazil has fallen from more than 25% to less than 7%.” 255 In order to confront this decrease in the FDI flows between Germany and Brazil, the communities from politics and trade gathered in Goiánia proposed the following: “The German side suggested that a bilateral investment protection and promotion treaty would further improve the conditions for foreign investment, especially for small and medium-sized companies, and asked for rapid ratification of the negotiated bilateral investment protection and promotion treaty. The Brazilian side stated that the issue is under review. It was agreed that the subject will return to the agenda of the next meeting. [...] The German side recognized the positive effect for further investment in Brazil potentially resulting from the adoption of the draft legislation on transfer pricing currently debated 251 Own translation of the following original text: “Denn keines der EU-Länder mit nennenswerten Investitionen im MERCOSUR will Terrain aufgeben. Darunter z.B. in Argentinien an erster Stelle Spanien (39%), gefolgt von den USA (28%), Frankreich (7%), Kanada (6%) und Italien (5%). Gleich um die Jahreswende [2001/2002, Erg.d.A.] belagerte die spanische Regierung die Casa Rosada (Regierungssitz) in Buenos Aires, um zu erwirken, dass die Gewinne spanischer Firmen in Argentinien nicht in abgewerteten Pesos, sondern in Devisen nach Spanien transferiert würden. Im Juli 2002 setzen die spanischen Mitglieder der Fraktion der Volksparteien (EVP, darin die deutsche CDU/CSU und die österreichische ÖVP) im Europäischen Parlament eine Entschließung zu Argentinien durch, in der Hilfe gefordert, auf die kulturellen Wurzeln verwiesen und insbesondere auf ein Menschenrecht in modernen Gesellschaften verwiesen wird, nämlich das Recht auf Eigentum.” Taken from: Küppers, Gaby: It takes four to tango. Nach dem Tango-Effekt hat die EU die Verhandlungsspur mit dem MERCOSUR verloren, in: ila No. 260, p. 33. 252 Valor Econômico, October 28, 2003. 253 Torrelli, Claudia: MERCOSUR for sale? The EU’s FTAA and the need to oppose it. Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) & Transnational Institute (TNI), Info Letter, Amsterdam, August 2003, p. 3. 254 http://www.encontrobrasilalemanha.com.br/ 255 REPORT OF THE 2003 GERMAN-BRAZILIAN ECONOMIC MEETING (XXX MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMISSION ON ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND XXI ENTREPRENEURIAL MEETING), see: http://www.iberoamerikaverein.de. 89
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Christian Russau Enforcement of int
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Preface Since the end of 1999 the C
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If the “Interregional Association
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8 Chapter 5: The enforcement of int
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10 1.1 Negotiations of the “Inter
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12 A similar agreement of the so-ca
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14 tute in the eyes of many countri
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16 amaraty, where the FTAA-negotiat
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18 free trade agreement between the
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20 at the UN Millenium Summit to ha
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22 on the possibility of a unilater
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24 tual contradictions between the
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26 fired. The workers union OGB-L,
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28 policy and EU development policy
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Chapter 2: Foreign direct investmen
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50% in 2002 as compared to the prev
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The reasons for propagating this co
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