A Review of FBI Security Programs

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Secure Areas. 27 However, access to those areas is not always well-controlled, and classified material moving to and from them may be vulnerable. At field offices, openly stored material may be accessible to personnel who do not need to know that information. Training in transporting and storing Secret material comes typically on-the-job, and document security practices vary widely from component to component. The FBI imposes no physical controls on disseminating and copying most categories of classified material within FBI space. Few units heed directives about placing classified material face-down when persons not authorized access are nearby, using cover sheets, destroying unneeded working copies, classifying and safeguarding needed copies, and maintaining protocols for securing computers, waste, notes, and security containers. Secret documents are often destroyed off-site in a fashion that does not completely protect against loss or theft. Security Officers assigned to assist with classified document issues are frequently undertrained and do not receive management support. FBI uniformed security police, who provide the primary line of defense against unauthorized entry at Headquarters and other facilities are understaffed, insufficiently trained, and ill equipped to deter improper removal of classified material. The authority of these officers is undercut by providing FBI executives with “gold badges” that allow them and visitors they escort to bypass normal security and by “executive escorted visitor badges” that allow uncleared visitors repeated escorted access. RECOMMENDATIONS I. Classified National Security Documents Should Be Handled And Stored In SCIFs And Secure Areas Segregated From Other Components And Available Only To Those With A Need To Know 27 A SCIF is a facility that has been constructed according to DCID standards and has received CIA accreditation. A Secure Area is an area with enhanced physical security protections, such as continuous protection by guards or alarm systems. -76-
Given the ubiquity of ACS, Headquarters should immediately undergo the formal review required for open storage of Secret material. The Bureau should train employees that compartmentation and need-to-know principles apply even in Secure Areas. Those principles should be enforced by ensuring that all components handling classified material operate in Secure Areas or SCIFs. Employees in those areas should be well trained and supported in maintaining security. Headquarters SCIFs and Secure Areas should be located on the same floor or in the same part of the building, segregated from components that do not routinely use such information. Access to these areas should be closely controlled. Field squads that handle classified material should be segregated in Secure Areas that cannot be routinely accessed by personnel with no need-to-know. II. The SACS Badge System And The FBI Police Program Should be Strengthened Access to Secure Areas and SCIFs should be controlled by Secure Access Control System (SACS) key-card scanning devices. Every employee entering a SACS area should be required to “badge in.” The SACS system should require personal identification numbers in addition to a badge scan. All passengers in car-pools entering Headquarters should be required to badge into the building. The FBI uniformed security police should be brought to full strength and trained to identify unauthorized and inadequately secured classified material being removed from Headquarters. The police should also be trained in security protocols and should conduct aperiodic checks of vehicles and carrying cases leaving Headquarters to emphasize the gravity of document security. They should also examine the photograph on every SACS badge entering Headquarters for a match with the bearer. The badges of non-employees with unescorted access should clearly note that the bearers are not FBI employees. “Gold badges” and “executive escorted visitor” badges should be eliminated. III. The FBI Should Enhance Protections On Handling, Copying, And Disposing -77-
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U.S. Department of Justice A Review
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Commission for the Review of FBI Se
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Contents Executive Summary ........
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The Commission for the Review of FB
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in FBI security programs that will
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Unlike other Intelligence Community
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INTRODUCTION I could have been a de
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un by an officer in the Soviet mili
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establishment, U.S. penetration of
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operatives he had exposed as double
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Hanssen was indicted on twenty-one
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een transferred to FBI Headquarters
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Gardens. The rebellious colonies di
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Furthermore, in spite of Hanssen’
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others.” In calling for the estab
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have discovered in FBI security pro
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The following is a compressed compi
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I. Security Investigations And Adju
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DOCUMENT SECURITY I. Classified Na
Page 39 and 40: of Central Intelligence Directives
Page 41 and 42: II. The Office of Security Should D
Page 43 and 44: INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY (INFOS
Page 45 and 46: Robert Hanssen’s espionage demons
Page 47 and 48: een filled, the persons assigned of
Page 49 and 50: with the preliminary damage assessm
Page 51 and 52: FBI was investigating him. 13 While
Page 53 and 54: focus. 14 As a result of inadequate
Page 55 and 56: in unrestricted administrative case
Page 57 and 58: On October 3, 2001, an Electronic C
Page 59 and 60: senior FBI officials responsible fo
Page 61 and 62: percent of the amount sought. 16 Th
Page 63 and 64: information security policies that
Page 65 and 66: PERSONNEL SECURITY I think that [my
Page 67 and 68: The Commission conducted a detailed
Page 69 and 70: The PSU is also responsible for adm
Page 71 and 72: Unit for new applicants, the Person
Page 73 and 74: various elements is spread througho
Page 75 and 76: addressed. These interviews are ess
Page 77 and 78: identified, these individuals can b
Page 79 and 80: overextended and potentially at ris
Page 81 and 82: The FBI’s polygraph program was i
Page 83 and 84: awareness programs relating to poly
Page 85 and 86: DOCUMENT SECURITY Security was lax
Page 87 and 88: Much of Robert Hanssen’s espionag
Page 89: Room. In the same year, the FBI Mai
Page 93 and 94: (SCI). Before being given access to
Page 95 and 96: eceived in the wake of recent terro
Page 97 and 98: under minimum security controls. Th
Page 99 and 100: carriers receive timely security cl
Page 101 and 102: with the true scope of improper act
Page 103 and 104: SECURITY STRUCTURE . . . [I]f I had
Page 105 and 106: In general, we found serious weakne
Page 107 and 108: executive will ensure constant focu
Page 109 and 110: technical security countermeasures.
Page 111 and 112: Eighty-five percent of those office
Page 113 and 114: months training in investigations,
Page 115 and 116: accounts cancelled. A six-hour secu
Page 117 and 118: Unfortunately, reporting to securit
Page 119 and 120: security violations should be subje
Page 121 and 122: and training. -106-
Page 123 and 124: Robert Hanssen’s treachery is hei
Page 125 and 126: Glossary of Acronyms Acronym ACS AD
Page 127 and 128: Acronym GSR HERU HIT HCS HQ HUMINT
Page 129 and 130: Acronym OPM OPR OPSEC ORCON OSI OST
Page 131 and 132: COMMISSION CHARTER
Page 133 and 134: time equivalent government personne
Page 135 and 136: WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, the Commission
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A Review of FBI Security Programs

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