A Review of FBI Security Programs
A Review of FBI Security Programs
A Review of FBI Security Programs
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in unrestricted administrative case files. These reports provide considerable detail about<br />
foreign intelligence assets, including their identities and activities.<br />
The <strong>FBI</strong>’s counterespionage efforts have been undermined by this lack <strong>of</strong> confidence.<br />
According to a Unit Chief, personnel charged with investigating espionage allegations<br />
generally do not upload case file information into ACS. The Chief also noted that they do<br />
not even solicit help with leads on ACS because on one occasion, when a lead was sent to<br />
a field <strong>of</strong>fice, new agents who covered the lead – unaware <strong>of</strong> the unit’s avoidance <strong>of</strong> ACS<br />
– uploaded information without restricting it. By complying with the <strong>FBI</strong> directive to<br />
upload, but apparently unaware <strong>of</strong> how ACS file restrictions operate, these agents<br />
compromised classified information. Other members <strong>of</strong> counterespionage units noted that<br />
databases have been created, separate from the <strong>FBI</strong>’s established systems, to collect, analyze,<br />
and protect data. These databases, which may exist throughout the <strong>FBI</strong>, operate outside the<br />
supervision <strong>of</strong> the Bureau’s security apparatus.<br />
Hanssen’s espionage has increased suspicion <strong>of</strong> ACS among Bureau personnel. Many<br />
persons interviewed suggested that the little confidence they had in ACS as a secure system<br />
<strong>of</strong> records evaporated after Hanssen. NYFO personnel feel vindicated for resisting Bureau<br />
policy that information be uploaded into ACS, and personnel in the Washington and<br />
Indianapolis Field Offices are frustrated for having sometimes uploaded information.<br />
Russian intelligence units in the Washington Field Office were apparently hard hit by<br />
Hanssen’s misconduct. Many <strong>of</strong> their sources were compromised. By contrast, only two<br />
human assets operated out <strong>of</strong> NYFO were put in jeopardy. These sources were imperiled<br />
because information concerning them was extracted from NYFO hard copy documents sent<br />
to other field <strong>of</strong>fices as leads and uploaded into ACS. It is not unusual for NYFO<br />
information to appear in ACS in this manner.<br />
It is difficult to gauge whether confidence in ACS can be restored. Some persons<br />
interviewed have suggested that confidence is shattered beyond repair and that the <strong>FBI</strong> will<br />
need to deploy a new, or at least renamed, more user-friendly system. Many interviewees<br />
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