A Review of FBI Security Programs

The manuals should clearly and in detail explain categories of security violations and
levels of punishment. The present system, which simply puts security violators on notice
that their actions can lead to discipline, is inadequate. Lastly, the manuals should require
input from SCMS into OPR, field office, and Headquarters investigations of security issues.
Currently, OPR can authorize Assistant Directors and Special Agents-in-Charge to
investigate serious classified information security breaches within their components. SCMS
should review the results of delegated investigations before final adjudication to ensure that
investigators understand the scope and impact of potential security breaches and to enhance
centralized collection of information about security breaches.
CONCLUSION
This section has outlined particular steps that should be taken to ensure document
security or at least make it much more difficult for disloyal employees to compromise
material that undergirds national security. Those steps and the reasons for them are
explained in greater detail in the appendices. However, the detail should not obscure the
broader point that security will never be effective unless Bureau personnel are trained to
appreciate the importance of the information that goes through their hands and the necessity
for tight controls.
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