- Page 1 and 2: U.S. Department of Justice A Review
- Page 3 and 4: Commission for the Review of FBI Se
- Page 5: Contents Executive Summary ........
- Page 9 and 10: in FBI security programs that will
- Page 11 and 12: Unlike other Intelligence Community
- Page 13 and 14: INTRODUCTION I could have been a de
- Page 15 and 16: un by an officer in the Soviet mili
- Page 17 and 18: establishment, U.S. penetration of
- Page 19 and 20: operatives he had exposed as double
- Page 21 and 22: Hanssen was indicted on twenty-one
- Page 23 and 24: een transferred to FBI Headquarters
- Page 25 and 26: Gardens. The rebellious colonies di
- Page 27 and 28: Furthermore, in spite of Hanssen’
- Page 29 and 30: others.” In calling for the estab
- Page 31 and 32: have discovered in FBI security pro
- Page 33 and 34: The following is a compressed compi
- Page 35 and 36: I. Security Investigations And Adju
- Page 37 and 38: DOCUMENT SECURITY I. Classified Na
- Page 39 and 40: of Central Intelligence Directives
- Page 41 and 42: II. The Office of Security Should D
- Page 43 and 44: INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY (INFOS
- Page 45 and 46: Robert Hanssen’s espionage demons
- Page 47 and 48: een filled, the persons assigned of
- Page 49 and 50: with the preliminary damage assessm
- Page 51 and 52: FBI was investigating him. 13 While
- Page 53 and 54: focus. 14 As a result of inadequate
- Page 55 and 56: in unrestricted administrative case
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On October 3, 2001, an Electronic C
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senior FBI officials responsible fo
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percent of the amount sought. 16 Th
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information security policies that
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PERSONNEL SECURITY I think that [my
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The Commission conducted a detailed
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The PSU is also responsible for adm
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Unit for new applicants, the Person
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various elements is spread througho
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addressed. These interviews are ess
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identified, these individuals can b
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overextended and potentially at ris
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The FBI’s polygraph program was i
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awareness programs relating to poly
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DOCUMENT SECURITY Security was lax
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Much of Robert Hanssen’s espionag
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Room. In the same year, the FBI Mai
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Given the ubiquity of ACS, Headquar
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(SCI). Before being given access to
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eceived in the wake of recent terro
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under minimum security controls. Th
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carriers receive timely security cl
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with the true scope of improper act
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SECURITY STRUCTURE . . . [I]f I had
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In general, we found serious weakne
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executive will ensure constant focu
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technical security countermeasures.
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Eighty-five percent of those office
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months training in investigations,
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accounts cancelled. A six-hour secu
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Unfortunately, reporting to securit
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security violations should be subje
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and training. -106-
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Robert Hanssen’s treachery is hei
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Glossary of Acronyms Acronym ACS AD
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Acronym GSR HERU HIT HCS HQ HUMINT
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Acronym OPM OPR OPSEC ORCON OSI OST
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COMMISSION CHARTER
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time equivalent government personne
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WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, the Commission