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Proceedings 2002/2003 - IRSE

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EURORADIO AND THE RBC 41<br />

would be a problem as technology advanced; that<br />

was the philosophy behind the layered approach.<br />

J Mew (Thales) warned of the necessity for key<br />

management.<br />

J Harmer agreed with this stating that the object of<br />

encryption was to prevent communication.<br />

D Weedon (AMEC Rail) asked if there was a<br />

mathematical target level of security to protect<br />

against an unsafe event. He also suggested that if<br />

the comparable level of safety was as good as, or<br />

better than existing systems, no statistical analysis<br />

would be necessary.<br />

C Riley replied that although there is no specified<br />

target, it should be noted that the RBC could not<br />

override the interlocking. The potential for an<br />

incorrect movement authority to be given does exist<br />

and hence the need for encryption. He also agreed<br />

that it must be a widely held belief that there were<br />

safety benefits or development would not have got<br />

this far.<br />

J Harmer stated that a figure of one message<br />

falsely accepted in 40 years within Europe was<br />

generally quoted. Even with a determined hacker,<br />

the likelihood of acceptance of a false message was<br />

1 in 10,000 years.<br />

R E B Barnard (Alstom) referred to a recent report<br />

that concluded protection of communications<br />

systems required doubling each year to prevent<br />

malicious attacks and therefore GSM must be<br />

over-engineered to provide this level of security over<br />

the life of the system.<br />

D Djezzar commented that whilst efforts are made<br />

to provide system security by encryption, it is probably<br />

easier to affect system availability simply by<br />

bombarding the network with false information.<br />

J Harmer agreed that availability presents different<br />

hazards but loss of a base station to train link would<br />

bring the train to a stand; a fail-safe situation. He<br />

also challenged how often public networks fail<br />

because of malicious attacks.<br />

D McKeown (Independent Consultant) wanted<br />

some reassurance that there were real benefits to be<br />

gained.<br />

C Riley reiterated that the technology can<br />

overcome the difficulties and that there are real<br />

opportunities to not only make substantial cost<br />

savings but also provide network flexibility. The EPT<br />

team is working to deliver a rollout programme using<br />

the technology to the full.<br />

The President thanked Mr Riley and Mr Harmer for<br />

their paper and contribution to the subsequent<br />

discussion.<br />

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